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An abundance of research suggests that demographic differences in criminal 
outcomes are prevalent at many stages of the criminal justice system (e.g., arrest, 
prosecution, conviction, and sentencing).  For instance, males are 1.7 times more likely 
than females to be arrested, and they are also 2.5 times more likely than females to receive 
a prison sentence.  Disparities are also evident by race.  Blacks make up 13 percent of the 
U.S. population, but account for 42 percent of those imprisoned.  Blacks also tend to 
receive longer prison sentences than white offenders.  Research has suggested that legal 
factors (e.g., crime type) cannot always account for these group disparities and that 
extralegal factors such as race and gender impact the legal decision-making process as 
well.  Although much is known about how race and gender assert an influence on various 
justice outcomes, there remains a gap in the literature regarding the replication of biased 
decision-making at a later stage of the criminal justice process:  post-sentencing.   
Using a sample of 2012 and 2013 prisoners released from a Southern state prison, 
this study examines the influence of an inmate’s race and gender on prison officials’ 
decision to issue an infraction as well as the influence of these extralegal factors on the 
type of sanction prison officials impose for the infraction.  Findings from a series of 
logistic regression and generalized linear mixed models demonstrate that there are race 
and gender disparities in who receives a formal prison infraction.  Sanction outcomes for 
these formal infractions, however, suggest that race and gender do not assert an influence.   
Rather, factors that account for variation in sanction outcomes are related to the 
characteristics of the infraction, characteristics that describe why the inmate is serving 
time in prison, and the security level of the sanctioning facility.  
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Unequal treatment in the criminal justice system is a topic of discussion that has 
ebbed and flowed over the years.  However, recently it has reclaimed mainstream interest, 
particularly with regard to race and gender differences in outcomes at all stages of the 
criminal justice process (e.g., arrest, prosecution, conviction, and sentencing).  In 
particular, high-profile, racially charged events have inundated the storyline, and a recent 
case in 2016 illustrates this point.  As many may recall, a Minnesota officer pulled over 
a 32-year-old black male driver because of his vehicle having a broken tail light.  In the 
car sat Philandro Castile, the driver, as well as Castile’s girlfriend and her 4-year-old 
daughter.  After a brief altercation between the officer and Castile, the officer discharged 
seven gunshots into Castile, fatally wounding him.  The reasoning for this violent action 
was the officer falsely perceived Castile as reaching for a hand gun. While this altercation 
was taking place, Castile’s girlfriend live streamed the entire incident on the Internet, 
demonstrating that the officer shot her boyfriend for what seemed like no apparent reason. 
The officer told investigators that he thought Castile had a gun in his hand and that there 
was no other option but to shoot him.  The outcome of this case resulted in a jury acquittal 
of the officer for the crime of manslaughter. Given this turn of events, we are left with 
the questions:  Did Castile’s race play any role in the officer’s decision to react in a way 
that ultimately took the life of an innocent man? Additionally, did the officer’s extralegal 
characteristics play a role in his acquittal? 
Unfortunately, viral images displaying authorities using excessive and oftentimes 
deadly force on black Americans, like that of Philandro Castile, is a theme that has 
emerged in the 21st century.  Cases like Michael Brown, Trayvon Martin, and Eric Garner, 
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to name a few, reaffirm that race has taken a new position in the mainstream dialogue 
surrounding crime and injustice in America and illustrate that bias in decision-making 
occurs at all stages of the process, even at points of first contact.  However, this disparate 
handling is not isolated to just race; it is also evident by gender.  In 2009, a young Native 
American female in Oklahoma named Patricia Spottedcrow sold a small amount of 
marijuana worth less than $20 to a police informant, a drug transaction that occurred 
while her children were present.  She was arrested and charged with distribution of a 
controlled dangerous substance.  After accepting a plea deal, Spottedcrow was sentenced 
to 10 years in prison.  Under Oklahoma state law, a crime of this level was punishable by 
a term of imprisonment of two years to life, but could have been subject to the provision 
of a suspended sentence if the conviction was for a first offense.1  Given that Spottedcrow 
had no prior convictions, her 10-year sentence took to the front pages of news outlets and 
left some questioning what led to this decision and the justness of this treatment.   
I use the specific cases of Philandro Castile and Patricia Spottedcrow to serve as 
a point, but not a narrow one.  Whether it is race, gender, age, sexuality, religion, or 
national origin, all groups of individuals are susceptible to unequal treatment.  In the case 
of Castile, his race elicited a source of fear in the Minnesota officer that arguably 
contributed to his reaction to discharge the seven fatal gun shots.  In the case of 
Spottedcrow, one can only speculate on the reason as to why the judge imposed such a 
harsh sentence for her first offense.  Was it her violation of gender norms, her minority 
racial status, or something still yet unknown?  When images of individuals like the two 
stories presented herein stream through national and local media outlets, this can 
                                                 
1 Penalties for distribution of a controlled dangerous substance are listed in Oklahoma law under 63 O.S. § 
2-401. 
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contribute to a cultural reproduction of race and gender discrimination (Barlow 1998; 
Entman 1992; Entman 2006).  This discrimination may serve to reinforce the stereotypes 
we have of others who are different than us, thereby enhancing an in-group/out-group 
mentality.  However, group discrimination is not a new concept; rather, it has been around 
for centuries (Omi and Winant 2005; Smedley 2007). 
Unjust criminal detainment and criminal sentencing are not the beginning nor the 
end of the conversation.  Similar stories of disparate treatment happen at all levels of the 
criminal justice system – from arrest, to prosecution, to conviction, to sentencing, to post-
sentencing.  Although events like those which unfolded for Castile and Spottedhorse have 
been distributed by the media, there are many more hidden injustices that occur on a daily 
basis.  Many of these injustices remain unseen by the general public, especially those 
which do not elicit such a moral outrage.  Whether the event is high-profile or masked by 
the everyday happenings of the seemingly normal American life, unfair treatment for 
certain groups is ever-present.   
In this research, I focus my attention on a related problem, but one that is 
embedded much deeper in the criminal justice process.  It is not as powerful of an image 
as the cases to which I referred; rather, it is one of the many daily injustices to which the 
general public are blinded.  And, although it may not necessarily appear in the mainstream 
dialogue on crime and punishment in the United States, its absence is not suggestive of 
its level of importance.  The related problem to which I refer is the possible disparate 
group treatment at post-sentencing.  Post-sentencing in this study refers to the sentencing 
for prison rule violations after an inmate is under custodial punishment.  Prior studies 
have shown that there is disparate treatment of blacks at every stage of the criminal justice 
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system, including: stops and searches, arrests, prosecutions and plea negotiations, trials, 
and sentencing (Mauer 2011; Rovner 2014).  Regarding gender, females are typically 
treated in a lenient manner when compared to males, and their lower representation at 
every stage of the justice system serves as support for this notion (Goulette et al. 2015).  
However, even in the face of extensive information on the disproportionate group 
representation throughout the justice system, there remains a substantial gap in the 
literature with regard to disparate rates at one specific stage of the criminal justice 
process: post-sentencing.  In particular, this research evaluates whether or not extralegal 
factors such as race or gender assert an influence on the frequency at which post-
sentencing rule violations (i.e., prison infractions) are issued and on the type of 
sanctioning an inmate receives for these rule violations (i.e., removal of earned credits).  
Thus, the overarching research questions this study aims to answer are:  Does race or 
gender influence prison officials’ decision to issue a prison infraction? Do these same 
characteristics influence the type of sanction a prison official issues for the prison 
infraction?  Although there are many types of sanctions for post-sentencing rule 
violations, the removal of earned credits may have more severe implications for the 
offender, the operations of the institution, and the public, and is why it is the sanction of 
focus in this study. 
This research is grounded in the Focal Concerns Perspective of sentencing 
(Steffensmeier et al. 1998) and is informed by the Selective Chivalry Thesis (Reckless 
and Kay 1967; Moulds 1978).  The Focal Concerns Perspective explains disparities in 
criminal sentencing on the basis that authorities of the criminal justice system are able to 
exercise discretion in their decision-making, and it is this discretion that contributes to 
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disparate group outcomes.  The Selective Chivalry Thesis supplements this perspective 
as it speaks to the conditioning effect of one’s adherence to stereotypical gender roles and 
its influence on the decision-making of authorities.  These schools of thought guide this 
study’s examination of prison infractions and subsequent sanctions to understand whether 
or not there is a replication of disparate outcomes for specific race and gender groups, 
outcomes which could have (unanticipated) consequences for the length of time an 
offender spends in prison.   
This research adds to the study of crime, criminal justice, and corrections in two 
primary ways.  First, it more fully explains (disparate) group outcomes visible throughout 
one’s journey through the criminal justice system.  Scholars and activists alike must work 
to uncover the cumulative race and gender disparity in criminal processes, one that I 
hypothesize to be larger than previous estimates indicate.  Second, the replication of 
disparate group treatment at post-sentencing could carry both fiscal and social impacts 
that have been previously unrealized.  These impacts may be significant considerations, 
as America’s use of prisons exceeds any other country in the world (Walmsley 2016), 
and existing policies that affect an inmate’s time to serve behind bars may have an undue 
contribution to this problem.  Additionally, prison overcrowding is of high concern, 
particularly in the Southern state corrections system that is of focus in this study.  Even 
more concerning is that certain groups of prisoners could have a disproportionate share 
of total earned credits deducted.  Not only would this have an impact on the number of 
days an inmate served behind bars, which points to the immediate financial implications,2 
                                                 
2 The Vera Institute of Justice’s report “The Price of Prisons: Examining State Spending Trends 2010-
2015” finds that the annual cost per inmate is $33,274. This annual cost, based on data from 45 states, 
equates to an average cost of $91.16 per day, per inmate. 
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but, more deeply, it could impact the inmate’s social future via its increased 
institutionalization of an individual.3  Although disparate race or gender treatment at post-
sentencing may not carry with it the same immediate visceral reaction that onlookers 
experienced with the injustice that occurred for Philandro Castile or Patricia 
Spottedhorse, it does not diminish the effect this action has on the criminal offender.  It 
also does not downplay the implications that race and gender bias have when extended 
beyond sentencing into post-sentencing situations.  
 In the subsequent chapters, I provide background support for this research as well 
as detail the trajectory of this study.  To begin, Chapter 2 presents the theoretical 
framework used in this research to explain why there exist race and gender disparities in 
society and, more specifically, in the criminal justice system.  Chapter 3 reviews extant 
literature on the construction and consequences of race and gender, paying close attention 
to the role each plays individually in the social dynamic of our society.  I also connect 
how the perception of race and gender shapes group disparities in the criminal justice 
system at all stages of the process, from arrest to post-sentencing.  Chapter 4 explicitly 
states the research questions this study aims to answer, and Chapter 5 outlines the 
methodological approach I use to accomplish this task.  Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 describe 
the findings from the analyses.  Chapter 8 discusses those results, providing commentary 
on how this research adds to and can influence future criminal justice policies related to 
treatment of demographic groups to which individuals belong.   
 
                                                 
3 Institutionalization is the experience of prison “encouraging criminal orientation among inmates” (Innes 
1997: 159).  It refers to "the assimilation of inmates into an inmate society within which a premium is 
placed on antisocial attitudes and behavior that tend to undermine any efforts of correctional practitioners 
to encourage prosocial change." (Thomas and Peterson, 1975:17). 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
Many criminological theories examine disparate outcomes in the criminal justice 
system from an offender-centric perspective, meaning individual-level factors are the 
focal reason for one’s criminal behavior.  For instance, some theorists have argued that 
the gender gap in crime is the result of females being more strongly bonded to 
conventional society, which makes them less prone to engage in deviance (Hirschi 1969). 
Other individual-level perspectives argue that females oftentimes internalize emotional 
responses to stressors, which mediate the relationship between strain and criminal coping 
(Agnew 1992; Agnew 2006).  Community-level factors such as neighborhood 
disorganization, on the other hand, have also been named as predictors of criminal activity 
(Shaw and McKay 1942).  This neighborhood disorganization accounts for some of the 
overrepresentation of racial minorities in the criminal justice system, as these 
disorganized neighborhoods oftentimes concentrate poverty and socially isolate racial 
minorities from the larger society (Massey and Denton 1993), factors which have been 
shown to be highly correlated with black violent crime (Shihadeh and Flynn 1996).  
Lastly, some criminological theories take a structural approach, focusing on the design of 
the criminal justice system as a contributing factor to disparate rates of incarceration.  For 
instance, the system portrays a biased view against the poor at every stage due its 
concentration on (or prosecution of) predatory acts of the poor and its de-emphasis on 
predatory acts of the well-off (Reiman and Leighton 2012).  Policies like the War on 
Drugs have also been a large contributor to recent changes in the gender representation 
in the system (Chesney-Lind 2006; Merolla 2008; Sharp 2014). Congruent with this 
thinking are arguments that it is not the just the offender’s actions that explain this pattern, 
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but rather society’s response to the offender’s actions that hold the answer.  In this regard, 
the drivers of disparate group representation in the criminal justice system are viewed to 
be policies and practices, implicit bias in decision-making, and structural disadvantages 
in communities with a high density of racial minorities, which are associated with higher 
rates of offending and arrest (Nellis 2016).   
With this perspective in mind, this research focuses on reactions to, rather than 
the etiology of, criminal behavior.  Not only does this study examine race differences in 
who received a prison infraction and the resulting sanctions for this infraction, but it also 
evaluates these same outcomes for males and females.  The primary theory used to frame 
this study is the Focal Concerns Perspective, but I also supplement this theory with the 
Selective Chivalry Thesis.  As I describe in the below section, the Focal Concerns 
Perspective places an emphasis on criminal justice authorities’ decision-making as 
contributors to group disparities in a variety of outcomes.  This perspective fits well with 
the current study, as post-sentencing is merely an additional stage in the criminal 
processing of individuals.   I first place an emphasis on its application to race then proceed 
into a discussion of its application to gender.  It is here, the application to gender, where 
I begin to weave in the tenets of the Selective Chivalry Thesis. 
 
Focal Concerns Perspective 
As mentioned by Sampson and Lauritsen (1997), Hagan (1987:426) asks an 
important question, “Why has race so preoccupied us in the study of the criminal justice 
system?”  In some instances, research has approached this topic through the lens of 
Conflict Theory.  A major tenet of Conflict Theory is that groups which pose a threat to 
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middle- and upper-class hegemony are likely to be subjected to social control because 
they are viewed as a threat to the ruling classes (Sampson and Lauritsen 1997).   This 
proposition, then, suggests that criminal law serves as an instrument to protect the 
interests of the powerful and the elite, where punishment is based on extralegal variables 
(e.g., race and gender) rather than on the legal facts of the case.  A reliance on extralegal 
factors over legal factors may point to discrimination.  A review of extant research on the 
role of discrimination in disparate outcomes in the criminal justice system, however, has 
in more recent years shown only minimal support for this simplistic notion (Hagan 1974; 
Hagan 1987; Petersilia 1985; Sealock et al. 1998; Steffensmeier et al. 1993; Tillyer and 
Engel 2013).  The most compelling evidence in support of discrimination as a cause of 
(race) disparities is the finding that discriminatory attitudes are the result of the social 
construction of a “moral panic” (Tittle and Curran 1988).  These moral panics are the 
manifestation of a perceived group threat.  Sampson and Lauritsen (1997:362) conclude 
that, although “racial discrimination emerges some of the times at some stages of the 
system in some locations…there is little evidence that racial disparities reflect systematic, 
overt bias on the part of criminal justice decision makers.”  This limited, time-bound 
support for overt racial discrimination in criminal justice decision-making leads me to 
examine other theoretical frameworks that would better guide our thinking on why there 
remain, to this day, race and gender disparities throughout all stages of the criminal justice 
system.  
The Focal Concerns Perspective explains disparities in criminal sentencing on the 
basis that authorities of the criminal justice system are able to exercise discretion in their 
decision-making.  Drawing from prior work by Miller (1958), Steffensmeier et al. (1998) 
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assert that there are “focal concerns” that judges use in decision-making in criminal 
matters.  These focal concerns pay attention to attribution (or qualities they associate with 
the offender) rather than overt racial discrimination.  Although the original framework 
pointed to disparities in sentencing among female defendants, others have expanded its 
framework to include explanations of race disparities as well (Hartley et al. 2007; Sharp 
et al. 2000).   
The focal concerns framework suggests that judicial decision makers rely on three 
key factors in determining appropriate sentencing for an offender’s crime:  the offender’s 
blameworthiness; the protection of the community; and practical constraints and 
consequences of the punishment.  Oftentimes judges are asked to make rational 
sentencing decisions even though they have incomplete information on the case and on 
the offender.  Judges experience “bounded rationality” and, thus, tend to develop 
patterned responses on an offender’s disposition toward future criminal behavior based 
on attributions that can be linked to extralegal factors (Albonetti 1991).   As a result, these 
patterned responses in decision-making become a perceptual shorthand, or a supposition, 
to assist decision-makers in settling on the best verdict for all parties involved.  They 
come from past experiences, stereotypes, and prejudices.  Steffensmeier et al. (1998) 
indicated that the shorthand can be linked to race, gender, and age.  Over time, these 
attributions may become routine guides that minimize the level of uncertainty a judge has 
in his or her decision-making (Farrell and Holmes 1991).  Below I provide detail on each 
of the three focal concerns. 
Blameworthiness refers to the offender’s culpability, which takes a retributive 
approach to punishment.  The punishment increases as the degree of injury to the victim 
11 
and the offender’s culpability for that injury to the victim increases.  This is primarily 
measured by the seriousness of the offense, but it can extend to the offender’s criminal 
history and his or her role in the offense (e.g., he or she was the primary/only perpetrator).  
If decision-making regarding an offender’s blameworthiness is tied to race, then this 
could provide a powerful explanation for the black-white gap in sentencing outcomes.   
Historically, blacks have been handled differentially.  This is not only illustrated 
in pre-antebellum times when behaviors of blacks were condemned, but if displayed by 
a white man were viewed as less problematic (Muhammad 2010).  It is also illustrated in 
the 21st century.  At one point, discriminatory federal sentencing policies for crack vs. 
powder cocaine resulted in a 100-to-1 ratio (Sklansky 1985).4  This disparate sentencing 
is particularly harmful to blacks, as crack cocaine use is high in inner-city black 
communities (Elliott 1993).  If this blameworthiness is tied to gender, then it also may 
serve as an explanation for the gender gap in outcomes.  Females, compared to males, 
tend to be treated in a more lenient manner due to the paternalistic protectiveness of the 
justice system actors.  These actors assume females need to be sheltered from experiences 
like jail and criminal court proceedings that are typically unfriendly to them and, 
alternatively, are more suitable to the male experience (Nagel et al. 1971).  However, it 
is noteworthy that this chivalrous treatment tends to be applied to white females, as black 
females oftentimes experience harsher treatment from the point of arrest to the point of 
sentencing (Bush-Baskette 2004).  
Protection of the community, or the dangerousness of the defendant, focuses on 
the need to incapacitate him or her to prevent any further harm through recidivism.  
                                                 
4 This disparity is now reduced to 18:1 as a result of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. 
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Decision-making authorities may rely on attributions based on case information, criminal 
history, facts of the crime (e.g., involvement of a weapon), and offender characteristics 
(e.g., drug dependency, family support).  For instance, Ulmer and Johnson (2004) found 
that blacks and Hispanics compared to whites were more likely to be sentenced to serve 
time in prison and for longer periods of time, outcomes that were conditional on the 
sentencing county’s black and Hispanic population.  The researchers suggested these 
findings were consistent with certain offenders being perceived as more threatening when 
coming from areas of high minority concentration.      
Practical constraints and consequences can refer to organizational-level facets 
such as the decision-maker’s concern for prison overcrowding and resources or concern 
for maintaining working relationships with other courtroom officials.  They can also refer 
to individual-level facets such as concern for the offender’s ability to serve his or her time 
(e.g., having a poor health status) and concern for the disruption of ties between the 
offender and the offender’s children.  Koons-Witt (2002) found that women with 
dependent children were significantly less likely to be imprisoned, a finding that held true 
pre- and post-implementation of sentencing guidelines that aimed to achieve equality in 
sentencing (discussed in more detail below).   
Steffensmeier et al.’s (1998) research supported the Focal Concerns Perspective 
in criminal justice decision-making.  They found that the main predictors of a judge’s 
decision were the seriousness of the crime as well as the offender’s prior record, race, 
gender, and age.  Even more telling, however, was the feedback collected during 
qualitative interviews with the decision-makers.  To paraphrase, some judges indicated 
that they were reluctant to send a white offender to prison out of fear that he or she would 
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be victimized by a black offender.  Additionally, judges viewed women and older 
offenders as less dangerous and less of a risk to community safety.  Overall, crime has 
been conceptualized as a minority problem (Reiman and Leighton 2012), and some 
leaders openly admitted to using race to signify one’s criminality.   Decision-makers’ 
perceptions of minority problems being concentrated in a specific space seem to reinforce 
the use of race as a screen for criminal attribution (Bridges et al. 1987:359).   
With this in mind, I use the Focal Concerns Perspective as a guide to suggest that 
extralegal factors lead to biased decisions on behalf of criminal justice authority figures 
in post-sentencing. I emphasize that it is a guide, because one of the three “concerns” is 
protection of the community.  Although, in prison, officials may seek to protect those in 
the prison environment, it does not carry the same weight as the duty to protect the 
community.  The community can be argued to be full of innocent individuals who all are 
potential victims.  In prison, protection is most likely translated into a maintenance of 
order.  
Although this study is framed with the Focal Concerns Perspective in criminal 
justice decision-making, I supplement this framework with the Selective Chivalry Thesis 
to further explain disparities by gender.  Females typically receive lighter sentences or 
informal handling when it comes to criminal processing; however, some research 
suggests that when gender norms are violated, then the punishment for females may be 
harsher (Chesney-Lind and Sheldon, 1998; Nagel and Weitzman 1971).  The Focal 
Concerns Perspective, to some extent, addresses this trend, but it is my position that the 
Selective Chivalry Thesis explains this particular point in a more robust manner.    
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To provide some background, as originally introduced, the Chivalry Thesis helped 
to explain a social pattern of paternalistic treatment of females (Reckless and Kay 1967; 
Moulds 1978). Females, traditionally, have received gentler handling due to the 
perception that they need protection, simply because they are different than males.  The 
agents of the criminal justice system treat females more paternalistically because (male) 
judges tend to associate female defendants with their own close relationships:  as their 
mothers, their sisters, their spouses, and their daughters (Visher 1983).  Females are 
oftentimes seen as weak, childlike, and defenseless and, therefore, are not held fully 
responsible for their behavior.  In turn, females may benefit from shorter punishments or, 
in some cases, their criminal behavior may not be prosecuted in exchange for an informal 
handling of their case (e.g., charges dropped if she completes a rehabilitative program).  
In some ways this may be to safeguard her from the stigma a criminal record carries, one 
that may have serious negative social consequences for her where society reacts in a way 
that isolates and punishes her (Schur 1984).  Research has suggested, however, that the 
effect of gender on sentencing outcomes is not consistent across all crime types 
(Rodriguez et al. 2006).  If it is not consistent across all crime types, then the thesis loses 
some of its explanatory power.  It is because of these contrary findings that I supplement 
the Focal Concerns Perspective with the Selective Chivalry Thesis, as its central tenets 
better explain the trends I hypothesize to exist. 
The Selective Chivalry Thesis, although in part similar to the Chivalry Thesis, is 
more encompassing in its explanation.  It is a modified version of the original Chivalry 
Thesis, which argues that chivalry is conditioned upon one’s adherence to traditional 
gender roles.  As females are viewed as weak and childlike, they can be subject to 
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paternalistic treatment – treatment from which females tend to benefit due to lighter 
criminal sentences (Daly 1987; Daly 1989; Farr 2000).  However, these benefits are 
afforded to females who fulfill stereotypical roles defined for their gender.  When females 
transgress from stereotypical roles, they are given harsher sanctions than one would 
normally expect.  Their transgression is viewed as a double deviance; they not only 
engage in crime, but also depart from gender appropriate behavior.  In other words, they 
are seen as evil women.   
The Selective Chivalry Thesis receives mixed support.  One study found that 
juvenile females who committed status offenses, such as prostitution or running away 
from home, were often treated more harshly by the justice system than males who had 
committed similar offenses (Chesney-Lind and Sheldon, 1998).  Nagel and Weitzman 
(1971) analyzed the impact of gender on sentencing on a nationwide survey of indigent 
defendants, concluding that more lenient treatment was given to females in grand larceny 
cases, but that females convicted of more “masculine” crimes (i.e. assaults) were more 
likely to receive sentences equal to those of similarly situated male defendants.  However, 
Spohn and Spears (1997) tested the hypothesis that gender played a lesser role in violent 
crimes, because these women had broken the stereotypes of appropriate female behavior. 
Their findings indicated that, even in violent felonies, females were more likely to receive 
shorter sentences.  The joint effects of gender and race, however, have suggested that 
women of color have not benefited from judicial chivalry to the same degree as white 
women (Feinman 1986; Rafter 1990). Lastly, Steffensmeier et al. (1998) found in their 
research that the main effects of defendant characteristics, like race and gender, were 
relatively modest compared to their interaction effects.  Thus, this Selective Chivalry 
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Thesis may only hold for specific race and gender combinations.  It is possible that a more 
nuanced explanation is needed to understand how the justice system treats females.   
I approach the gender component of this research primarily from the Focal 
Concerns Perspective, but utilize the Selective Chivalry Thesis framework to refine my 
thinking on the subject.  I hypothesize that the likelihood of receiving a prison infraction 
mirrors the gender gap seen at all prior stages of the criminal justice proceedings.  
However, in terms of the sanction imposed for this infraction, I hypothesize that the 
selective chivalry thesis accounts for a nuanced outcome.  For infractions that are 
categorized as lower severity, sanction outcomes for females are more lenient than those 
imposed for males.  But, when prison infractions are among those categorized as the 
greatest severity, sanction outcomes for females are nearly the same or even exceed those 














Chapter 3: Literature Review 
To understand group disparities in criminal justice system outcomes, it is 
beneficial to have an appreciation for historical race and gender relations in the United 
States.   I spend time discussing race and gender separately, highlighting the origins of 
these social constructs and the consequences they have for human social interactions.  
Then, I segue into a review of the literature regarding these group disparities in the United 
States criminal justice system.  I first begin with a synthesis of extant research on 
differences that are evident at various decision points in the criminal justice system, from 
arrest to sentencing.  I conclude with a discussion on the current state of research on post-
sentencing disparities, both for infractions and sanctions for these infractions.  In this 
vein, I address in more detail how this study aims to fill a substantial gap in the literature 
with regard to the prevalence of race and gender disparities at all stages of the criminal 
justice system. 
 
Race Relations in the United States  
Race has organized and divided Americans for centuries, and it has created 
injustices by denying groups of individuals of rights and resources in the name of cultural 
hegemony. Race is culturally defined and its utility is to preserve white privilege and 
American exceptionalism (Omi and Winant 2005).  I spend time introducing the concept 
of race and trace its evolution in America to shed light on how it has impacted current-
day minority oppression.  I ground the development of prejudicial ideas and racism in the 
historical antecedents of 17th and 18th century ethnocentrism and slavery, as this is a 
point of development of the race concept.  Following this discussion, I turn my attention 
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to modern-day colorblind racism, which appeared in the advent of the modern civil rights 
movement as a method to maintain the current racial structure in the face of opposition.  
It is my position that this unique history has shaped current-day race relations and has 
directly and indirectly contributed to the race disparities that are evident today in the 
American criminal justice system.   
 
Race and Ethnicity 
Before delving into the historical account of structural racism in America, I would 
be remiss to assume a universal understanding of the difference between race and 
ethnicity.  Race and ethnicity are at times used interchangeably in common vernacular, 
but they are indeed distinct concepts.  Race is a social construct that divides groups of 
individuals based on phenotypic differences such as hair texture, the color of one’s skin, 
and facial features. Ethnicity, on the other hand, is a common culture, lifestyle, value 
system, and language shared by a group of individuals.  Although race and ethnicity are 
separate in their own right, they overlap in that an ethnic group may be comprised of 
individuals of the same race (Smedley 2007).   
Considering these opposing definitions, one may question how an individual is 
grouped into a race category, especially if phenotypic features are not pronounced.  The 
answer to this question lies in the level of tolerance of an environment.  If an environment 
is not tolerant of group differences, then individuals are assigned to a race category 
through the observation of others.  If the social environment is accepting, then one is able 
to self-identify.  This notion of assignment versus self-identification is evidenced by 
historical trends in enumerations conducted by United States Census Bureau, where early 
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forms of collection were based on direct observation and more recent forms are based on 
self-identification (Snipp 2003). Even within self-identification, race categorization can 
be fluid, as individuals may assimilate to the larger culture’s values to make life easier in 
some way (Saperstein and Penner 2012).  
 
Historical Racism 
Using our understanding of race and ethnicity, we can better recognize the 
development of race from a historical perspective.  The concept of race started as a folk 
idea, a belief that was socially defined and not a fixed biological condition (Smedley 
2007).  By the 16th century, the term occupied the Spanish vernacular as a way by which 
to differentiate themselves from foreign groups whom they encountered during 
explorations.  By the 17th century, race (racism) began to occupy part of the American 
landscape beginning with the European colonization of North America.  In particular, its 
origin in North America can be traced to English-Irish tension in the Old World where 
the English viewed the Irish as savages in order to justify group exploitation and 
repossession of Irish-owned land.  Upon settling in the New World, the English continued 
this exploitation, but directed it toward Native Americans in order to seize their territory.  
Similar to the English treatment of the Irish, Native Americans were viewed as hostile 
savages who were in need of civilization – a view that, coupled with religious dogma, 
justified the English’s colonization of the natives’ territory. At this time, race became a 
social construct that carried a specific meaning, whereas earlier exploitation of the Irish 
was due to ethnocentrism.   
In the advent of the English colonization of the New World, blacks entered the 
nation from Africa as servants, some of whom came unwillingly.  They were not initially 
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viewed as savages like their Native American or Irish counterparts because they did not 
own land and, thus, were not a threat to white Europeans.  As some blacks occupied a 
permanent slave status that enabled white plantation owners to grow the economy and 
meet capitalist demands, however, the justification of their enslaved status solidified.  
Justification for this treatment ranged from religious beliefs that suggested blacks were 
subhuman to beliefs that unalterable biology determined blacks’ lower position in society 
(Omi and Winant 2005; Smedley 2007).  These views perpetuated racist behaviors and 
stripped blacks, both those enslaved and those free, of their rights and freedoms. They 
were disenfranchised and relegated to a lower social status to promote social control and 
cultural hegemony.  By the 18th century, even free blacks were degraded and relegated 
to the bottom of the social stratum (Smedley 2007).  They were stripped of common rights 
and freedoms due to discriminatory laws that prevented their owning of land and voting.  
In sum, blacks were not afforded the same equality enjoyed by whites. 
 
New Racism and Protection of the Social Order 
In 1863, a step was made to extend racial equality in America through the 
Emancipation Proclamation, which declared all persons held as slaves shall be free.  
However, it was not until the passing of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution in 1865 that slavery was completely abolished and that blacks were legally 
declared free and were afforded political rights.  The amendment not only intended to end 
human enslavement, but it also sought to eliminate effects of the slave system (Carter 
2004).  From this point up to the mid-1960s, poor treatment of blacks and racial 
segregation continued, but in more subtle, legal ways.  For instance, lingering Jim Crow 
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laws restricted blacks from using the same schools, drinking fountains, public entrances, 
and restrooms as whites.  This was a system that purported a “separate but equal” 
philosophy.5  Blacks, particularly those in the South, experienced a reality that actually 
rendered them powerless.  Their rights were restricted and they were economically 
dependent on white landholders (Smedley 2007).   
Around the 1960s, new social movements developed to combat racism through a 
transformation of racial meaning (Omi and Winant 2005).  Minority groups worked to 
achieve equality and to reshape the political landscape through a modern civil rights 
movement.  In response to this movement, and to maintain the prevailing racial order and 
American ideals of individualism, the government administration rearticulated race 
policies in an effort to redistribute resources along a racial line.  Affirmative action 
policies intended to compensate blacks for past mistreatment, and structural oppression 
became framed as reverse discrimination against whites.  Whites argued that these 
policies debilitated their social progress and encouraged the selection of non-whites 
solely based on race, not on individual qualities. As evidenced by the re-articulation of 
racial policies in the 1980s, the language and style of racism changed from earlier 
centuries.  The use of racism became contradictory and subtle to help build a wall for 
white Americans, and it engendered colorblind racism (Bonilla-Silva 2010).  
Although discrimination against blacks and other racial minorities persists today, 
it is now framed differently.  Whites, and some blacks, interpret and explain racial issues 
in such a way that minimizes and dispels its existence. For instance, Bonilla-Silva (2010) 
suggests that whites frame racism in a way that blames the individual and fails to 
                                                 
5 Plessy v. Ferguson 1896 
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acknowledge or completely dismisses the continued impact of past social structural 
injustices.  Whites attribute continued racial inequalities to culture and nature (e.g., black 
families are disorganized, blacks naturally stick together) and rely on colorblind ideology 
to articulate their views on racial matters.  Although blacks acknowledge the existence of 
discrimination, they, too, use colorblind frames to explain racial problems.  However, 
these blacks tend to be upwardly mobile.  Although this may be a perplexing notion, it 
has become part of blacks’ (double) consciousness (Bonilla-Silva 2010; Du Bois 
1995[1899]).   
Other viewpoints deviate from this explicit racial bias and point to the persistence 
of implicit or unconscious racial bias as influencing behavior.  Despite an individual’s 
best intentions, one holds prejudiced views toward others that oftentimes defy their own 
awareness (Smith and Levinson 2012).  It is a subtle thought, perhaps, that can negatively 
influence individuals’ judgements of others and can carry repercussions.   As we work to 
move away from explicit racist actions through policy changes (some of which are noted 
above), there will most likely be a persistence of unconscious or implicit racial biases that 
affect everyday interactions with others.  It is these implicit biases that continue to 
threaten the future of racial equality. 
 
Consequences of Racism 
As discussed, racial conflicts in the United States have deep historical roots, and 
these conflicts have consequences for racial minorities that are evident in the collective 
disadvantage of oppressed groups.  However, the consciousness of present-day 
Americans is stifled by the lack of a true understanding of America’s racist past.  Even 
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though the American Creed is equality for mankind (Schlesinger 1998), a long history of 
racist structural oppression and subhuman treatment for certain groups is a blatant 
contradiction of this motto.  Although there are different approaches to understanding 
prejudices in America, I assert that a focus on historical race relations in the United States 
is key to understanding the problem. 
Although blacks were emancipated from slavery in the late 19th century, group 
oppression persists.  As discussed above, racism and bias is not just a product of 
individual-level discrimination and prejudicial attitudes.  It is, in fact, more than this.  
Racism and bias is an outcome of patterns of socialization (Omi and Winant 2005).  
Structural features that exclude and exploit individuals coupled with oppressive 
ideological beliefs give rise to prejudices and racist acts. Racialized identity and racial 
consciousness is learned through rules of classification, and we are implanted into a 
racialized social structure that becomes our way of understanding the world (Omi and 
Winant 2005).  As discussed earlier, colorblind framing of group differences no longer 
focuses on the group.  Instead, the blame for shortcomings is placed on the individual.  
Instead of recognizing that black neighborhood racial segregation is a result of racist 
practices (e.g., redlining and block busting), it is viewed as a cultural and natural 
phenomenon (Bonilla-Silva 2010).  Instead of recognizing that the criminal justice system 
is disproportionately inundated by racial minorities, in part, due to racist policies (e.g., 
the now 18:1 sentencing disparity for crack cocaine vs. powder cocaine), the social 
problem is attributed to the higher frequency of drug use among minorities.  When this is 
the perspective of the masses, policies such as fair sentencing, racial mixing, busing, and 
affirmative action that work to alleviate racial disparities are no longer seen as necessary 
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because the outcome is motivated by individual desire and will.  Perhaps a quote from 
Michael Tonry (2010) is most fitting.  In his work, he mentions that the effects of social 
stereotypes and unrecognized biases about women and homosexuals were acknowledged 
and changed, but biases along the race line persist.  When questioning why America 
continues with its disparity-causing policies, he offers this (2010:294): 
It is that we white Americans as a class are so accustomed to seeing the world 
from the perspective of our own self-interest that we unconsciously support 
policies that ensure our social, political, and economic dominance. Anti-
immigrant policies are a vulgar recent example: people hostile to immigrants may 
talk about the rule of law and illegal immigration, but their real, underlying 
concerns relate to competition for jobs, fear of social change, and worry that their 
own well-being will suffer. 
 
Thus, Tonry highlights several thought-provoking themes within this quote, ideas that 
may help to guide our understanding of why there is a lack of awareness of its existence.  
Do we subconsciously attribute outcomes to specific minority races and to females to 
ensure dominance to the maintenance of a system as it currently is?   
Just as race has occupied a large role in the human social interactions in America, 
so, too, has gender.  Scholars have made great strides in explaining the embedded nature 
of gender in the current social structure, providing us with a better understanding of how 
gender inequality has come into existence and the reflexive process by which it is 
maintained.  This is now where I concentrate my attention. 
 
Gender as a Social Construct  
Gender is also a social construct that has organized and divided individuals for 
many years.  Since the early 20th century, researchers have made great progress in the 
conceptualization of masculinities and femininities, moving away from theories of 
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biological determinism to more complex interactional and structural-level influences of 
one’s masculinity and femininity.  Ultimately, gender is embedded in social processes 
and its creation has not only produced inequalities along the gender line, but these very 
social processes have been the source of inquiry for why gender inequality persists.   
I aim to define gender and sex, providing a thorough distinction of the two 
concepts.  With a clearer understanding of their differences, I turn to an overview of the 
conceptual evolution of gender from the early 20th century to the present.  Within this 
tracing of evolving conceptualizations, I examine the gender structure at the individual, 
interactional, and institutional levels.  I conclude with a discussion of the consequences 
of violating gender norms. 
 
Gender and Sex 
As I begin to explore the conceptual evolution of gender over the last 100 years, 
it befits the conversation to first define gender and clarify its distinct position from sex.  
Gender and sex are also frequently used interchangeably, similar to race and ethnicity, 
but they, too, are distinct concepts.  West and Zimmerman (1987) recognized the 
confusion early on and provided a framework that clarified the differences between 
gender and sex.  Within their framework, they identify three concepts:  sex, sex category, 
and gender.  According to these scholars, sex is the assignment of a person into a male or 
female category based on biological factors such as genitalia or chromosomal typing.  Sex 
category is an externally defined role that is achieved through displays seen as male or 
female.  Gender is the way in which one conducts him or herself and is recognized by 
others for performing attitudinal and activity norms for a sex category.  Under this guise, 
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gender is an achieved status of masculinity or femininity through interactions with others; 
it is something that people do rather than a biological trait they possess. With an 
understanding of the difference between gender and sex, I now turn my attention to how 
the conceptual framework for gender and sex has changed over time.  
 
Individual-Level Conceptualizations of Gender 
Prior to the mid-20th century, social scientists paid little attention to theoretical 
work on gender differences in humans.  Differences that did exist were thought to be the 
result of varying sex hormone levels (Risman and Davis 2013).  Some present-day 
scholars still have a strong bias toward biological factors as an explanation for different 
expressions of masculinity and femininity (Udry 2000), while others lean on biological 
differences that, although no longer relevant, perpetuate presumed sex differences (see 
Jackson n.d.). Nearing the mid-20th century, however, a departure from biological 
determinism of gender opened the door for research grounded in the social sciences.   
In the 1960s and 1970s, research began to measure sex roles through personality 
traits, but intellectual thought still did not separate gender from sex (Risman and Davis 
2013).  Sex role attitudes were conceptualized along a continuum that ranged from 
masculine to feminine.  In essence, if an individual was highly masculine, then by default 
he or she was low in femininity.  Bem (1974) later re-conceptualized this construct and 
identified masculinity and femininity as two different dimensions that a person could 
possess to different degrees.  Soon afterward, sociologists turned their attention to the sex 
role socialization of children (Risman and Davis 2013) as a basis for developing these 
personality traits.  From this perspective, boys and girls learned to be masculine or 
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feminine by the behaviors they were encouraged to adopt.  Male children were rewarded 
for displaying masculine behaviors and playing with masculine toys.  Female children, 
on the other hand, were encouraged to take on feminine behaviors and play with toys that 
were deemed appropriate for little girls.  
Although progress had been made during these periods with regard to individual-
level conceptualizations of gender, there was still much more to be explained.  Up until 
the 1970s, gender conceptualizations were relatively underdeveloped, which limited a 
concrete connection to the existence of gender inequality (Acker 1992). As I move into 
the next phase of gender conceptualizations embedded within social interactions, one can 
begin to make the linkage between gender and gender inequality. 
 
Interactional-Level Conceptualizations of Gender 
In the advent of the feminist movement in the 1970s, scholars began to move away 
from conceptualizing gender as a sex role or a personality trait.  They shifted their 
attention to a new structuralism approach that emphasized gender in the context of 
interactions.  Within this framework, gender is accomplished in our relations with others.   
West and Zimmerman’s (1987) foundational theoretical framework facilitated 
additional thought on the distinction between sex and gender within this interactional-
level conceptualization.  Their framework de-emphasized childhood socialization and 
focused on an individual’s accountability to “doing gender” in a way that coincided with 
his or her sex category.  This accountability to do gender also extended beyond oneself 
to others (Kane 2006).  Doing gender involves engagement in a dynamic process, one 
that is embedded in everyday interactions with others within specific contexts.  It is a 
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process of portraying one’s gender in a way that aligns with heteronormative conceptions 
of masculine or feminine attitudes and actions (West and Zimmerman 2009). To 
successfully do gender means that individuals are conforming to cultural conceptions of 
conduct to which they are accountable.  Again, within this framework, gender is 
something that we do rather than who we are.   
 
Structural-Level Conceptualizations of Gender 
My focus now turns to structural-level conceptualizations of gender, a perspective 
that identifies how gender inequality is created and maintained.  New structuralism 
emerged near the end of the 20th century, and it redirected the focus away from individual-
level factors and toward macro-level influences that create issues of gender inequality. 
Scholars around this time began to recognize that in order to understand gender we needed 
to conceptualize it as a social structure embedded in the individual, interactional, and 
institutional levels (Risman 2004). It is structural conditions that create and reinforce 
gender differences beyond any particular individual characteristic (Martin 2004; Risman 
2004; Risman 2009).  This thinking allows us to understand the ways in which our society 
has developed a hierarchical gender structure. 
Ridgeway’s (2009) work on how gender shapes social relations and creates gender 
inequalities provides a theoretical basis for how we have arrived at a stratified gender 
structure. And, in order to understand how society changes and resists change, we should 
consider how gender frames our social relations.  Individuals tend to define their self from 
the other through the recognition of social differences.  These contrasting social 
differences lead to stereotypes about how most people in a category will perform and 
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serve as a way to make sense of the world around us (Ridgeway 2009).  Eventually, these 
behaviors become institutionalized and reified as rules of behavior through their 
reinforcement in the media and our everyday lives.  As a result, hierarchical behaviors 
are identified that represent the ideal or hegemonic version of a category and create a 
gendered structure that differentiates opportunities and constraints along the gender line. 
With this particular gender framing in mind, we can better understand how 
culturally hegemonic beliefs come into existence, as this is an important component to 
the development and maintenance of gender inequality.  Connell and Messerschmidt 
(2005) provide a theoretical framework that speaks to the hierarchical gender structure 
which has allowed men to dominate over women.  Although there is a plurality of 
masculinities and femininities, the authors rest on the foundational concept that certain 
masculinities are more central to power and authority than others, which they term 
hegemonic masculinities.  They also assert that there are no complementary hegemonic 
femininities, as femininity is entirely subordinate; other scholars disagree (Schippers 
2007).  To reify this process, men are constantly scrutinized for the way they enact 
masculinity to prevent a loss of power that may come with behaving in alternative, 
feminine ways.  Men may also overcompensate when their gender identity is threatened 
(Willer et al. 2013) as well as work to instill appropriate masculine behavior in their 
children to uphold their accountability to the preservation of the social structure (see Kane 
2006).  The enactment of and accountability to these hegemonic behaviors is a reflexive 
process that not only is performed at the individual and interactional-level, but 
perpetuates the structural embeddedness of gendered expectations.   
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Violation of Gender Norms 
Gender and the roles to which individuals are prescribed to follow are well-
integrated into American society, and they are often accepted as the norm.  Eagly’s (1987) 
role theory of gender argues that traits of men and women come from a gendered division 
of labor, where men disproportionately occupy powerful, high-status roles and women 
disproportionately occupy homemaker roles. These typical roles generate stereotypes in 
the minds of all individuals.  Although the Women’s Liberation Movement of the 1970s 
worked to dispel typical images of what it meant to be a woman and broaden this 
perspective to something much more inclusive, gender stereotypes still exist, even if 
subconsciously.  These images of femininity and masculinity order social life and 
institutions in specific ways (Daly and Chesney-Lind 1988; Messerschmidt 1993; Schur 
1984), and whether or not these stereotypes manifest themselves in subconscious or overt 
actions, they still have serious implications for the sex division in this nation.  The 
consequences not only affect the home and family domain, but they affect other areas as 
well such as the workplace and, relevant to this study, the criminal justice system.   
When understanding gender disparities in the criminal justice system, we must 
underscore how the organization of gender norms shapes male and female involvement 
in crime (Steffensmeier and Allen 1996), as well as how it shapes decisions regarding 
punishment for that crime.   To elaborate, males may engage in crime/deviance to achieve 
masculinity, as the use of violence serves as a “masculine-validating resource” that 
maintains the separation between men and women (Messerschmidt 1993:83).  Although 
most men do not resort to criminal violence, law-abiding men may still commit a violent 
act when their masculinity is threatened by others.  For these men, being violent is a 
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gender performance (Harris 2000), and it may be one that is expected.  However, women 
who engage in crime are viewed as double deviants.  Not only are they deviant for the act 
of breaking the law, but they are also deviant because criminality is not consistent with 
the definitions of what it means to be female (Heimer and Decoster 1999).  I mention this 
point as it begins to shape our thinking on how criminal justice decision makers assign 
punishment.  In the criminal justice system, females are oftentimes handled in less harsh 
ways or even informally.  However, other research has indicated that younger females are 
perceived to fabricate reports of abuse, whine too much, and manipulate the court system 
(Gaarder et al. 2004), research that may point to no differences in their handling compared 
to males.   
As summarized above, these race and gender discourses provide insight into 
group disparity in the criminal justice system.  I now turn my attention to a deeper 
discussion of race and gender bias in criminal processing of individuals.     
 
Group Bias in the U.S. Criminal Justice System 
Race and gender disparities in criminal processing can, and do, stretch across 
many different aspects of the criminal justice system. Group differences are evidenced in 
rates of arrest, prosecution, conviction, sentencing, and post-sentencing.  For instance, 
black and Latino offenders sentenced in state and federal courts face significantly greater 
odds of incarceration than similarly situated white offenders, and they also receive longer 
sentences than their white counterparts in some jurisdictions (Spohn 2000).  Pettit and 
Western (2004) suggested that the risk of incarceration was six to eight times higher for 
black males. Spohn and Beichner (2002) found that males have 2.5 times greater odds of 
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receiving a prison sentence when compared to females, net of legally relevant factors. 
Although these demographic differences are ever-present, progress is being made, as 
group disparities are less than what was observed in the 20th century.  While studies 
evaluating the impact of legal and extralegal factors are mixed in their conclusions on the 
role extralegal factors really play in disproportionate representations in the system, 
Crutchfield et al. (2010:931) have a different opinion.  No matter whether the effect of 
race, gender, or age is small, medium, or large, they ask: “Can a nation which recites an 
official Pledge of Allegiance, which includes the words ‘with liberty and justice for all,’ 
reasonably conclude that any statistically significant differences in criminal justice 
outcomes based on anything but legal factors is acceptable?”  I continue in the same vein.  
The effect, no matter how large or small, must be understood and addressed.  
With this said, one may ask, what causes these disparate group outcomes in the 
criminal justice system?  As suggested in Chapter 2 as well as earlier in this chapter, I 
approach this research from a structural-level rather than an individual-level perspective. 
Merolla (2008) noted that critical criminology places an emphasis on the changing 
practices and priorities of law enforcement rather than on the individual-level 
explanations.  Instead of focusing on the etiology of individual-level offending, structural 
changes and how they affect the chances of arrest for certain groups of individuals are of 
focus.  These include the influence of the media as well as criminal justice policy makers 
in their shaping of the public’s opinion of crime and criminals.  For instance, in the advent 
of the Women’s Liberation Movement of the 1970s, the image of females in the context 
of crime began to change.  Media-driven notions that girls were becoming more like boys 
perpetuated a masculinization framework (Chesney-Lind 2006). This framework, also 
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supported by female scholars of the time (Adler 1975; Simon 1975), implied that girls 
were becoming more violent, more deviant due to the same forces that propelled men into 
violence now being available to women.  In essence, females had more opportunities, 
more motivation to commit crime.  Additionally, women were portrayed as becoming 
more violent, a myth substantiated by a dramatic increase in arrest rates; however, self-
report data did not reflect this trend (Chesney-Lind 2006).  Changes to policy resulting in 
mandatory arrests and increased prosecution of women for domestic violence incidents 
(Chesney-Lind 2006), or the War on Drugs, were actually identified as playing a key role 
in the closing of the gender gap in arrests in the past 40 years. Thus, the structural-level 
perspective is key.  
These structural-level policies and images of criminality shape our opinions and 
create bias, bias that may manifest itself in a variety of ways at different levels of the 
process.  Nellis et al. (2008) suggested that, in policing, it may manifest in poor 
community interactions; in the courtroom, it may manifest in the way in which a 
defendant is addressed.  Bias in the prisons may, for example, manifest in a disciplinary 
official deciding to formally cite an inmate with an infraction.  And this biased decision-
making is oftentimes something that occurs outside of one’s own awareness.  Ultimately, 
when authority figures are afforded with discretion in decision-making, then bias is 
unavoidable.  Nellis et al. (2008) noted, however, that overt racial bias in decision-making 
has declined and that disparities are the result of lingering polices and decisions that 
unintentionally and indirectly produce these results.   
Few studies have been able to examine the cumulative effect of race and gender 
bias throughout the system, as offenders are not followed for lengthy periods.  
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Longitudinal studies are costly and require a significant amount of time.  Not to mention, 
they are subject to participant attrition.  Instead, the bulk of the research examines 
criminal case processing at a single decision point.  Kutateladze et al. (2014) attempted a 
longitudinal approach to better understand the impact of group characteristics at 
successive stages of the system.  They found black and Latino defendants to be more 
likely than white defendants to be detained, to receive a custodial plea offer, and to be 
incarcerated, but to be more likely to benefit from case dismissals. The findings for Asian 
defendants were less consistent, but suggested they were the least likely to be detained, 
to receive custodial offers, or to be incarcerated.  Shernock and Russell (2012) found that 
there was less favorable treatment of males but more impartial treatment toward racial 
minorities regarding the issuance of protection orders, an arrest, and formal prosecution. 
In broad terms, then, blacks are over-represented at many stages of the criminal 
justice process when compared to whites.  However, females are much less likely to be 
formally involved in the criminal justice system than their male counterparts.  A summary 
of these disparate group representations across various stages of the criminal justice 
system is presented in Tables 1 and 2.  I turn my now turn my attention to four key points 
in the criminal justice system to highlight the knowledge gained from prior research on 
group disparities throughout the system. 
 
Arrest 
Race/ethnic and gender bias insert their own influence on the criminal justice, an 
influence that cannot be overlooked.  National survey data suggest that the majority (59 
percent) of Americans believe that bias in police stops is a social problem (Ludwig 2003).   
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Table 1. Race/Ethnicity Disparity Matrix6 
Decision Point Black Hispanic Native American White 
Arrest7 0.27 0.15 0.02 0.56 
Detention8 0.35 0.14 0.01 0.48 
Sentence Type -----  -----  -----   ----- 
Probation9 0.30 0.13 0.01 0.55 
Incarceration10 0.42 0.22 n/a 0.36 
U.S. Population11 0.13 0.18 0.01 0.61 
Note:  Figures represent percentages; Other races omitted as sources do not consistently report these categories. 
 
 
Table 2. Gender Disparity Matrix6 
Decision Point Male Female 
Arrest7 0.73 0.27 
Detention8 0.86 0.14 
Sentence Type  -----  ----- 
Probation9 0.75 0.25 
Incarceration10 0.93 0.07 
U.S. Population11 0.49 0.51 
Note:  Figures represent percentages 
 
When examined by the respondent’s race, a higher proportion (85 percent) of blacks 
agreed it was a problem where only 54 percent of whites were in agreement12.  Thus, 
public perception is that there is bias at the initial stages of the criminal justice process, 
but the perception differs by the race of the respondents.  Unfortunately, data are not 
available for public opinions on gender profiling; however, empirical research does 
                                                 
6Matrices adapted from Nellis et al. (2008) as a manner in which to determine the extent of disparate group 
representation at each stage of the criminal justice system.  
7 United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation.  2015.  "Crime in the United States, 
2015."  Retrieved October 2, 2017, from https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2015/persons-arrested/persons-arrested. 
8 Minton, Todd D., and Zhen Zeng. 2016. "Jail Inmates in 2015." Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice 
Statistics. 
9 Kaeble, Danielle, and Thomas P. Bonczar. 2016. "Probation and Parole in the United States, 2015." 
Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
10 Carson, E. Ann. 2018. "Prisoners in 2016." Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
11 U.S. Census Bureau. 2016. "Annual Population Estimates of the Resident Population, July 1, 2016." 
Retrieved October 2, 2017 from https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045216. 
12  Gallup conducted 1,044 telephone interviews from a randomly selected sample of adults in the 
continental U.S. The survey was open from December 2002 through February 2003.  Roughly an equal 
numbers of black and white respondents participated. Survey results maintain a 95% confidence level with 
a margin of sampling error not greater than ±5%. By race, the margin of sampling error is ±6% for white 
respondents (n=505) and ±6% for black respondents (n=501). 
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address disparities in actual arrests by gender (Sealock and Simpson 1998; Smith et al. 
2006; Tillyer and Engel 2013) 
Although explicit racism by police is now relatively rare, racial disparities in stops 
made by the police can be explained by discretionary decisions based on racial 
considerations. The motivation is not necessarily driven by a dislike for minority groups. 
Rather, decisions are based on beliefs about group criminality, a thought that is in line 
with the focal concerns perspective.   Race (and gender) is a criminal shorthand that leads 
to more suspicion of racial minorities (Harris 2002).  The perceptual shorthand has also 
led to biased policies that have a disproportionate effect on blacks and females (e.g., 
disparate sentences for crack cocaine; the War on Drugs).  Smith et al. (2006) found 
support for this perceptual shorthand by way of police developing unconscious, cognitive 
schemas that make them more likely to be suspicious of criminal subgroups with whom 
they regularly come in contact.  These researchers concluded that police were found to 
be significantly more suspicious of men than of women in traffic-stop encounters, 
suspicion that was strongly associated with the decision to arrest.  Tillyer and Engel’s 
(2013) study aligns with this research, finding that males were 1.7 times more likely to 
be arrested compared to female drivers, while females were more likely to receive just a 
warning.  Race effects in this study were less conclusive.  Sealock and Simpson (1998) 
also found that females were less likely to be arrested than their male counterparts, with 
the gender-typing variable having explained a large portion the decision to arrest.  
Nevertheless, legal factors (i.e., seriousness of the offense and the number of prior police 
contacts) mattered as well.  Lundman and Kaufman (2003) found that extralegal factors 
impacted police action, evidence that race is a factor that shapes daily police work.  
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Findings indicated that black drivers reported more traffic stops than did white drivers, 
while Hispanic drivers reported fewer stops.  However, when considering the reason for 
this traffic stop, both blacks and Hispanics were less likely than whites to view the reason 
as legitimate and that the officials acted improperly.  Females, compared to males, on the 
other hand were more likely to view the stop as legitimate and report that the police acted 
properly.   
Some argue that the disparate group representation in arrests is not driven 
primarily by bias.  Blumstein (1982) recognized that arrests were subject to 
discriminatory processes, but argued that arrest data mirrored the racial distribution of 
criminal offending for the crimes which offenders were incarcerated.  Although some of 
the arrest percentage could be attributed to racial discrimination, he concluded that the 
bulk of the racial disparity in arrests was due to a substantially greater involvement of 
blacks than whites in crime.  Harris et al. (2009) also concluded that the social 
environment that fosters disproportionate involvement in crime was a more fruitful 
avenue to pursue, as evidence indicated that the disparate representation of blacks, whites, 
and Hispanics in prison and in arrest statistics closely corresponded.  The close alignment 
of these statistics suggested that racial discrimination may not be the key driver.  
However, Mitchel and Caudy (2015) concluded from self-report data that racial 
disparities in drug arrests could not be explained by differences in drug offending, non-
drug offending, or residing in communities that were subject to a high level of policing.  
Although the authors did not say that the disproportionate arrests were due to racial bias, 
exactly, they did acknowledge that the findings were consistent with this explanation.  
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The bias, they argued, stemmed from discriminatory polices such as the War on Drugs 
that disproportionately held blacks (and females) accountable, as discussed above.   
Differences within gender by type of crime for which males and females are 
arrested also appear in the data.   Black males were found to be more frequently arrested 
on drug charges than black females or whites, and females were found to have a higher 
likelihood of repeat arrests for prostitution (Horowitz and Pottieger 1991).  Although it is 
recognized that visibility in the latter finding does not directly indicate bias in the system, 
it does lend itself to a closer examination of prejudices of society.  Prostitution is treated 
as criminal as a result of the paternalistic gender bias against immoral females.   
In summary, public opinion as well as official statistics support the notion that 
there are disparate group outcomes in arrests by race and gender.  Overall, some racial 
minorities are more likely to be arrested than whites, while females, when compared to 
males, are less likely to be arrested.  Biased views that decision makers have toward these 
groups may play a role.  I now turn my attention to group disparities in prosecutorial 
proceedings.   
 
Prosecution 
In this brief section, I focus on prosecutorial decision-making with regard to the 
decision to detain an individual, the decision to charge an individual with a crime, and 
the decision to offer a defendant a plea deal.  The process of prosecuting an offender is 
inclusive of many steps, most of which occur “behind closed doors,” thereby potentially 
contributing to unequal group outcomes (Mauer 2011:92S).  Although explicit racism as 
a motivation for these disparate outcomes may be diminishing, as mentioned above, the 
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impact of implicit racial bias can still appear at all phases of the prosecutorial process.  
As Smith and Levinson (2012) suggest, prosecutors oftentimes consider societal 
conceptions of an individual’s culpability, which may be based on the defendant’s 
extralegal attributes.  These associations between an individual’s race or gender and 
whether or not he or she is guilty are oftentimes automatic, both on behalf of the 
prosecutors and the potential jury members if the case proceeds down that path.  Thus, 
one’s decision to charge the individual and develop a strategy for doing so are dependent, 
in some ways, on these implicit and stereotypical viewpoints.  From the alternative 
perspective, an individual may receive ineffectual representation due to bias that seeps 
into the attorney-client relationship (Lyon 2012). 
 Empirical research demonstrates that group differences in decision-making at this 
general state of criminal processing do exist.  Since the 1970s, there has been an increase 
in the prosecution of females for domestic violence incidents (Chesney-Lind 2006). By 
gender and race, Spohn et al. (1987) found that males, and particularly Hispanic males, 
were the most likely to be prosecuted to the fullest extent. Additionally, although females 
were the least likely to be prosecuted, there were differences when considering her race.  
White females compared to black females experienced lower prosecution rates (19 
percent and 30 percent, respectively).   
Although studies on prosecution as whole suggest race and gender disparities in 
who the courts pursue and how the courts handle certain individuals, some scholars have 
advocated for decomposing the prosecution process to fully expose the breadth of the 
disparity (Kutateladze et al. 2014).  This is to better understand differences which exist 
by who is charged, who is detained, who receives a case dismissal, and who receives a 
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plea negotiation.  For instance, Starr and Rehavi (2013) found that federal prosecutors 
were two times as likely to charge black defendants.  However, a more detailed look into 
the initial charging process showed that females were more likely than males to receive 
a charge reduction, but that there were no differences in this event when comparing racial 
minorities to whites (Schumer and Johnson 2010).  For those who were charged, females 
and younger defendants were less likely to be detained during the pretrial stages of 
prosecution (Freiburger and Hilinski 2010), while black and Hispanic defendants 
compared to white defendants were more likely to be detained after being charged with a 
crime (Demuth 2003).  After being charged, blacks and Hispanic defendants were more 
likely than whites to be offered a plea negotiation (Kutateladze et al. 2014).  For those 
who reach a jury trial, other concerns arise with regard to how a jury is selected, a 
selection that has the potential to alter procedural outcomes.   Anwar et al. (2012) find 
that all-white juries convicted black defendants at a higher rate, but that the presence of 
just one black juror eliminated this disparate effect.    
Studies on prosecutorial decision-making suggest that bias in decision-making is 
evident at this stage of the justice system as well.  Although, it is important to examine 
the many points within prosecution to fully identify the extensiveness of race and gender 
disparities.  Some may argue that prosecutorial outcomes can have a residual effect that 
is evidenced in conviction and sentencing, a point in the process that I discuss next.   
 
Conviction and Sentencing 
There is a lengthy history in the United States with regard to disparate sentencing 
practices and attempts to standardize punishment.   Prior to federal reform in 1984, federal 
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judges had broad discretion in criminal sentencing, with the only bounds provided to them 
being maximum penalties (Gertner 2010; Wilkins et al. 1991).  Thus, judges were free to 
enforce a wide range of punishments, providing them with the freedom to impose their 
individual views of effective sentencing on the offender.  As a result, presiding judges 
enforced a wide range of sentences even among similar offenses.   
In 1984, the Sentencing Reform Act provided a dramatic change in sentencing 
law and practice.  Its principal features were to: 1) establish a comprehensive and 
coordinated authority for sentencing; 2) to address the problem of unwarranted disparity 
in sentencing and to enhance crime control by creating an independent commission that 
created mandatory sentencing guidelines; and 3) to create a means for assembling and 
distributing sentencing data for research and education (USSC 2017).   This act was 
embedded within the broader Comprehensive Crime Control Act in the same year.  As a 
result of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the independent commission that would 
create and oversee mandatory sentencing guidelines became known as the United States. 
Sentencing Commission (USSC).  The USSC soon enacted the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines with the end goal of promoting honesty in federal sentencing and reducing 
unjust disparities.  The formation of this authority was an attempt to better manage the 
lax governance of judicial decision-making and to limit and structure the discretion of 
these federal judges.  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provided a sentencing matrix 
that cross-tabulated information for both the offense level and the offender’s criminal 
history.  The recommended sentence lay at the point at which these two variables 
intersected.  These guidelines intended to ensure that similar crimes would receive similar 
sentences, and that decisions were made irrespective of the offender’s race, gender, 
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socioeconomic status, and geographic location.  It also found it inappropriate to consider 
of an offender’s education, employment record, family responsibilities, and community 
ties in the determination of criminal sentence.  The guidelines developed by the USSC 
were finalized in 1987.   
In years since the passage of this act, however, flaws in the design were realized.  
Not only did the sentencing guidelines carry their own discriminatory effects, but they 
also created frustration on behalf of the presiding judges.  Regarding inherent 
discrimination, and as an example, the guidelines disproportionally affected offenders of 
color.  In particular, and as mentioned earlier, offenders possessing crack cocaine were 
initially subjected to the same mandatory minimum sentence as offenders convicted of 
possessing one hundred times the amount of powder cocaine (Sklansky 1985), with crack 
cocaine carrying a penalty that was 100 times more severe than powder cocaine.13  
Regarding frustration on behalf of the presiding federal judges, these authorities felt that 
the guidelines severely limited their ability to evaluate the context of a case and 
administer an appropriate sentence. They were instructed to not consider extralegal 
factors, stated above, and to impose a sentence that was held within the matrix provided 
to them.     
As one of the principal features of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was to create 
a means for assembling and distributing sentencing data for research and education, this 
meant that the effectiveness of the sentencing guidelines could be evaluated.  In an 
analysis to assess judicial adherence to its guidelines, the USSC studied federal 
sentencing data to understand the consistency of sentencing outcomes as well as uncover 
                                                 
13 This is now reduced to a ratio of 18:1 due to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. 
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correlations between sentencing outcomes and demographic characteristics (USSC 2006; 
USSC 2012).   Their 2006 report revealed that nearly 86 percent of sentences conformed 
to the guidelines, a statistic that remained fairly steady when re-evaluated in 2012.  
Additionally, approximately 60 percent of sentences falling within the guidelines were 
imposed at the minimum, or bottom, of the applicable range.  However, when assessing 
the outcomes for demographic differences, results were less encouraging.  Demographic 
characteristics of the offender were found to be strongly correlated with federal 
sentencing outcomes, and the group disparities in outcomes had increased by 2012.  Male 
offenders were found to be associated with higher sentences than female offenders.  Black 
offenders were associated with sentences that were nearly five percent higher than white 
offenders, while offenders of “other” races were associated with sentences that were 
nearly 11 percent higher than white offenders.  When comparing sentence outcomes of 
Hispanics to whites, there was no statistical difference in their outcomes.   
A defendant’s race should not influence the sentence imposed after a conviction. 
Rather, sentencing decisions should rest on legally relevant criteria, if criminal justice 
outcomes are indeed just.  The USSC’s position on these disparate demographic outcomes 
is that, although some judges weigh factors such as the characteristics of the offense and 
the offender differently than other judges in similar cases, these outcomes are not 
suggestive of race or gender discrimination on behalf of the judges.   It is my position, 
that it is impossible to remove individual biases in decision-making.  While it may not be 
the sole contributor, I argue that bias cannot be denied as a contributor to these outcomes; 
judicial authorities are not immune to having stereotypes influence their decision-making.  
Although these stereotypes of others may not manifest in overt discriminatory behavior, 
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it is conceivable to say that they do hold an implicit bias that defy his or her own 
awareness (Smith and Levinson 2012). 
Independent scholars have reached similar conclusions on the role of extralegal 
factors in the judicial decision making processes even though the mechanism by which 
they have an influence is debated (e.g., bias).  Steffensmeier et al. (1998) analyzed the 
independent and joint effects of race, gender, and age on sentencing practices in 
Pennsylvania.  They concluded that (young) black males, when compared to whites, 
received the harshest sentences – both in terms of incarceration and length of sentence.  
This finding remained significant when controlling for prior criminal history, offense type 
and severity, and year in which the offender was convicted.  Everett and Wojtkiewicz 
(2002) also found racial disparities in sentence severity after controlling for offense-
related characteristics, a finding which they attributed, in part, to racial biases.  In 
contrast, some research suggests that there are few racial differences in sentencing 
outcomes (see Petersilia 1985), but Steffensmeier and Demuth (2000) challenged these 
findings by suggesting that the reason for inconsistent findings on the relationship 
between race and sentence outcomes was due to differences in research methodologies.  
The authors suggested that Hispanics are usually grouped into the white category and, 
thus, dampen the black-white group difference in sentencing outcomes.  Their follow-up 
research found that Hispanic offenders actually received harsher sentences than whites 
and blacks.  By the same token, blacks received harsher sentences than whites.   
With regard to gender, females that do reach the point of conviction typically 
receive preferential treatment, a finding that is consistent across vast research.  When 
compared to other extralegal factors such as race/ethnicity and age, gender is interpreted 
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as the most powerful (Steffensmeier et al. 1998).  In his work on sentencing disparities 
among offenders convicted in federal courts, Mustard (2001) found that females tended 
to receive shorter sentences than males and that this disparity was even greater than the 
sentencing disparity between whites and blacks.  The reason for this gap tended to be 
related to departures from sentencing guidelines rather than differential sentencing within 
these guidelines.  Within gender, these departures accounted for 67 percent of the male-
female differences (Mustard 2001). 
Although there is a consistent gender gap in sentencing, there is less clear research 
regarding whether the gender gap is uniform across all crime types.  A large question 
remains about whether or not females who violate traditional gendered roles receive 
harsher sentences than do females who commit crimes that are more closely aligned with 
their gendered role expectations.  Research on this topic has suggested that females who 
violated traditional gender stereotypes (e.g., engaging in crimes that are typically 
committed by males) were more likely to receive harsher sentences than females who 
committed crimes that were stereotyped as female, such as shoplifting (Daly 1994).  
However, Rodriguez et al. (2006) found that the effect of gender by crime type on 
sentencing was not as straightforward.  Although females who committed drug and 
property crimes were less likely to be sentenced to prison and for shorter periods of time 
than their male counterparts, they did not experience this same benefit when it came to 
violent crimes.  Even though they received shorter sentences for these violent crimes, 
they were just as likely as males to be sent to prison.   
Despite the fact the federal government implemented sentencing guidelines to 
address disparities in sentencing based on factors outside of legal facts of the case, the 
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role of the federal sentencing guidelines has become less pronounced over time, as some 
Supreme Court cases have relegated the guidelines to an advisory status.  Instead, the 
importance placed on offense and offender characteristics has become more prominent.  
Additionally, these federal sentencing guidelines have little impact at the state level. 
States have implemented their own commissions, some of which are still active and others 
which are not.  As of 2008, 21 states had active sentencing guideline systems (Kauder 
and Ostrom 2008); although, there is no universal agreement on what constitutes active 
participation in this system.  Thus, state-level and even federal-level data, for that matter, 
may be more subject to group disparities in sentencing than intended.   
Having traced the extent of differential group representation from arrest to 
sentencing, I now turn my attention to a review of current knowledge in terms of the 
replication of this these disparate group trends in post-sentencing.    
 
Post-sentencing: Infractions 
It is well documented that there are race and gender disparities that occur in the 
criminal sentencing process, as outlined above.  However, less research is available about 
how these disparities are replicated in post-sentencing processes.  Post-sentencing, in this 
study, refers to the point at which an offender is under custodial supervision, during which 
time he or she may violate a prison rule.  This rule violation may lead prison officials to 
file a formal infraction and subsequently sanction the inmate for this behavior.  Sanctions 
may include decisions to revoke a suspended sentence or, for those in prison, decisions 
to delay prison release through the deduction of his or her earned credits.  As this study 
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focuses on inmates found guilty of violating prison rules as well as sanctions for these 
violations, the proceeding discussion reviews the literature accordingly.  
A prison infraction refers to the violation of a prison rule or regulation that serves 
to govern an inmate’s behavior while he or she is incarcerated.  These rules and 
regulations are typically not considered to be a violation of the federal or state penal code, 
but they are to be followed by each inmate while under custodial supervision to manage 
behavior and maintain order in the prisons.  Incurring a prison infraction may be thought 
of by some as the continuation of the inmate’s criminal career, while others may view 
prison as an environment that encourages adaptation into this criminal subculture (Innes 
1997; Cihan et al. 2017).  In many cases, it can be argued that one’s prison misconduct is 
the result of existing maladaptive social responses.  At the same time, the prison 
environment may be viewed as a mechanism that exacerbates and, at times, teaches new 
maladaptive responses.  This mentioned, it is the intent of this research to look beyond 
these factors as reasons for incurrence of prison infractions.  Instead, my attention is 
directed toward group disparities in the issuance of infractions and whether or not there 
is bias how sanctions are imposed.  It is important to note that this particular state’s prison 
system has a three-tier infraction severity classification system:  Class 1, Class 2, and 
Class 3 infractions.14  Class 1 infractions are the least severe and include acts such as 
gambling, possession of tobacco, and failure to comply with rules of community-based 
placement.  Class 2 infractions are moderately severe and include acts such as inmate-on-
inmate assault or destruction of property.  Class 3 infractions are the most severe and 
                                                 
14 A full listing of institutional infractions effective at the time data for this study were collected can be 
viewed in Appendix A.   
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typically include conduct that is the most egregious (e.g., killing another person; inmate-
on-staff non-consensual acts).   
  Prior research related to the influence of extralegal factors on the issuance of 
formal prison infractions tends to predict which inmates are at risk for engaging in prison 
misconduct.  In their meta-analysis of prior studies on the correlates of inmate 
misconduct, Steiner et al. (2014) found that an inmate’s background characteristics (e.g., 
age, gang membership, mental health problems), institutional experiences (e.g., prior 
prison misconduct, time served), and prison characteristics (e.g., prison security level) 
predicted prison misconducts.  Cunningham and Sorensen (2007) specifically found that 
age, sentence length, offense conviction type, gang affiliation, prior prison violence, and 
prior prison experience were predictive of violent institutional infractions among state-
level, male-only prison inmates in Florida.  Unfortunately, this research did not shed light 
on disparate rates by race.  Rocheleau (2013) concluded from her research on state prison 
inmates in Rhode Island that “pains of imprisonment” such as boredom, safety concerns, 
and conflicts with staff tended to predict one’s risk of serious misconduct.  Other research 
has assessed the effect of federal- and state-level prison programming on the reduction of 
prison misconducts (Langan and Pelisser 2002; Pompoco et al. 2017).   
 
Post-sentencing: Sanctions 
 Once an offender is found guilty of a prison infraction, a variety of mechanisms 
are available to sanction or punish the undesirable behavior. This may include a monetary 
fine, restricted visitation rights or canteen privileges, or placement in disciplinary 
segregation for a specified amount of time.  He or she may also be subject to the deduction 
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of earned credits which the inmate has previously accrued, the sanction of interest in this 
study.  I expand on this below. 
Many state prisons within the United States have policies that award an inmate 
with early release from prison:  clemency, parole, and earned credits.  Both clemency and 
parole require an act of leniency by an authority outside of the corrections department, 
and these acts may be of higher profile and more visible to the general public.  Being 
granted early release due to the accrual of credits is a process that some may consider less 
“politically volatile,” as they are regarded as a necessary process to incentivize good 
conduct among inmates (Larkin 2013:40).  Inmates can accrue these credits for 
participation in productive activities or for following prison rules (NCSL 2016).  They 
are a mechanism by which an offender is able to earn early release from prison based on 
past conduct, and they have been found to be as a useful tool for “penological, fiscal, and 
humanitarian purposes.” (Larkin 2013:2).  Earned credits may include a variation of the 
following:  jail time, good conduct, and achievement credits.  Although each type of credit 
has its unique criteria for application, in broad terms, these credits are days an offender 
earns that are applied to her or his sentence as time served, thereby gradually reducing 
the number of days he or she spends in prison (Edwards 2001).   
Although all inmates are admitted into prison and their sentence (translated into 
days to serve) establishes an anticipated discharge date, this discharge date can be updated 
based on the number of credits the offender has earned or lost.  For instance, in this 
Southern state’s correctional system, if an offender abides by the rules set forth for him 
or her, then he or she is able to achieve an earning status of four good conduct credits 
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(days) for every one day served in prison.15  This is the equivalent of four days of time 
served even though only one calendar day expires.  For example, inmates examined in 
this study, who were eligible to earn credits, accrued enough earned days to exit prison 
after having served, on average, 40 percent of their prison sentence.  Other states allow 
the inmate to earn up to 30 days per month for participation in an education program 
(NCSL 2016).  By having earned 30 days, the inmate would have completed 60 days of 
his sentence: 30 days for program participation and 30 days for the actual time served.   
Inmates can receive these credits for a variety of reasons, such as serving time in 
county jail prior to being transferred to the state prison, exhibiting good behavior in 
prison, completing rehabilitative programming, and maintaining employment while in 
prison.  In this Southern state’s correctional system, the good conduct credit accrual 
potential for an inmate varies by his or her classification level; although, some inmates 
are excluded from earning credits for a period of time (more on this in a moment).  
Regarding the classification level, this prison system has a 4-level classification system 
that is based on an inmate’s time in prison as well as his or her behavior in all areas of 
institutional life.  As an inmate progresses through the classification system, he or she is 
subject to earn more credits. For instance, inmates typically enter prison at a level 2, 
meaning they have a baseline earning potential of 22 credits per month, or roughly per 
every 30 days; level 3 inmates may earn 33 credits per month, and level 4 inmates may 
earn 44 credits per month.  An inmate increases his or her class standing the longer he or 
she is in prison.  As long as the inmate remains free of disciplinary infractions by 
conforming to prison rules, then he or she is eligible to accrue these credits.  Other 
                                                 
15 These earning levels are set according to state law.   
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mechanisms for earning credits (e.g., completing an institutional program) may result in 
a one-time application of 30 credits.     
Once an inmate disrupts this good behavior, however, he or she is subject to 
having a quantity of earned credits removed.  The severity of the deduction is dependent 
on the severity of the misbehavior/infraction.  For the most severe infraction level (Class 
3), the deduction of earned credits ranges from one to 365.  For the moderate infraction 
level (Class 2), the deduction of earned credits may be as few as one and as many as 120.  
Lastly, the least severe infraction level (Class 1) is subject to a loss of one to 60 earned 
credits.   
Post-sentencing sanctions, specifically the deduction of earned credits, could 
impact the length of time an offender remains behind bars, as I have mentioned.  Limited 
research sheds light on how the denial or deduction of earned credits is distributed across 
race and gender.  A review of the literature identifies three key studies that address this 
topic.  Crouch (1985) examined the significance of minority racial status in discipline 
severity for prison infractions and concluded that minority status (i.e., systematic 
discrimination) played no significant role in officials’ decisions on punishment severity.  
Rather, punishment severity was best predicted by inmate deviant behavior (i.e., total 
offenses while in prison and the number of times the inmate appeared before the 
disciplinary committee) and anti-social attitudes toward authority. Crouch’s findings, if 
taken alone, suggests that disparate race outcomes realized at all former stages of the 
criminal justice process do not extend to post-sentencing.  Although Crouch provided a 
great foundation for us to understand the role of one’s race on prison officials’ post-
sentencing decisions, there are some limitations of this research.  First, the study’s sample 
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was inclusive of only male offenders who fell between the ages of 17 and 21.  It did not 
allow for a discussion of the effect of being female on incurring a prison infraction.  
Additionally, the small sample size (n=124) limited the conclusions about effects for 
Hispanics, as they made up only 17% (n=21) of the final sample, and Native Americans 
who were not a part of the study at all.  The current study provides an adequate sample to 
examine these groups.   
In a more recent study, Frase (2009) found that, in Minnesota, the effects of 
delaying prison release by denying time credits modestly increased the black-white 
disparity in sentences from what was present at the time of initial sentencing. While he 
arrived at this conclusion, he also noted that Hispanic whites were not separated from 
non-Hispanic whites, which may have dampened the black-white effect because 
Hispanics had higher arrest, conviction, and incarceration rates. Although this research 
suggested that differences in time credit distribution contributed to the disparate 
population make-up of state prisons, this study could have benefited from a more 
thorough examination of if and how different race categories predicted whether or not 
time credits were disproportionally deducted; more so, gender differences should have 
been addressed.   
Lastly, during preparation of the current study, Steiner and Cain (2017) published 
their work on the same topic using data from a Midwestern state prison.  Specifically, 
similar to the current study, they sought to more fully understand factors that influenced 
prison officials’ decisions to remove good time credits in response to rule violations.  The 
researchers concluded that officials were primarily influenced by the seriousness and type 
of rule violation as well as the inmate’s history of rule violations rather than extralegal 
53 
factors such as race or gender.  Although their research is very similar in nature to the 
current study, I suggest that my approach helps to build on Steiner and Cain’s (2017) 
findings for several reasons.  The current study aims to estimate in greater detail the effect 
of removing an inmate’s credits by examining all credits earned, not just good time 
(conduct) credits.  I also examine a sample of prisoners who released from prison to 
quantify the full impact of credits removed on total time in prison.  The authors of the 
prior study only examined current incarcerates who were convicted of a rule violation 
during their full term of imprisonment, or only the first five years of confinement if they 
had been in prison longer than this time frame.  Where my study contributes the most is 
in terms of 1) the sheer frequency at which this Southern state prison system of interest 
sanctions offenders to a loss of earned credits, and 2) the study’s research design.  Steiner 
and Cain noted that removing good time credits in their Midwestern state prison system 
was rare (only 6 percent of all incidents examined).  The Southern state prison system in 
this current study subjected approximately 52 percent of its rule-violating inmates to this 
sanction.  Steiner and Cain also evaluated a two-level hierarchy of effects, examining 
incident-level and inmate-level factors.  This current study employs a three-level design, 
simultaneously examining not only incident- and inmate-level factors, but facility-level 







Chapter 4: Statement of Problem and Research Questions 
A wealth of evidence suggests there are race and gender disparities at many stages 
of the criminal justice process, but little research exists regarding the replication of this 
disparity at post-sentencing.  Studies that have been conducted are relatively more recent 
additions to the field and leave room to a paint of fuller picture of the problem.  Thus, a 
continued examination of outcomes at this phase of the criminal justice process is 
warranted, as it speaks to the extensiveness of the issue at hand.  It also further illuminates 
the social and financial implications of (disproportionately) housing offenders in prison 
for additional days as the result of deducting credits earned by the inmate.   
Government data characterizing America’s reliance on incarceration as a tool to 
manage criminal behavior further explains the magnitude of this study.  Over the last 40 
years, United States’ state incarceration rates have nearly quadrupled, a response 
primarily due to changes in drug laws that began in the 1970s and continued for two 
decades.  To clarify the sheer number of individuals affected, in 1980, approximately 
300,000 offenders were under the jurisdiction of state correctional authorities nationwide 
(BJS 1982).  By 2016, this number had grown to over 1,300,000 inmates (Carson 2018).  
Even more startling is the disproportionate incarceration rate of certain groups of 
individuals.  For instance, nationally, blacks make up 13% of the U.S. population (U.S. 
Census 2016), but they account for an overwhelming 42% of all incarcerated offenders 
(Carson 2018).  However, even in the midst of this mass incarceration trend, females have 
consistently accounted for a marginal percentage of sentencing and imprisonment 
statistics.  Currently, females make up 51% of the U.S. population (U.S. Census 2016), 
but they account for only 7% of all U.S. state-level incarcerates (Carson 2018).  
55 
Given this disproportionate group representation in the state prisons, the effect of 
filing a rule violation and sanctioning an inmate to lose earned credits in disproportionate 
ways could have major consequences.  Not only could it contribute to prison 
overcrowding, but it also could have adverse consequences for those affected.  As of 
2016, 47 states had policies that awarded inmates with credits (NCSL 2016), suggesting 
that if disparate outcomes are found to exist among this study’s sample data, then other 
states would be remiss to not examine their own processes and their larger implications.  
A descriptive analysis of all inmates in this Southern state’s prison system suggests that 
there may be a race and gender disparity for those who received a formal prison infraction.  
Among those who exited prison between calendar years 2012 through 2013, 52 percent 
of blacks received an infraction, compared to 45 percent of Native Americans, 41 percent 
of Hispanics, and 40 percent of whites.  By gender, just over 45 percent of male inmates 
received a formal prison infraction compared to 37 percent of females.  Given these 
statistics, research of this type is important to provide a deeper look into this disparity.  
Findings may help inform policies and reduce group inequalities in outcomes.   
Using the Focal Concerns Perspective informed by the Selective Chivalry Thesis, 
I investigate the impact of an inmate’s race and gender on how prison infractions are 
issued, with an additional inquiry into the type of sanction one receives for the incident.  
In light of prior research that also found a relationship between age and criminal justice 
outcomes, the analyses in this study account for the independent and joint influence of 
this highly influential variable coupled with race and gender as well.  This is an important 
examination because any disparities realized at post-sentencing would extend the 
estimated race/gender gap visible today throughout the criminal justice system.   
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This study focuses on four primary research questions.  All aim to examine race 
and gender disparities in post-sentencing (i.e., prison infractions and sanction outcomes).  
Due to the differences in sanction severity across the infraction classes Class 1, 2, and 3, 
I segment the data by this variable for each research question pertaining to punishment 
outcomes.  The research questions are: 
1. Are there race or gender differences in who incurred a prison infraction? 
2. For inmates who incurred an infraction, are there race or gender differences in the 
likelihood of receiving an earned credit sanction for this infraction? 
3. For inmates who received an earned credit sanction, are there race or gender 
differences in the quantity of earned credits deducted? 
4. For inmates who received an earned credit sanction, are there race or gender 
differences in who received the maximum earned credit penalty? 
For research question 1, I hypothesize that racial minorities are more likely than 
white offenders to receive a formal prison infraction; females are less likely than males 
to receive a formal prison infraction. For research question 2, I hypothesize that racial 
minorities are subjected more often than whites to the loss of earned credits as a penalty 
for their infraction; females are sanctioned less often than males, but only for less 
egregious infraction classes (Class 1 and Class 2).  For the most egregious infraction class 
(Class 3), the female-male disparity is reduced.  For research question 3, I hypothesize 
that racial minorities have, on average, more earned credits deducted than white 
offenders; female offenders have, on average, fewer earned credits deducted than male 
offenders, but only for less egregious infraction classes.  For the most egregious classes, 
female-male disparity in the number of credits removed is reduced.  For research question 
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4, I hypothesize that racial minorities have increased odds of being sanctioned to the 
maximum earned credit penalty when compared to whites; females when compared to 
males have reduced odds of being sanctioned to the maximum earned credit penalty.  
However, for the most egregious class, the female-male disparity in receiving the 
maximum earned credit penalty is reduced. 
These research questions enable me to assess whether or not there are quantifiable 
differences by race and gender in who received a prison infraction as well as in the type 
and severity of sanctions received.  The results may point to a replication of disparate 
punishment in the criminal justice process at the point of post-sentencing, where racial 
minorities are more likely to incur an infraction and to be sanctioned more harshly than 
whites, and males are more likely to incur an infraction and to be sanctioned more harshly 













Chapter 5: Methods 
Data 
This study uses official data collected by a state corrections department in the 
South.  State-level data and, furthermore, this particular state prison system are ideal for 
many reasons. At the time of this study, state-level incarceration was a large contributor 
to the overwhelming number of imprisoned offenders in the United States (Carson 2014; 
Carson and Golinelli 2013).  Disparate outcomes realized at this level may be more 
impactful than those experienced in federal prisons due to the sheer volume of inmates 
under state supervision.  Secondly, inmates imprisoned at the state level at the time of 
this study were subject to earning credits, a key outcome in this study.  Lastly, this 
particular prison system ranked high in terms of its incarceration rate when compared to 
other state prison systems in the United States (Carson 2014; Carson and Golinelli 2013).  
An effect realized among these sample data could have large social and financial 
implications for similarly situated state prison systems.   
  Data for this study come from a database used by the state corrections 
department personnel to track administrative information on adult inmates under its 
supervision.  This database contains information on facility characteristics, inmate 
demographics, prison infractions, sanctions for the infraction, and prison infraction 
reports. The base sample includes inmates who released from this state prison during 
calendar years 2012 and 2013 (n=15,695).  Inmates who released from prison represents 
a key population, as I am interested in understanding not only if there are disparate 
outcomes for specific groups, but how these outcomes influence the overall length of time 
59 
an inmate serves behind bars.  Impacts to the overall time an inmate serves behind bars, 
as mentioned above, may carry financial and social implications.  
  
Samples 
To answer the research questions, I utilize three distinct prison inmate release 
samples: 1) all prison releases; 2) all prison releases who incurred an infraction and were 
eligible to receive an earned credit sanction; and 3) all prison releases who incurred an 
infraction, who received an earned credit sanction, and were eligible to lose the maximum 
number of credits allowed by the infraction class.  These three distinct inmate samples 
are required, as this study begins with one group and then dives deeper into its subsets to 
address subsequent stages of the infraction and sanctioning process. 
 The first sample addresses the first research question (RQ.1):  “Are there race or 
gender differences in who incurred a prison infraction?”  Eligible offenders include 
inmates who exited prison between 2012 and 2013 (n=15,695).  However, data are 
oftentimes subject to entry errors and these state prison data are no exception.  A validity 
check of the ratio of the inmate’s sentence to the inmate’s time served in prison suggests 
that some inmates served over 100 percent of their sentence (n=1,025; 7 percent).  Others 
served 0 percent of their sentence (n=202; 1 percent). To insure the quality of the data, I 
exclude these observations from the analysis.  Additionally, due to sample size 
limitations, I continue the data reduction process.  Race/ethnicity includes the following 
categories:  African American, Asian, Caucasian, Hispanic, Native American, Pacific 
Islander, and Other.  For the purpose of this analysis, I omit Asian, Pacific Islander, and 
Other inmates, as they collectively make up less than one percent of the total sample 
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(n=67; <1 percent).  Although their outcomes are important on a substantive level, their 
small numbers do not allow for statistical analysis. Next, I omit inmates under a delayed 
sentencing program for young adults (n=128; <1 percent), as their prison experience is 
markedly different than the general inmate population.16  The total data reduction process 
results in 1,422 (9 percent) inmates being removed, leaving a final sample for RQ.1 of 
14,273 inmates.   
 The second sample, a subset of inmates from RQ.1, aims to answer research 
question 2 (RQ.2):  “For inmates who incurred an infraction, are there race or gender 
differences in the likelihood of receiving an earned credit sanction for this infraction?”  
Although RQ.1 is the starting sample from which RQ.2 comes, the data structure is 
different.  I shift from a wide data structure to a long data structure.  The number of 
inmates is reduced because I only retain inmates who incurred an infraction.  However, 
the number of observations per inmate increases due to my examination of multiple 
incidents within an inmate.  As such, my sample of 14,273 inmates narrows to just 6,431 
inmates, but these 6,431 inmates incurred a total of 29,927 infractions.  Not all 
observations, however, are eligible for inclusion in the analysis due to important policy 
stipulations that affect the outcome of interest.  Specifically, departmental policy 
provisions requires an inmate to have accumulated at least one earned credit before being 
eligible for have an earned credit removed.17  Of the 6,431 inmates, only 6,355 inmates 
                                                 
16 Per statute in this Southern state, inmates in the Program have no official sentence imposed by the courts.  
The courts delay sentencing for, at minimum, 180 days to, at maximum, 365 days, pending the completion 
of the Program.  Additionally, this Southern state prison system’s policy requires inmates participating in 
the Program to be assigned to Level 1, a level that accrues 0 earned credits per month. 
17 Per policy, an inmate must have accrued, at minimum, the number of credits to be deducted (e.g., an 
inmate cannot be sanctioned to lose 300 credits if he or she only had a net credit balance of 265).  Because 
of this policy, it is unknown with the data available if an inmate did not receive this sanction type due to 
insufficient credits available or due to some other factor (e.g., the sanctioning authority did not see it fit to 
deduct earned credits).    
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(29,295 infractions) had accumulated at least one earned credit at the time of the 
infraction, which thereby excludes 76 inmates (1 percent) and 632 infractions (2 percent) 
from the analysis.  I also omit inmates who served life sentences (n=68/512; 1 percent/<2 
percent).  The earning and deduction of earned credits for life sentence inmates potentially 
carries a different meaning in terms of reward and punishment, and it may not have been 
a commonly used behavior management tool.18  Lastly, some inmates received multiple 
infractions for one incident (n=2,446; 8 percent).  I adjust for this situation by retaining 
the most serious offense for which the inmate was punished.  The total data reduction 
process results in a removal of 144 inmates (2 percent) and a total of 3,590 infractions 
(12 percent), with the bulk of the infraction reduction attributed to inmates having 
received multiple infractions for one incident.  The final sample for RQ.2 includes 6,287 
inmates who incurred a total of 26,337 infractions.  By infraction class, the following 
samples are:  Class 1=2,125 inmates with a total of 3,479 incidents; Class 2=5,301 
inmates with a total of 16,972 incidents; and Class 3=2,473 inmates with a total of 5,886 
incidents.  Inmate totals exceed the reported 6,287, as some inmates belong to more than 
one infraction class. 
The third sample addresses the third (RQ.3) and fourth (RQ.4) research questions. 
As a reminder, RQ.3 asks:  “For inmates who received an earned credit sanction, are there 
race or gender differences in the quantity of earned credits deducted?” RQ.4 asks: “For 
inmates who received an earned credit sanction, are there race or gender differences in 
who received the maximum earned credit penalty?”  I continue the sample reduction 
                                                 
18 In this state prison system, while under a life sentence, a record of having earned a credit is maintained 
solely for the purposes of record keeping in the event the inmate’s sentence should be commuted by the 
state’s Governor.  Because life sentences are rarely commuted, the sanctioning personnel may not have 
viewed an earned credit sanction as an applicable penalty. 
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process from the point noted above to address research questions 3 and 4 because, even 
though the inmate received a formal infraction and was eligible to receive an earned credit 
sanction, he or she may not have actually been sanctioned to this punishment.  
Additionally, he or she may not have accrued sufficient credits to allow for the maximum 
number of credits to be deducted.  Similar to above, it is unknown with the data available 
if an inmate in this case did not have the full number of credits removed due to insufficient 
credits available or due to some other factor.  I omit inmates who meet these latest criteria 
(n=1,915/15,374; 30 percent/58 percent).  Although this large sample reduction may 
sound alarming, keep in mind that inmates could have received a variety of sanctions 
(e.g., segregation, monetary fine, reduction of canteen privileges), and an earned credit 
sanction is just one of the many sanction types.19  This concludes the data reduction 
process, as possible errant records, inmates belonging to race/ethnicity groups containing 
too few inmates, special sentences (e.g., delayed and life), and multiple infractions for 
the same incident are already removed through to the earlier data reduction stages.  The 
final sample for RQ.3 and RQ.4 includes 4,372 inmates who incurred a total of 10,963 
infractions.  By infraction class, the following samples are:  Class 1=948 inmates with a 
total of 1,318 incidents; Class 2=3,375 inmates with a total of 6,763 incidents; and Class 
3=1,790 inmates with a total of 2,882 incidents.  Once again, the inmate total exceeds the 
reported 4,372 as some inmates are a part of more than one infraction class. 
 
                                                 
19 A full list of sanctions is available in Appendix B. 
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Data Structure 
The next subsections discuss in detail the variables used in all analyses.  However, 
I must mention that the variable description quickly becomes difficult to describe due to 
this study utilizing two distinct data structures for its analysis.  As I noted above, RQ.1 
utilizes a wide dataset, whereas RQ.2, RQ.3, and RQ.4 utilizes a long data set.  This 
results in my using distinct language when describing the variables, as the long dataset 
contains multiple observations that belong to higher-level categories.  To identify those 
higher-level categories, I use language such as level 1, level 2, and level 3, reasoning 
which I explain in the section on my analytical approach.  RQ.1, however, uses a wide 
data set with no higher levels, and, therefore, language with regard to “levels” does not 




There are four outcome variables that allow me to examine research questions 1-
4.  To answer RQ.1, which explores the relationship between race/gender and receiving 
a prison infraction, the outcome variable is whether or not an inmate incurred an 
infraction (received an infraction).  Inmates having at least one infraction during the 
prison term (yes) were coded as 1 and inmates having zero infractions during the prison 
term (no) were coded as 0.     
RQ.2 examines the relationship between race/gender and being sanctioned to lose 
earned credits (earned credits removed).  This variable is measured at the infraction level 
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(level 1).  Being sanctioned to lose earned credits (yes) was coded as 1 and not being 
sanctioned to lose earned credits (no) was coded as 0.    
RQ.3 examines the relationship between race/gender and the quantity of earned 
credits removed (quantity removed).  To answer this research question, I began by 
examining a continuous variable measured at the infraction level (level 1) that represented 
the total number of earned credits removed for the infraction.  The range of credits that 
an inmate could lose varied by infraction class.  Class 1 infractions, the lowest infraction 
class, allowed for the revocation of 1-60 credits; Class 2 infractions, the moderate 
infraction class, allowed for the revocation of 1-120 credits; and Class 3 infractions, the 
most severe infraction class, allowed for the revocation of 1-365 credits.  Because the 
total number of earned credits an inmate could lose depended on the infraction class, I 
created three distinct dependent variables, one for each infraction class.  An examination 
of this continuous variable revealed that oftentimes the number of earned credits removed 
was concentrated at specific points in the scale.  Thus, this forced me to group the values 
into ordered categories.  These ordered categories differed by infraction class, but no 
noticeable adjustments were required by race or gender.  Quantity removed, as a result, 
is defined in three ways.  For Class 1 infractions, 1-30 days was coded 0, 31-45 days was 
coded 1, and 46-60 days was coded 2.  For Class 2 infractions, 1-30 days was coded 0, 
31-60 days was coded 1, 61-90 days was coded 2, and 91-120 days was coded 3.  For 
Class 3 infractions, 1-100 days was coded 0, 101-200 days was coded 1, 201-300 days 
was coded 2, and 301-365 days was coded 3.  Thus, higher values of quantity removed 
suggest a harsher punishment.     
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RQ.4 seeks to understand the relationship between race/gender and receiving the 
maximum earned credit deduction (maximum penalty).  Being sanctioned to the 
maximum penalty (yes) was coded as 1 and not being sanctioned to the maximum penalty 
(no) was coded as 0.  This variable is also measured at the infraction level (level 1).  
 
Independent Variables 
This study focuses on two focal independent variables that allow me to examine 
research questions 1-4.  These are race/ethnicity and gender.  For RQ.2, RQ.3, and RQ.4, 
these variables are measured at the inmate level (level 2). 
 Race/Ethnicity: Race/ethnicity is a categorical variable that is based on self-
reported information.  Although, at times, inmate categorization may have been due to 
the prison intake official’s observation of the inmate’s status.  The frequency at which 
direct observation rather than self-report occurred is unknown.  I created four dummy 
variables for race/ethnicity as follows:  black, Hispanic, Native American, and white.  The 
reference group is “white.”  
Male: Male is a dichotomous variable that is also based on self-reported 
information.  As with race, an inmate’s categorization may have, at times, been due to the 
prison intake official’s observation of the inmate’s status.  I created a dummy variable for 
an inmate’s gender (male) in which males were coded as 1 and females were coded as 0.   
 
Control Variables 
Prior research has suggested that situational factors, inmate characteristics, and 
prison characteristics predict prison infractions (Gendreau et al. 1997; Steiner et al. 2014).  
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Thus, the analysis also controls for factors that may impact the likelihood of observing 
disparate outcomes, and these factors are: violent infractions; prior institutional 
infractions; months between infractions; multiple violations during the same incident; 
total sanctions for the infraction; age; education; the inmate’s criminogenic risk score 
according to the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R); prior prison incarcerations; 
total prison sentence length; percent of sentence served up to the point of the infraction; 
months served in prison; violent crime; whether or not the crime for which the inmate 
was incarcerated required him or her to serve 85% of the sentence; and facility security 
level.  Although all of these variables appear at some point in the analysis, several are 
specific to certain research questions.  I make mention of this below when describing 
them individually.  As the bulk of this study utilizes the long data structure, I organize 
the control variables by the data level to which they pertain (level 1, 2, or 3).  Again, this 
is a point discussed further in the section detailing my analytical approach. 
 
Level 1: Infraction 
Violent Infraction: Violent infraction is a dichotomous variable that represents 
whether or not the infraction is violent or non-violent.  There is no standard definition of 
what constitutes a violent or non-violent infraction in departmental policy; rather, 
infractions are listed by severity (e.g., Class 2) and nature of the incident (e.g., group 
disruptive behavior).  I reviewed the full range of infractions (n=103) and categorized 
them accordingly.20  Criteria for a violent infraction includes acts such as threats, battery, 
obscenities toward staff, and weapons violations.  Non-violent infractions includes acts 
                                                 
20 See Appendix A for a full listing of violent infractions, noted under the column titled “Violent.” 
67 
such as drug use or manufacturing, escapes, failure to comply with orders, theft, and 
property violations.  After categorizing the full list of infractions into violent or non-
violent, I recoded violent infractions so that violent was coded as 1 and non-violent was 
coded as 0.   
Prior Infractions: Prior infractions is a proxy measure of an inmate’s prior 
criminality while in prison.  This variable measures the number of incidents for which the 
inmate was found guilty during the prison term leading up to the incident of focus.  I 
dichotomized the values to create a binary indicator.  Having at least one prior infraction 
was coded as 1 and no prior infractions was coded as 0.  
Months to Infraction: Months to infraction is a continuous variable that measures 
the number of months between an inmate’s infractions (e.g., [second infraction date – 
first infraction date]/30.42), or, in the case of the initial infraction, the number of days 
between prison reception date and the first infraction (i.e., [first infraction date – prison 
admit date]/30.42).  
Multiple Violations: Multiple violations is a binary variable that indicates whether 
or not the inmate received multiple violations stemming from the same incident.  If an 
inmate received multiple violations on the same date, then I consider these violations to 
be a part of the same incident.  Infractions associated with one inmate that occurred on 
the same date were coded as 1 with all others coded as 0.  
Total Sanctions: Total sanctions is a continuous variable representing the number 
of sanctions imposed on the inmate for the one infraction. Although sanction types are 
categorical (e.g., monetary fine), if more than one sanction was applied, then I assigned 
each sanction a value of 1 and summed these values by incident.   
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Level 2: Inmate21 
Age: For RQ.1, age is a continuous variable representing age (in years) at the time 
of prison exit.  Age was computed from two existing variables:  date of birth and prison 
exit date (i.e., [prison exit date – date of birth]/365.25).  For RQ.2 through RQ.4, age was 
also a continuous variable; however, in these research questions it represented the 
inmate’s age (in years) at the point at which the infraction occurred.  Age was computed 
from two existing variables: date of birth and infraction date (i.e., [infraction date – date 
of birth]/365.25).   
Education: Education is a categorical variable representing the inmate’s highest 
level of formal schooling attained.  I dichotomized the values to create a binary indicator 
so that having a high school diploma, a GED, or at least some college experience was 
coded as 1 and having not completed high school or a GED was coded as 0.  
Level of Service Inventory-Revised Risk Score: Level of Service Inventory-
Revised (LSI-R) risk score is the outcome of an assessment administered at prison 
reception that determines an inmate’s criminogenic needs in 10 areas.  These areas 
include but are not limited to criminal history, family, drug and alcohol use/abuse, and 
employment.  The assessment score is continuous and ranges from 0-54, with higher 
values indicating more criminogenic risk.  This risk assessment is internally consistent at 
                                                 
21  This corrections department utilized a mental health classification system to assist in strategic 
management planning for medical services.  The classification system grouped inmates into one of six 
categories that, in a broad sense, characterized their need for mental health services.  I attempted to control 
for the effect of an inmate’s mental health level at the time of the incident on the outcome; however, nearly 
36% were missing data on this variable.  To minimize this missingness, I aggregated to the inmate level 
the most severe mental health status across all of his or her infractions.  This reduced the missingness to 
13%.  However, in an effort to retain the full sample, I dichotomized mental health status into a dichotomous 
indicator of whether or not the record had a missing value.  I then entered this new variable into the 
statistical models to understand if the missingness significantly predicted the outcome.  Across all models, 
it was not statistically significant (p > 0.05).  Thus, I omitted it in full.    
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the total score level (.84-.87) and has acceptable levels of inter-rater reliability for trained 
raters (.80-.96) (Andrews and Bonta 1995; Andrews and Bonta 2003). 
Prior incarceration: Prior incarceration is a dichotomous variable that represents 
whether or not an inmate served a prior term of incarceration in the custody of this 
particular Southern state prison system.  A prior prison term is a sentence of incarceration 
that completed before the initiation of the prison term which resulted in the 2012 or 2013 
prison release.  A dummy variable was created in which all inmates who spent one or 
more days in prison prior to this point in time were coded as 1 and all inmates who did 
not spend time in prison prior to this point in time were coded a 0. 
Sentence Length (in years):  Total prison sentence length is a continuous variable 
measured in years that reflects the amount of time an inmate was sentenced to serve in 
prison.  Oftentimes, an inmate is convicted of more than one crime.  For these convictions, 
he or she receives distinct sentences, which may be served concurrently or consecutively.  
To determine total sentence length, if an inmate was to serve his or her sentences 
concurrently, then the longest sentence dictated the end of the prison term and, therefore, 
the total time to serve.  If an inmate was to serve his or her sentences consecutively, then 
these sentences were added to arrive at the total time to serve.   
Violent Crime:  As mentioned in the “sentence length” variable, an inmate 
oftentimes serves concurrent sentences for multiple convictions.  Other times, he or she 
serves the sentences consecutively.  For the creation of this variable, if the inmate was 
serving time in prison for at least one crime categorized as violent by this prison’s 
definition (e.g., assault and battery),22 then he or she was considered to be serving time 
                                                 
22 See Appendix C for a full listing of violent crimes. 
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for a violent crime.  In this case, serving time for at least one violent crime, recognizing 
that other crimes may have been non-violent, was coded as 1 and all others (i.e., only 
non-violent crimes) were coded as 0.   
85% Crime:  A crime categorized as “85%”23 is typically violent (e.g., Murder I).  
More so, any person convicted of an 85% crime is required to serve no less than eighty-
five percent (85%) of any sentence of imprisonment before becoming eligible to earn 
credits.  This rule is in place to ensure that the inmate serves at least eighty-five percent 
(85%) of the sentence length in prison as required by law.  This sentence/crime type may 
have affected the number of earned credits an inmate accrued or even lost.  Thus, inmates 
with at least one 85% crime, recognizing that other crimes may be non-85% crimes, were 
coded as 1 and all others (i.e., only non-85% crimes) were coded as 0.  
Percent of Sentence Served: Percent of prison sentence served is a continuous 
variable that accounts for the amount of time an inmate had already served on his or her 
sentence at the point he or she incurred the infraction.  It was computed from three 
existing variables: prison admit date, infraction date, and total prison sentence (i.e., 
[infraction date – prison admit date]/total prison sentence).  I control for the effect this 
variable may have on the outcome, as more time in prison could result in prison officials’ 
greater awareness of the inmate’s personal misconducts. 
Months in Prison: Months served in prison is a continuous variable that accounts 
for the amount of time an inmate served in prison.  It was computed from two existing 
variables: prison admit date and prison exit date (i.e., [prison exit date – prison admit 
date]/30.42).  This variable is specific to the analysis for RQ.1.  I control for the effect 
                                                 
23 See Appendix C for a full listing of 85% crimes. 
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this variable may have on the outcome, as more time in prison provides an inmate with a 
greater opportunity to incur a prison infraction.   
 
Level 3: Facility24 
Physical Security Level: In a broad sense, this prison system includes four 
physical security levels that suggest the level of supervision needed to ensure the safety 
and security of persons, the institution, and the community.  Listed in order of most severe 
to least severe, these are:  maximum, medium, minimum, and community.  These four 
security levels describe the facility’s majority rather than describe the security level of 
the bed to which the inmate was assigned.  Due to the female facilities in this study not 
having maximum security, I collapsed maximum and medium securities into one 
category, maximum/medium, thereby reducing the number of security groups to only 
three designations.  Next, I created three dummy variables for security level as follows:  




This study seeks to understand the impact of race and gender on post-sentencing, 
examining potential disparities in who receives an infraction as well as potential 
disparities in the sanction an inmate receives for the infraction.  The various research 
                                                 
24 This research attempted to control for the effect of being in a private compared to a public prison.  
However, this factor only varied for males, as all females were assigned to public facilities.  Although, prior 
research has suggested that troublesome inmates may be likely to be transferred to private facilities in order 
for staff to avoid the burden of their greater disciplinary problems (Spivak and Sharp 2008), thereby 
suggesting qualitative differences between the two classes of inmates, the results of this study suggested 
that being in public or private prison (for males) did not predict sanction outcomes (p > 0.05).  Thus, this 
factor was omitted from analyses for RQ.2 – RQ.4 to minimize the number of estimated models. 
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questions necessitate the use of two distinct analytical approaches.  To assess the effect 
of an inmate’s race and gender on the likelihood of receiving an infraction compared to 
no infraction (RQ.1), I employed a logistic regression model.  Logistic regression is a 
statistical method used to analyze a non-nested binary outcome variable.   
To assess the effect of an inmate’s race and gender on sanction outcomes requires 
a lengthier discussion than that just provided for infraction outcomes.  The target data for 
RQ.2, RQ.3, and RQ.4 are quite different in their design than the data used in RQ.1, as 
the outcome of interest is sanction outcomes for an infraction.  As inmates oftentimes 
incur more than one infraction during their prison term, this naturally creates a nested 
data structure. Nested data include clusters of observations that are dependent, and a key 
assumption of standard statistical techniques is that observations are independent 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  Ignoring the dependency between observations for these 
research questions would threaten the validity of statistical inference by biasing the 
standard errors, thereby increasing the probability of a Type I error (Raudenbush and 
Bryk 2002).  More specifically, in these data the infractions (level 1) are nested within an 
inmate (level 2).  Adding additional complexity to the analysis is that both level 1 and 
level 2 variables are nested within a facility (level 3), but this facility assignment is time-
varying.  Therefore, level 3 is considered to be crossed or cross-classified, as an inmate 
may not have been assigned to just one facility as time passed.  Figure 1 provides a 
hypothetical depiction of this relationship.  It is also noteworthy that, although the data 
are nested within an inmate, I am not interested in modelling intra-individual variation 
over time.  Thus, a longitudinal design is not warranted and I consider these data to be 
cross-sectional.   
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Having described the complexity of the data set I use to answer RQ.2, RQ.3, and 
RQ.4, I continue with a description of the analytical approach.  For these three research 
questions, I employ three-level, cross-classified generalized linear mixed models 
(GLMM) to examine which variables, if any, predict the outcome.  This partially cross-
classified GLMM is a flexible regression technique that explains variability in the 
intercepts and slopes at lower levels of analysis based on group characteristics of the 
higher levels of analysis (Cafri et al. 2015; Hox 2002; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  
GLMM also enables me to estimate the effects for categorical rather than continuous 
outcomes using a nonlinear link function (Ene et al. 2014).  A link function models the 
effect of certain variables on the logit of the outcome rather than the raw value of the 
outcome so that the best regression line can be fit to the data.  It is important to note that, 
although the data in this study are nested, they do not fall within a strict hierarchy across 
all levels, which would in a traditional sense warrant the use of a hierarchical generalized 
linear model (HGLM).  As there is variation in the quantity of earned credits which could 
be deducted across the three infraction classes (i.e., 1, 2, and 3), I fit separate models for 
each class.  I now provide more detail regarding the specific analytical approaches for 
RQ.2-RQ.4. 
In this study, RQ.2 explores the probability of an inmate being sanctioned to an 
earned credit deduction and the influence of several incident-, inmate-, and facility-level 
characteristics on the chance of this outcome occurring.  Being sanctioned to an earned 
credit deduction is binary; thus, I employ a GLMM using a logit link.  Across the models 
in RQ.2, I estimate the fixed effects for all level 1, level 2, and level 3 variables.  However, 
race, gender, and their combinations (level 2) are allowed to vary or have random effects 
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at level 3 to examine whether or not the slopes change across facilities.  I base this 
decision on the primary goal of this study: to understand whether or not race or gender 
predict an official’s decision to punish an inmate using an earned credit sanction net of 
other important variables. 
RQ.3 examines the probability of being at or below a specific earned credit 
penalty level and the influence of incident, inmate, and facility characteristics on the 
chance of this outcome occurring.  This outcome is polytomous; thus, I employ a GLMM 
using a cumulative logit link.  Similar to RQ.2, I estimate the fixed effects for all level 1, 
level 2, and level 3 variables.  I also examine the random effects of race, gender, and the 
interaction of these two variables (level 2) across level 3 to reveal whether or not the 
slopes vary between facilities, as this is the primary objective of this study. 
RQ.4 explores the probability of an inmate receiving the maximum earned credit 
penalty and the influence of incident, inmate, and facility characteristics on the chance of 
this outcome occurring.  Once again, this outcome is binary; thus, as with RQ.2, I employ 
a GLMM using a logit link.  Similar to the other research questions, I estimate the fixed 
effects for all level 1, level 2, and level 3 variables.  Race, gender, and the race-gender 
combinations (level 2) are allowed to vary at level 3 to assess if slopes vary across 
facilities.  
Although this study examines the effect of race and gender on prison officials’ 
decision-making for all inmates who exited prison between calendar years 2012 and 2013 
(a population), my analyses utilize inferential statistics to better understand the effect 
sizes of these variables.  I believe this to be an appropriate application in this context, as 
I consider these particular data to be a sample of all inmates who released from prison.  
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The earlier data reduction processes address nearly all of the missing data in this 
data set, as much of the missing data is attributed to inmates being admitted to prison 
prior to the department’s implementation of a new electronic database.  Some earlier 
records did not convert accurately to the new data recording system.  This missing data 
primarily related to a lack of accurate prison admit and prison exit dates, which had a 
cumulative effect on generating prison term-specific data.  Having corrected for these 
errors, there remains one variable that requires additional cleaning:  LSI-R risk score.  
The LSI-R risk score is missing for approximately 15% of all cases and to retain these 












Chapter 6: Infractions 
The data for this study are evaluated in two parts to assess the impact of an 
inmate’s race and gender on post-sentencing outcomes.  In this first results chapter, I 
specifically focus my attention on the relationship between an inmate’s race/gender and 
having received a formal prison infraction.  The second results chapter, Chapter 7, digs 
deeper into the data to examine a subsequent step of the post-sentencing process, 
examining whether or not there are race and gender differences in how sanctions are 
applied for these infractions.   
 
Research Question 1: Examining Who Receives an Infraction 
 Just under half (44 percent) of all prison exits included in this study incurred at 
least one formal prison infraction during their incarceration.  With a large number of 
inmates receiving a formal infraction, I examine which inmate characteristics explain 
variance in this outcome.  Thus, the objective of RQ.1 is to assess the question, “Are there 
race or gender differences in who incurred a prison infraction?”  Preliminary statistics 
suggest that there are race and gender differences in the outcome, with more blacks (52 
percent), Hispanics (41 percent), and Native Americans (45 percent) incurring an 
infraction when compared to whites (40 percent) and more males (45 percent) incurring 
an infraction when compared to females (37 percent).  However, to better disentangle 
whether or not these specific extralegal factors account for variation in the outcome net 
of other group characteristics, I employ a logistic regression model.  The results of this 
model are described subsequent to a full discussion of the study sample’s characteristics.       
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Sample Characteristics 
Table 3 provides a descriptive view of the sample used in RQ.1.  Most 
importantly, 44 percent of inmates who exited prison during 2012 through 2013 incurred 
at least one prison infraction.  Of these inmates, the majority were male (86 percent).  
With regard to race, most were white (56 percent), with blacks being the largest minority 
racial category represented (26 percent).  A much smaller proportion were Native 
American (11 percent) or Hispanic (7 percent).  At the time of exiting prison, these 
inmates were, on average, approximately 38 years of age.  Half (50 percent) had less than 
a high school education.  With regard to criminogenic risk scores, inmates bordered a 
moderate-high risk level (28).  Nearly half (46 percent) served at least one prior term of 
incarceration in this Southern state’s prison system.  Inmates served, on average, 
moderate length prison terms of seven years.  Lastly, the majority were non-violent 
inmates (70 percent) who did not serve time on an 85% crime (93 percent). 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for RQ.1 (n=14,273) 
    
Measures M SD Range 
Male 0.86 0.35 0-1 
Race/ethnicity       
Black 0.26 0.44 0-1 
Hispanic 0.07 0.25 0-1 
Native Am. 0.11 0.31 0-1 
White1 0.56 0.50 0-1 
Age (yrs.) 37.63 10.69 17-83 
>=HSD/GED 0.50 0.50 0-1 
LSI-R Risk Score 27.83 6.21 2-49 
Prior Incarcerations 0.46 0.50 0-1 
Sentence (yrs.) 6.67 6.15 0-45 
Violent Crime 0.30 0.46 0-1 
85% Crime 0.07 0.26 0-1 
Months in Prison (log) 2.99 0.97 -3-6 
        
Outcome Variable       




To test the hypothesis that race and gender influence the likelihood of receiving a 
prison infraction, I employed a logistic regression.  Tests for multicollinearity indicated 
that a very low degree of correlation was present between the predictor variables, with 
the variance inflation factors (VIF) ranging from 1.04 to 2.53.  The model fit statistics 
suggested that the full model presented in Table 4 fit the data better than the null model 
(χ2=5335.72, df=22, p ≤ 0.05).   
Results of the analysis provide partial support for the hypothesis that racial 
minorities are more likely to receive an infraction than whites.  In particular, when 
compared to white inmates, black inmates had 3.9 times greater odds of receiving an 
infraction.  There was no difference for Hispanic or Native Americans inmates.  With 
regard to gender, males had 1.2 times greater odds of receiving an infraction when 
compared to females.  Age at the time of prison exit also explained variation in the odds 
of receiving an infraction, where each year increase in age was associated with a five 
percent decrease in the odds of the event occurring.  Although these main effects were 
statistically significant predictors of receiving a prison infraction, I proceeded to test the 
joint effects of several of these variables.  A test of the combination of race and gender 
revealed no differences in slopes for these distinct combinations.  I also tested for the 
interaction between race, gender, and age, but these results also suggested there were no 
differences in slopes. Therefore, although race, gender, and age mattered independently, 
the strength of the relationship between these variables and the odds of receiving a prison 
infraction did not change when modified by another characteristic of the inmate.     
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Other variables were statistically significant predictors of an inmate receiving an 
infraction.  Having a longer prison sentence and serving time on an 85% crime predicted 
lower odds of receiving an infraction.  However, a higher criminogenic risk score, having 
served a prior prison term in this state corrections system, and having served more time 
in prison predicted greater odds of receiving an infraction.   
  
Table 4. Logistic Regression Estimates of Receiving an Infraction 
    
Measures b se OR 
Intercept -5.35 0.32 0.00* 
Male 0.46* 0.12 1.58* 
Race/ethnicity       
Black 1.37* 0.56 3.92* 
Hispanic 1.60 1.52 4.93 
Native Am. -0.14 0.68 0.87 
Age (yrs.)  -0.05* 0.01 0.95* 
Male*Black -1.09 0.59 0.34 
Male*Hispanic -2.04 1.56 0.13 
Male*Native American 0.46 0.73 1.58 
Male*Age -0.01 0.01 0.99 
Black*Age -0.02 0.01 0.98 
Hispanic*Age -0.07 0.04 0.94 
Native American*Age 0.00 0.02 1.00 
Male*Black*Age 0.02 0.02 1.02 
Male*Hispanic*Age 0.07 0.04 1.07 
Male*Native American*Age -0.01 0.02 0.99 
>=HS/GED -0.08 0.04 0.92 
LSI-R Score 0.04* 0.00 1.04* 
Prior Incarceration 0.20* 0.05 1.22* 
Sentence (yrs.)  -0.09* 0.01 0.92* 
Violent Crime -0.06 0.05 0.95 
85% Crime  -0.57* 0.10 0.57* 
Months in Prison (log) 2.08* 0.05 8.04* 
        
Fit Statistics       
 -2 LL                       14230.55** 





Chapter 7: Sanctions 
With a better understanding of the impact of an inmate’s race and gender on his 
or her likelihood of receiving a formal prison infraction in this particular Southern state’s 
prison system, I move to an analysis of the type of sanction imposed for this infraction.  
In this chapter, I address in detail an analysis of how a variety of factors account for 
variation in the type and severity of sanctions imposed for the infraction.  Again, my 
primary research questions seek to understand whether or not inmate-level (level 2) 
variables such as being a racial minority or being male account for both the variance in 
receiving an earned credit sanction as well as the quantity of earned credits deducted.  I 
describe the results of this analysis in three parts to give equal attention to RQ.2, RQ.3, 
and RQ.4.  I conclude this chapter with a summary of findings on sanction outcomes from 
the three analyses. 
 
Research Question 2: Examining Use of Earned Credit Sanctions 
 Although nearly half (44 percent) of all prison exits included in this study incurred 
at least one infraction during their prison term, the majority of this subset of inmates (52 
percent) was punished by receiving an earned credit sanction for at least one of these 
violations.  Therefore, the objective of RQ.2 is to better understand “For inmates who 
incurred an infraction, are there race or gender differences in the likelihood of receiving 
an earned credit sanction for this infraction?”  Although a preliminary view of the data 
suggests minimal differences in the use of an earned credit sanction across race (blacks: 
52 percent; Hispanics: 50 percent; Native Americans: 52 percent; whites: 52 percent) and 
gender (males: 52 percent; females: 49 percent), I investigate this further to understand if 
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controlling for group compositional differences reveal any additional insights.  In the 
sections that follow, I first report the full qualitative differences of inmates in this sample 
and follow with the results of the generalized linear mixed models. Results in these 
following sections are separated by infraction class (Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3) due to 
the varying severity of earned credit penalties associated with each.  
 
Sample Characteristics 
Table 5 provides the sample characteristics for inmates included in the subsequent 
regression analysis, with statistics separated by the three infraction classes.  For inmates 
in this study, facility personnel tended to frequently punish rule violators by imposing an 
earned credit sanction.  On average, this event occurred between 38 percent and 61 
percent of the time, depending on the infraction class. When characterizing the incident 
(level 1 variables), I found that a higher proportion of violent infractions were distributed 
within the most severe infraction class (Class 3).  This was not surprising, as one may 
expect there to be an association between class severity and violent actions.  The data also 
showed that most incidents for which an inmate received an earned credit sanction (69-
80 percent) were preceded by at least one prior infraction during the same prison term.  
On average, inmates were formally cited for a rule violation every eight to 11 months.  
Relatively few incidents resulted in multiple rule violations being filed (<1 to 15 percent), 
but as the infraction severity increased, so did the number of sanctions one received for 
that incident.  Class 1 infractions, on average, received just under two sanctions, while 
Class 2 received nearly 2.5 sanctions and Class 3 received three sanctions. 
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for RQ.2 
  Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Measures M SD Range M SD Range M SD Range 
Level 1: Infractions                           
Violent Infraction 0.00 0.04 0-1 0.15 0.36 0-1 0.39 0.49 0-1 
Prior Infractions 0.69 0.46 0-1 0.74 0.44 0-1 0.80 0.40 0-1 
Months to Infraction 7.58 11.34 0-152 7.26 10.80 0-176 7.45 10.61 0-145 
Multiple Violations 0.03 0.18 0-1 0.07 0.26 0-1 0.15 0.36 0-1 
Total Sanctions 1.85 0.69 0-6 2.44 0.81 0-6 3.00 0.50 0-8 
  N=3,479 N=16,972 N=5,886 
                    
Level 2: Inmate                   
Male 0.85 0.36 0-1 0.87 0.33 0-1 0.94 0.23 0-1 
Race/ethnicity                   
Black 0.32 0.47 0-1 0.33 0.47 0-1 0.37 0.48 0-1 
Hispanic 0.06 0.25 0-1 0.06 0.24 0-1 0.08 0.27 0-1 
Native Am. 0.11 0.32 0-1 0.12 0.33 0-1 0.14 0.34 0-1 
White1 0.50 0.50 0-1 0.49 0.50 0-1 0.42 0.49 0-1 
Age (yrs.) 32.04 9.15 18-72 31.35 8.74 17-71 30.82 8.17 17-77 
>=HSD/GED 0.41 0.49 0-1 0.39 0.49 0-1 0.37 0.48 0-1 
LSI-R Risk Score 28.95 5.79 6-49 29.44 5.97 7-49 29.50 5.64 9-49 
Prior Incarcerations 0.47 0.50 0-1 0.48 0.50 0-1 0.50 0.50 0-1 
Sentence (yrs.) 11.07 8.39 0.8-40 10.01 7.44 0.3-43 10.69 7.60 0.9-43 
Violent Crime 0.41 0.49 0-1 0.43 0.50 0-1 0.48 0.50 0-1 
85% Crime 0.12 0.32 0-1 0.14 0.35 0-1 0.15 0.36 0-1 
Pct. Served 0.23 0.18 0-0.88 0.27 0.19 0-0.95 0.30 0.20 0-0.92 
  N=2,125 N=5,301 N=2,473 
                    
Level 3: Facility                   
Security Level                   
     Max./Med.2 0.44 0.50 0-1 0.51 0.50 0-1 0.65 0.48 0-1 
     Minimum 0.43 0.49 0-1 0.28 0.45 0-1 0.22 0.41 0-1 
     Community1 0.14 0.34 0-1 0.21 0.41 0-1 0.13 0.33 0-1 
  N=66 N=82 N=76 
                    
Dependent Variable                   
Credit Sanction (Y) 0.38 0.49 0-1 0.41 0.49 0-1 0.61 0.49 0-1 
1Reference category 
2There are no maximum security facilities for females. 
 
At the inmate level, males incurred most of the formally filed infractions, although 
they represented a smaller proportion of the total incidents within the lowest severity 
infraction class (85 percent) compared to the highest severity infraction class (94 percent).  
In other words, females committed a greater proportion of the least serious infractions.  
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Regarding race, the three sample subsets were predominately white (42-50 percent) 
followed by black (32-37 percent).  There was also a noticeable trend in that as infraction 
severity increased, the percentage of blacks within that category also increased; as 
infraction severity increased, the percentage of whites within the category decreased.  
Additionally, inmates who received an earned credit sanction were, on average, in their 
early 30s, had less than a high school education (59-63 percent), and had higher 
criminogenic risk scores.  Nearly half (47-50 percent) of these inmates served a prior term 
of incarceration in this state prison system.  Regarding factors associated with their crime 
and sentence for which they were in prison, on average, the inmates were serving a prison 
term of 10-11 years.  Nearly half had been in prison for violent crimes (41-48 percent), 
while few (12-15 percent) had been in prison for crimes that mandated they served eighty-
five percent of their sentence (85% crimes) before being eligible 1) to apply earned 
credits, or 2) for parole.  
At the facility level, the security level of the prison in which the inmates were 
housed showed a trend in terms of frequency of least severe to most severe infractions.  
Higher security prisons, those categorized as maximum and medium security, had a 
greater proportion of Class 3 infractions (65 percent), while minimum security prison 
tended to have a greater proportion of Class 1 infractions (43 percent).  At community 
security prisons, there was a greater proportion of Class 2 infractions (21 percent). 
 
Findings 
Although I have identified qualitative differences in the sample compositions, I 
now turn my attention to the analysis of the effects of race and gender, among other 
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factors, on prison officials’ decision to sanction an inmate to lose earned credits as 
punishment for his or her behavior for each infraction class.  Tests for multicollinearity 
indicated a low degree of correlation between the predictor variables (VIF=1.01-3.38).  
Table 6 provides the statistical output for the full model by the specific infraction classes, 
and I discuss these results in their respective sections below.   
 
Class 1 
Class 1 infractions were the lowest severity level among the three infraction types.  
They also accounted for the fewest number of incidences across all inmates when 
compared to higher severity infraction classes.  As this analysis contained multiple levels, 
I was able to compare the amount of variation in sanction outcomes that occurred between 
versus within inmates or facilities by examining the intra-class correlation coefficients.25  
Results showed that approximately nine percent of the total unexplained variance in the 
decision to punish an inmate by imposing an earned credit sanction was accounted for by 
between-inmate differences rather than within-inmate differences in their characteristics.  
A higher percentage (20 percent) of the unexplained variation in the decision to punish 
inmates by removing their earned credits was accounted for by between-facility 
variability in their characteristics.  These statistically significant intra-class correlation 
coefficients provided evidence to proceed with the multi-level analysis, as they suggested 
that there was, to some extent, a correlation between any two randomly chosen  
 
                                                 
25 An intra-class correlation coefficient represents the proportion of variance in the outcome that is between 
the level-specific units, and it ranges from 0-1 or 0%-100% if converted to a percentage.  For example, it 
represents the proportion of variation in sanction outcomes that is attributed to differences between inmates 
or differences between facilities rather than differences within inmates or differences within facilities.      
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Table 6. RQ.2 GLMM Estimates for Receiving an Earned Credit Sanction 
  Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Measures b se b se b se 
Intercept  -1.94* 0.94  -1.36* 0.58 0.33 1.37 
              
Level 1: Infractions             
Violent Infraction  -----  ----- 0.24* 0.06  -0.22* 0.08 
Prior Infractions -0.10 0.10  -0.37* 0.05  -1.32* 0.12 
Months to Infraction 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.05* 0.01 
Multiple Violations 0.65* 0.24 0.11* 0.08  -0.97* 0.10 
Total Sanctions 0.77* 0.07 0.70* 0.03 0.25* 0.07 
              
Level 2: Inmate             
Male 0.90 0.72 0.56 0.49 0.42 1.24 
Race/ethnicity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Black 2.35 1.90 0.47 0.65 -1.36 1.80 
Hispanic 11.77 7.15 -0.51 1.75 1.66 3.56 
Native American 0.97 1.22 1.98 1.95 2.13 1.78 
Age (yrs.) 0.04 0.04 0.09* 0.02 0.11* 0.05 
Age (sq.) 0.00 0.00  -0.00* 0.00  -0.00* 0.00 
Male*Black -2.83 2.09 -0.66 0.68 1.12 1.83 
Male*Hispanic -10.62 7.19 0.25 1.79 -1.61 3.62 
Male*Native American -1.16 1.37 -2.04 1.85 -1.94 1.85 
Male*Age -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.04 
Black*Age -0.09 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06 
Hispanic*Age -0.42 0.24 0.02 0.06 -0.11 0.13 
Native American*Age -0.02 0.04 -0.07 0.05 -0.09 0.06 
Male*Black*Age 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.06 
Male*Hispanic*Age 0.39 0.25 -0.01 0.06 0.11 0.13 
Male*Native American*Age 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06 
>=HS/GED 0.10 0.09 -0.01 0.05 0.11 0.08 
LSI-R Score 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
Prior Incarceration 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.27* 0.08 
Sentence (yrs.) 0.03* 0.01 0.05* 0.00 0.02* 0.01 
Violent Crime -0.01 0.10 0.18* 0.05 0.01 0.09 
85% Crime  -1.76* 0.23  -1.68* 0.09  -2.18* 0.13 
Pct. Served  -0.06* 0.10 0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.07 
              
Level 3: Facility             
Security Level             
Max./Med.  -1.85* 0.31  -2.31* 0.29  -1.38* 0.19 
Minimum  -1.22* 0.33  -1.78* 0.32  -0.77* 0.20 
              
Random Effects             
Level 2 intercept 0.46* 0.11 0.68* 0.05 0.72* 0.09 
Level 3 intercept 0.56* 0.20 0.93* 0.20 0.07* 0.04 
              
Fit Statistics             
 -2 LL 15950.76** 79338.15** 28243.13** 
Note: *p < 0.05; **=likelihood ratio test significant; estimation method=RSPL 
Class 1: ICCL2=9%; ICCL3=20%; Class 2: ICCL2=13%; ICCL3=34%; Class 3: ICCL2=19%; ICCL3=18% 
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observations within the same inmate or within the same facility.  Thus, observations were 
not independent – a violation of traditional generalized linear model techniques.      
Given this information, I proceeded with the analysis to understand whether or 
not an inmate’s race or gender or the combination thereof explained the variability in how 
prison officials sanctioned the inmate.  As these extralegal factors were the main focus of 
the study, I treated their effects as both fixed and random at the facility level.  Results 
indicated, however, that race and gender did not vary across facilities, leading to the 
conclusion that there were no differences in slopes within facilities on the odds of 
receiving an earned credit sanction (χ2=13.59, df=14, p > 0.05).  Thus, I continued the 
model building process, treating all factors as having fixed effects.  The full model which 
contained all infraction-, inmate-, and facility-level variables was the best fitting model 
(χ2=630.40, df=29, p ≤ 0.05).   
The focal variables in this study did not yield statistically significant effects, 
leading me to conclude that an inmate’s race and gender did not explain variation in 
prison officials’ decisions to impose an earned credit sanction on the inmate.  This finding 
pertained to both the main and joint effects of these inmate characteristics.  The results of 
the full model, however, did explain some variability in how prison officials imposed 
earned credit sanctions with regard to other characteristics at all three levels of analysis.  
Specifically, having multiple violations for one incident and receiving multiple sanctions 
for the infraction increased the log odds of receiving an earned credit sanction.  
Sanctioning officials were also more likely to sentence an inmate to lose earned credits 
as an inmate’s total prison sentence length increased.  Some variables, however, predicted 
lower odds of receiving an earned credit sanction.  In particular, inmates who were 
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serving time for an 85% crime, those who were closer to their prison release date, and 
those who were in a maximum/medium or minimum security prison (compared to a 
community security prison) were less likely to have this sanction type imposed.     
 
Class 2 
Class 2 infractions, which are moderate severity prison violations, accounted for 
an overwhelming majority of all inmate infractions, especially those for which an inmate 
received an earned credit sanction.  Again, due to the nested nature of the data used in 
this study, I tested for correlations among observations.  The intra-class correlation 
coefficient for the unconditional model indicated that approximately 13 percent of the 
variance in prison officials’ decision to sanction an infraction by removing earned credits 
was accounted for by inmate-level factors; a higher percentage, 34 percent was accounted 
for by facility-level factors. Both were statistically significant (p ≤ 0.05), which provided 
evidence that some of the variance in the outcomes was accounted for by the clustering 
of the data.  However, results failed to suggest that the intercepts and slopes for race, 
gender, or the combination of these variables varied across facilities (χ2=16.31, df=14, p 
> 0.05).  Therefore, I proceeded to the full model treating all factors as having fixed, 
rather than both fixed and random effects.     
The full model suggested that many variables accounted for variation in the log 
odds of receiving an earned credit sanction, more so than the results of the previous model 
for Class 1 infractions.  However, of utmost importance for this study was the impact of 
extralegal factors such as an inmate’s race and gender.  As with Class 1 infractions, 
neither race nor gender or the combination of these variables were statistically significant 
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predictors of receiving an earned credit sanction.   However, all of the infraction-level 
variables explained variability in receiving an earned credit sanction.  Specifically, 
infractions deemed violent, infractions that occurred less frequently, incidents in which 
more than one rule violation was cited, and infractions for which the inmate received 
multiple punishments all predicted an increase in the log odds of receiving an earned 
credit sanction.  Having prior infractions during the prison term, however, predicted lower 
odds of receiving an earned credit sanction.  With regard to inmate-level characteristics, 
age mattered, but its relationship to the outcome was non-linear.  Specifically, inmates 
were more likely to receive an earned credit sanction up to age 45, then this effect 
reversed thereafter.  I tested the interaction of age with race and gender and the results 
still suggested that these joint effects were not statistically significant.  The total time an 
inmate was sentenced to prison as well as serving time for a violent crime also predicted 
an increase in the log odds of receiving this sanction type, but serving time on an 85% 
crime yielded a reduced effect.  Lastly, the security level of the facility was a statistically 
significant predictor of an inmate receiving an earned credit sanction, where inmates at 
higher levels of security (maximum/medium and minimum) were less likely than inmates 
at a community security to receive this type of punishment.         
 
Class 3 
Class 3 infractions, the greatest severity among the three types of infraction 
classes, were the second most common infraction type for which inmates received a 
formal write-up.  Again, an analysis of the intra-class correlation coefficients revealed 
that approximately 19 percent of the variance in the decision to punish by imposing an 
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earned credit sanction for this class type was accounted for by between-inmate variability 
in their characteristics (p ≤ 0.05); 18 percent, of the variation in the decision to punish in 
this way was accounted for by between-facility variability in their characteristics (p ≤ 
0.05).  This supports my proceeding with the multi-level analysis.  I again estimated both 
the fixed and random effects of race, gender, and their combinations to understand if their 
intercepts and slopes varied across facilities.  Results were not statistically significant 
(χ2=11.34, df=14, p > 0.05) and, therefore, I omitted the random effects for these factors 
from the final model.   
As with the model for Class 2 infractions, all infraction-level variables were 
statistically significant.  However, their effects varied in some ways.  Infractions deemed 
violent, infractions which were preceded by other incidents, and infractions with multiple 
rule violations at one time all predicted lower odds of receiving an earned credit sanction.  
This may be explained by facility personnel deciding to issue another type of sanction in 
cases of violent, habitual offending.  Segregation or the immediate revocation of canteen 
privileges, to serve as examples, could be considered harsher, more immediate 
punishments that may have a greater impact on the inmate when compared to the removal 
of earned credits.  The removal of earned credits, instead, asserts its influence toward the 
end of the prison sentence and may not be in the realm of what an inmate considers if he 
or she is focused on the here and now.  Consistent with the Class 2 model was that both 
larger amounts of time between infractions and a greater number of sanctions received 
for the incident predicted an increase in the log odds of receiving an earned credit 
sanction.   
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I now turn my attention to the effects of inmate-level factors.  Contrary to the 
hypothesis for this research question, racial minorities compared to whites, males 
compared to females, and these race-gender (as well as race-gender-age) interactions 
revealed that no particular groups were more or less likely to receive an earned credit 
sanction over all other sanctions.  With regard to the other inmate-level characteristics, 
both age at the time of the infraction predicted greater odds of being sanctioned to lose 
earned credits, but only up to the age of 45; it declined after this point.  Additionally, 
having at least one prior prison incarceration in this corrections system compared to none 
as well as having longer prison sentences predicted increases in the log odds of receiving 
an earned credit sanction.  Serving time on an 85% crime predicted a decrease in the log 
odds of receiving an earned credit sanction as punishment for the behavior.  Lastly, as 
security level of the facility increased, the odds of receiving an earned credit sanction 
decreased.   
 
Research Question 3:  Examining Amount of Earned Credits Deducted 
 As mentioned earlier, 44 percent of all prison releases included in this study 
incurred at least one infraction during their prison term.  Of these inmates, a large 
percentage (52 percent) was formally punished by losing earned credits for at least one 
of their infractions.  Although regression analyses reveal that there are no race or gender 
disparities in the decision to sanction an inmate to lose earned credits, I dive deeper into 
the data to further my understanding of whether or not there are race or gender disparities 
in the severity of the sanction.  The objective of RQ.3 is to examine, “For inmates who 
received an earned credit sanction, are there race or gender differences in the quantity of 
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earned credits deducted?”  A preliminary analysis of the data suggests that inmates who 
were sanctioned to lose earned credits lost, on average, 134 credits.  When broken down 
by race, these statistics slightly deviated from the mean credits removed (blacks: 146 
credits; Hispanics: 140 credits; Native Americans: 126 credits; whites: 128 credits).  The 
data also suggest that the statistics vary by gender, where females lost, on average, 105 
credits and males lost, on average, 137 credits.  However, this preliminary review of the 
data does not account for differences in the range of days eligible to be removed by 
infraction class nor does it account for group compositional differences that may explain 
these disparities.  The following sections seek to address these areas, and the outcomes 
are presented in a similar manner as RQ.2.  Specifically, I first begin by describing the 
entirety of qualitative differences among inmates in the distinct infraction class samples 
and then follow with the results of the generalized linear mixed models. 
 
Sample Characteristics 
Inmates included in the sample for RQ.3 are a subset of inmates from RQ.2.  As 
a reminder, the sample for RQ.3 contains all inmates who received an infraction, who 
were sanctioned to lose earned credits, and who had accrued sufficient earned credits to 
allow for the full range of credits to be deducted.  Their group characteristics are provided 
in Table 7 and are separated by infraction class.  For these inmates, facility personnel 
tended to remove, in many cases, increments of earned credits. For example, they 
removed 30, 60, or 120 days rather than removed a more precise number of days that fell 
within the range of days (e.g., 23 days).  For all three infraction classes, officials, on 
average, removed a quantity that was over the range midpoint, particularly among higher  
93 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for RQ.3 
  Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Measures M SD Range M SD Range M SD Range 
Level 1: Infractions                           
Violent Infraction 0.00 0.06 0-1 0.14 0.34 0-1 0.31 0.46 0-1 
Prior Infractions 0.66 0.47 0-1 0.67 0.47 0-1 0.72 0.45 0-1 
Months to Infraction 7.78 11.78 0-152 8.94 11.51 0-176 10.78 12.55 0-145 
Multiple Violations 0.03 0.17 0-1 0.08 0.27 0-1 0.12 0.32 0-1 
Total Sanctions 2.00 0.65 1-4 2.63 0.71 1-6 3.00 0.44 1-8 
  N=1,137 N=6,763 N=2,723 
                    
Level 2: Inmate                   
Male1  ------  ------  ------ 0.89 0.31 0-1  ------  ------  ------ 
Race/ethnicity                   
Black 0.31 0.46 0-1 0.30 0.46 0-1 0.39 0.49 0-1 
Hispanic 0.07 0.25 0-1 0.05 0.22 0-1 0.07 0.26 0-1 
Native American 0.10 0.31 0-1 0.12 0.33 0-1 0.11 0.31 0-1 
White2 0.51 0.50 0-1 0.53 0.50 0-1 0.43 0.50 0-1 
Age (yrs.) 32.36 8.91 19-66 32.77 8.74 18-68 32.33 8.23 19-69 
>=HSD/GED 0.43 0.50 0-1 0.42 0.49 0-1 0.41 0.49 0-1 
LSI-R Risk Score 29.10 5.18 12-48 29.36 5.53 8-49 29.29 5.57 9-49 
Prior Incarcerations 0.54 0.50 0-1 0.53 0.50 0-1 0.58 0.49 0-1 
Sentence (yrs.) 12.18 9.11 1-40 10.70 7.82 0.8-43 12.11 8.26 1.5-43 
Violent Crime 0.34 0.47 0-1 0.33 0.47 0-1 0.42 0.49 0-1 
85% Crime 0.02 0.14 0-1 0.03 0.18 0-1 0.05 0.21 0-1 
Pct. Served 0.20 0.16 0-0.83 0.24 0.15 0-0.91 0.28 0.18 0-0.9 
  N=817 N=3,375 N=1,653 
                    
Level 3: Facility                   
Security Level                   
Max./Med.3 0.32 0.47 0-1 0.30 0.46 0-1 0.53 0.50 0-1 
Minimum 0.52 0.50 0-1 0.29 0.46 0-1 0.28 0.45 0-1 
Community2 0.15 0.36 0-1 0.40 0.49 0-1 0.20 0.40 0-1 
  N=52 N=79 N=66 
                    
Dependent Variable                   
Quantity Removed 1.27 0.89 0-2 2.17 1.04 0-3 2.14 1.15 0-3 
1Earned credits removed for females followed a bimodal distribution; thus, females were omitted from this analysis. 
2Reference category 
3There are no maximum security facilities for females. 
 
severity infraction classes.  Both Class 2 and Class 3 sanctions tended to be skewed 
toward having a greater number of days deducted that were allowed within the total range.   
With regard to the infraction-level (level 1) variables, I found that, similar to the 
sample used in RQ.2, a higher proportion of violent infractions were distributed within 
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the most severe infraction class (Class 3).  Once again, this is not surprising, as one would 
expect there to be a relationship between class severity and violent actions.  The data also 
showed that most incidents (66-72 percent) for which an inmate received an earned credit 
sanction were preceded by at least one prior infraction during the same prison term.  This 
statistic is lower than the proportions realized among inmates who simply received an 
infraction, regardless of the sanction type.  Also, on average, inmates were formally cited 
for a rule violation every eight to 11 months.  Few incidents resulted in multiple rule 
violations being filed (<1 to 12 percent) for the one incident.  Lastly, as the infraction 
severity increased, so did the number of sanctions received for that incident.   
Regarding the inmate-level characteristics, this sample is male-only for Class 1 
and Class 3 infractions.  Although I sought to understand the how gender, among other 
factors, influenced the quantity of earned credits removed, both these infraction classes 
exhibited a bimodal distribution for female inmates.  Thus, as the model for RQ.3 required 
more than two outcome categories, females were omitted.  The results for females are 
supplemented by the analysis for RQ.4, which is discussed in the next section.  As 
reported with the earlier samples, as infraction severity increased, so did the black to 
white inmate ratio.  Inmates in this sample were also, on average, about 32 years of age, 
held less than a high school education (57-59 percent), and had, on average, a high 
criminogenic risks score (29). The majority had served prison time in this state corrections 
department at least once before (53-58 percent).  They were also, on average, serving 
between a 10- to 12-year prison sentences for predominately non-violent crimes (58-67 
percent).  They were also less frequently serving time on an 85% crime (2-5 percent).  
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Lastly, on average, the inmates had served approximately 20-25 percent of their sentence 
at the time of receiving the infraction.   
With regard to the security level under which the inmate was housed, most Class 
3 infractions occurred at maximum/medium security facilities (53 percent), whereas most 
Class 1 infractions occurred at minimum security prisons (52 percent).  The bulk of Class 
2 infractions (40 percent) occurred at community-level facilities.   
 
Findings 
I now turn my attention to the effects of race and gender, among other factors, on 
prison officials’ decision to sanction an inmate to lose a specified quantity of earned 
credits as punishment for his or her behavior.  Table 8 provides the statistical output for 
the full model by the three infraction classes, and I discuss these results in their respective 
sections.  It is important to note that I tested for the assumption of proportional odds and 
the results were not statistically significant (p > 0.05).  Thus, parameter estimates were 
constant across all categories of the outcome variable.  Additionally, I tested for 
multicollinearity between the predictor variables and results indicated that a low level of 
collinearity was present (VIF=1.01-3.11).  The range of earned credits, as viewed in the 
sample characteristics above, vary by infraction class, meaning the outcome scale varies 
for each class-specific analysis.     
 
Class 1 
The likelihood of being at or below each earned credit reduction increment varied 
across both inmates and facilities.  Results suggested that approximately 13 percent of  
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Table 8. RQ.3 GLMM Estimates for Quantity of Earned Credits Deducted 
            Class 1           Class 2           Class 3 
Measures b se b se b se 
Intercept 1 0.30 1.23 -0.07 0.67 2.57 0.90 
Intercept 2 1.07 1.24 1.71 0.67 3.66* 0.90 
Intercept 3  ------  ------ 2.44 0.67 4.33* 0.90 
              
Level 1: Infractions             
Violent Infraction  ------  ------ 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.10 
Prior Infractions 0.38* 0.19 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.13 
Months to Infraction -0.01 0.01  -0.01* 0.00  -0.06* 0.01 
Multiple Violations 0.43 0.44 -0.09 0.10 -0.19 0.15 
Total Sanctions  -0.66* 0.13  -0.66* 0.04  -0.76* 0.11 
              
Level 2: Inmate             
Male  ‐‐‐‐‐‐   ‐‐‐‐‐‐  0.34 0.53  ------  ------ 
Race/ethnicity             
Black -0.80 0.60 0.58 0.78 -0.47 0.44 
Hispanic 0.75 1.43 0.31 2.02 0.32 0.92 
Native American -0.45 1.02 0.99 0.90 -0.43 0.65 
Age (yrs.) -0.06 0.06  -0.06* 0.03  -0.13* 0.05 
Age (sq.) 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
Male*Black  ------  ------ -0.75 0.82  ------  ------ 
Male*Hispanic  ------  ------ -0.23 2.10  ------  ------ 
Male*Native American  ------  ------ -1.36 0.98  ------  ------ 
Male*Age  ------  ------ -0.02 0.01  ------  ------ 
Black*Age 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Hispanic*Age -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.03 
Native American*Age 0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 
Male*Black*Age  ------  ------ 0.03 0.02  ------  ------ 
Male*Hispanic*Age  ------  ------ 0.00 0.07  ------  ------ 
Male*Native American*Age  ------  ------ 0.05 0.03  ------  ------ 
>=HS/GED -0.23 0.16 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.10 
LSI-R Score 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Prior Incarceration -0.05 0.16 -0.08 0.06 -0.06 0.10 
Sentence (yrs.) 0.01 0.01  -0.02* 0.00  -0.03* 0.01 
Violent Crime -0.09 0.17 -0.06 0.07 -0.24 0.11 
85% Crime -0.01 0.52 0.05 0.16 0.39 0.22 
Pct. Served -0.98 0.58  -0.13* 0.07 0.14 0.31 
              
Level 3: Facility             
Security Level             
Max./Med. 1.17* 0.42 0.54* 0.27 1.92* 0.19 
Minimum 0.59 0.42 0.50 0.29 1.13* 0.20 
              
Random Effects             
Level 2 intercept 0.64* 0.19 0.52* 0.06 0.59* 0.12 
Level 3 intercept 0.64* 0.28 0.68* 0.16 0.05 0.04 
              
Fit Statistics             
 -2 LL 6841.62** 67539.59** 24721.09** 
Note: *p < 0.05; **=likelihood ratio test significant; estimation method=RSPL 
Class 1: ICCL2=13%; ICCL3=17%; Class 2: ICCL2=11%; ICCL3=15%; Class 3: ICCL2=15%; ICCL3=16% 
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the variance in the quantity of earned credits deducted was accounted for by between-
inmate variability in their characteristics (p ≤ 0.05).  A higher percentage, 17 percent, of 
the variation in the quantity of earned credits deducted was accounted for by between-
facility variability in their characteristics (p ≤ 0.05).  Similar to prior analyses in this 
study, these statistically significant intra-class correlation coefficients provided evidence 
to proceed with the multi-level analysis.    
As a reminder, the Class 2 model was male-specific.  I proceed with the analysis 
to understand whether or not an inmate’s race explained variability in how prison officials 
sanctioned the inmate.  Similar to prior models, this extralegal factor was the main focus 
and, thus, I treated its effects as both fixed and random at the facility level.  Results 
indicated, however, that it did not vary across facilities, leading to the conclusion that 
there were no differences in slopes within facilities in the odds of receiving this sanction 
type (χ2=3.49, df=6, p > 0.05).  Thus, I continued the model building process, treating all 
factors as having fixed effects.  The full model, which contained all infraction-, inmate-, 
and facility-level variables was the best fitting model (χ2=250.04, df=21, p ≤ 0.05).   
For Class 1 infractions, I did not find support for my hypothesis.  The results 
suggested that race, gender, or the joint effects of these variables were not statistically 
significant predictors of the quantity of earned credits removed.  Age was also not 
statistically significant.  With regard to statistically significant predictors of prison 
officials’ decision to remove a specific quantity of earned credits, both infraction-level 
variables such as having prior violations of prison rules as well as the total number of 
sanctions applied for the incident explained variance in the outcome.  Specifically, having 
at least one prior violation increased the log odds of having more earned credits removed. 
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Alternatively, an inmate receiving more sanctions for the infraction predicted a decrease 
in the log odds of the inmates having more earned credits removed.  Lastly, being at a 
maximum/medium security prison compared to a community-level prison predicted an 
increase in the log odds of having more earned credits removed.  Thus, it appears that 
higher-level security prisons are more likely to sentence more harshly with regard to the 
quantity of earned credits removed when this type of sanction is imposed.  Although many 
of the variables in the final model were not statistically significant predictors of the event, 
the full explanatory model did yield a better model fit than the null model, as noted above. 
 
Class 2 
For Class 2 infractions, the likelihood of being at or below each earned credit 
reduction increment varied across both inmates and facilities.  Results suggested that 
approximately 11 percent of the variance in the quantity of earned credits deducted was 
accounted for by between-inmate variability in their characteristics (p ≤ 0.05).  A higher 
percentage, 15 percent, of the variation in the quantity of earned credits deducted was 
accounted for by between-facility variability in their characteristics (p ≤ 0.05).  These 
statistically significant intra-class correlation coefficients provided evidence to proceed 
with the multi-level analysis.    
Once again, I sought to understand whether or not an inmate’s race or gender or 
the combination thereof explained the variability in how prison officials sanctioned the 
inmate.  I treated the effects of these extralegal factors in this model as both fixed and 
random at the facility level, but results indicated that they did not vary across facilities.  
Thus, there were no differences in slopes within facilities on the odds of being at or below 
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each earned credit reduction increment (χ2=8.31, df=14, p > 0.05).  Thus, I continued the 
model building process, treating all factors as having fixed effects.  The full model which 
contained all infraction-, inmate-, and facility-level variables was the best fitting model 
(χ2=1767.67, df=30 p ≤ 0.05).   
With regard to predictors of prison officials’ decision to remove a specific 
quantity of earned credits, both infraction-, inmate-, and facility-level variables were 
statistically significant.  However, inmate-level factors such as race or gender or the race-
gender (as well as race-gender-age) interactions did not explain variation in the decision 
to remove a specific quantity of earned credits.  With regard to the variables that did 
explain the outcomes, specifically, more time having passed between infractions resulted 
in a decreased log odds of having more earned credits removed.  In other words, inmates 
who incurred infractions more frequently were less likely to have more earned credits 
removed.  Having more sanctions for the same infraction also reduced the log odds of 
having more earned credits removed.  Age also mattered, but in a direction that is opposite 
of former analyses in this study.  The length of one’s sentence as well as his or her time 
served up to the infraction was also correlated with fewer earned credits being removed.  
Lastly, being at a maximum/medium security prison compared to a community-level 
prison predicted an increase in the log odds of having more earned credits removed.   
 
Class 3 
For Class 3 infractions, the likelihood of being at or below each earned credit 
reduction increment varied across both inmates and facilities in this model as well.  
Decomposed intra-class correlation coefficients identified the amount of variance 
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explained at each level of the analysis to determine if the regression assumption of 
independence of observations was violated.  Results suggested that approximately 15 
percent of the variance in the quantity of earned credits deducted was accounted for by 
between-inmate variability in their characteristics (p ≤ 0.05).  A slightly higher 
percentage, 16 percent, of the variation in the quantity of earned credits deducted was 
accounted for by between-facility variability in their characteristics (p ≤ 0.05).  Both of 
these supported my use of the multi-level model, suggesting that observations were not 
independent of the inmate or the facility.  In fact, there was a correlation between 
infractions within the same inmate and infractions within the same facility.   
Once again, this model pertained to male inmates only.  Although the impact of 
race was central to this study, it was still not a statistically significant predictor of prison 
officials’ decision-making with regard to the quantity of earned credits deducted.  I also 
tested both its fixed and random effects at the facility level, but findings indicated that it 
did not vary across facilities (χ2=11.01, df=6, p > 0.05).  Given this result, I continued the 
model building process, treating all factors as having fixed effects.  As with prior results, 
the full model was the best fitting model (χ2=3298.65, df=22, p ≤ 0.05).   
At the infraction level, both months to the infraction and total sanctions received 
for the infraction were negatively related to the log odds of being sanctioned to lose a 
greater quantity of earned credits.  In particular, as time between infractions increased, 
and as the total number of sanctions increased, there was a reduced likelihood of having 
more earned credits removed.  Age also mattered, but, once again, it was negatively 
related to the odds of having a greater number of earned credits removed.  Prison officials 
also removed fewer earned credits for inmates serving longer prison sentences.  However, 
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those serving time in higher security prisons were more likely to lose more earned credits 
than those serving time at a community-level facility.  
  
Research Question 4: Examining Use of Maximum Earned Credit Penalty  
 Due to the grouped nature of how earned credits were removed, I proceed further 
into the analysis to answer questions that were unaddressed by RQ.3.  In particular, the 
distribution of the earned credits removed for females who were issued Class 1 and Class 
3 infractions followed a bimodal distribution.  Therefore, their penalties were 
characterized by either receiving or not receiving the maximum penalty.  RQ.3 by its 
design did not allow for this type of analysis and, therefore, I address it within this 
particular research question.  Additionally, this section allows me to further examine the 
penalties for males to understand if dichotomizing the outcome yields race and gender 
differences in the severity of this punishment type.  As a reminder, the objective of RQ.4 
is to examine, “For inmates who received an earned credit sanction, are there race or 
gender differences in who receives the maximum penalty?”  Preliminary data suggest that 
there is relatively little deviation by race in who received the maximum penalty (blacks: 
51 percent; Hispanics: 49 percent; Native Americans: 47 percent; whites: 51 percent), but 
a more substantial deviation by gender (males: 51 percent; females: 42 percent).  As with 
previous analyses, I investigate these differences to understand if these variances are 
meaningful and whether or not they persist once controlling for both the infraction class 
and group compositional differences.  I organize what follows in a similar manner to prior 
sections, with, first, a description of the qualitative differences among inmates in this 
sample and, second, the results of the generalized linear mixed models. 
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Sample Characteristics 
Table 9 provides detail on the sample characteristics for this fourth research 
question.  Once again, the information is reported separately for Class 1, Class 2, and 
Class 3 infractions.  As reported, facility personnel tended to punish rule violators in this 
study by removing the maximum number of earned credits within the range allowed for 
each infraction class.  The largest percentage of incidents with the maximum penalty 
imposed were Class 1 infractions (61 percent).  Although Class 1 was the least severe 
infraction type, it was also the infraction type that carried the smallest range of credits 
that were eligible for removal (1-60 credits), potentially serving as a reason for its most 
frequent use of the maximum penalty.  Class 3 fell second to this statistic, with over half 
of the incidents (53 percent) being sanctioned to lose the maximum number of credits (1-
365).  Class 2 infraction only had the maximum penalty imposed for 47 percent of the 
incidents.    
When characterizing the incident-level (level 1) variables, I found that a higher 
proportion of violent infractions were distributed within the most severe infraction class 
(Class 3), similar to prior samples in this study.  The data also showed that most incidents 
(65-72 percent) were preceded by at least one prior infraction during the same prison 
term.  On average, lesser severity infractions occurred more frequently than the highest 
severity.  Class 3 infractions tended to more often involve multiple rule violations (12 
percent of the time) than Class 1 infractions (five percent of the time).  Additionally, the 
higher severity infractions tended to be sanctioned with more than one sanction type (e.g., 
earned credit sanction and loss of privileges).    
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for RQ.4 
  Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Measures M SD Range M SD Range M SD Range 
Level 1: Infractions                           
Violent Infraction 0.00 0.06 0-1 0.14 0.34 0-1 0.30 0.46 0-1 
Prior Infractions 0.65 0.48 0-1 0.67 0.47 0-1 0.72 0.45 0-1 
Months to Infraction 7.47 11.41 0-152 8.94 11.51 0-176 10.65 12.49 0-145 
Multiple Violations 0.05 0.21 0-1 0.08 0.27 0-1 0.12 0.32 0-1 
Total Sanctions 2.03 0.65 1-4 2.63 0.71 1-6 3.00 0.44 1-8 
  N=1,318 N=6,763 N=2,882 
                    
Level 2: Inmate                   
Male 0.86 0.35 0-1 0.89 0.31 0-1 0.94 0.24 0-1 
Race/ethnicity                   
Black 0.29 0.46 0-1 0.30 0.46 0-1 0.38 0.49 0-1 
Hispanic 0.06 0.24 0-1 0.05 0.22 0-1 0.07 0.26 0-1 
Native American 0.13 0.33 0-1 0.12 0.33 0-1 0.11 0.32 0-1 
White1 0.52 0.50 0-1 0.53 0.50 0-1 0.44 0.50 0-1 
Age (yrs.) 32.42 8.85 18-66 32.77 8.74 18-68 32.36 8.22 19-69 
>=HSD/GED 0.43 0.50 0-1 0.42 0.49 0-1 0.42 0.49 0-1 
LSI-R Risk Score 29.08 5.32 12-49 29.36 5.53 8-49 29.31 5.63 9-49 
Prior Incarcerations 0.52 0.50 0-1 0.53 0.50 0-1 0.58 0.49 0-1 
Sentence (yrs.) 11.55 8.82 1-40 10.70 7.82 0.8-43 11.93 8.19 1.5-43 
Violent Crime 0.32 0.46 0-1 0.33 0.47 0-1 0.41 0.49 0-1 
85% Crime 0.02 0.15 0-1 0.03 0.18 0-1 0.05 0.21 0-1 
Pct. Served 0.20 0.15 0-0.83 0.24 0.15 0-0.91 0.28 0.17 0-0.9 
  N=948 N=3,375 N=1,790 
                    
Level 3: Facility                   
Security Level                   
Max./Med.2 0.31 0.46 0-1 0.30 0.46 0-1 0.51 0.50 0-1 
Minimum 0.47 0.50 0-1 0.29 0.46 0-1 0.27 0.44 0-1 
Community1 0.23 0.42 0-1 0.40 0.49 0-1 0.22 0.41 0-1 
  N=60 N=79 N=73 
                    
Dependent Variable                   
Maximum Penalty (Y) 0.61 0.49 0-1 0.47 0.50 0-1 0.53 0.50 0-1 
1Reference category 
2There are no maximum security facilities for females. 
 
At the inmate level, males received the bulk of all formal infractions, although 
males did represent a smaller proportion of the total incidents within the lower infraction 
classes (86 percent compared to 89-94 percent).  There was little variation by race in most 
cases.  However, there was a noticeable trend in that as infraction severity increased, the 
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percent of blacks within that category also increased; as infraction severity increased, the 
percent of whites within the category decreased.  Additionally, these inmates tended to 
be, on average, in their early 30s, tended to have less than high school education (57-58 
percent), and tended to score high on assessments of their criminogenic risk (29).  Just 
over half (52-58 percent) had served a prior term of incarceration in this state prison 
system.  Regarding factors associated with their crime and sentence, on average, the 
inmates were serving time in prison for a term of 10-12 years, some for violent crimes 
(32-41 percent), and some for crimes that mandated they served eighty-five percent of 
their time (85% crimes) before being eligible to apply earned credits to their sentence or 
to be paroled (2-5 percent).  
At the facility level, the security of the prison in which the inmates were housed 
showed a trend in terms of frequency of least severe to most severe infractions.  Higher 
security prisons, those categorized as maximum and medium security, had a higher 
proportion of Class 3 infractions (51 percent), while minimum security prisons tended to 
have a higher proportion of Class 1 infractions (47 percent).  At community security, 
there was a higher proportion of Class 2 infractions (40 percent).   
It was a noticeable trend that inmates across the distinct samples (RQ.2, RQ.3, 
and RQ.4) shared similar characteristics.  However, those who had the most sanction days 
removed (RQ.4 sample) tended to be less violent, have fewer violent infractions, have 
fewer prior incidents, and be at lower security level facilities when compared to all 
inmates who received an infraction (RQ.2).  I discuss this in more detail below.   
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Findings 
Although there are qualitative differences in the sample composition, I once again 
turn my attention to my analysis of the effects of race and gender, among other factors, 
on prison officials’ decision to sanction an inmate to lose the maximum number of earned 
credits as punishment for his or her behavior.  Table 10 provides the statistical output for 
the full model by infraction class, and I discuss these results in their respective sections. 
As with prior analyses, I tested for multicollinearity between the predictor variables and 
results indicated that a low level of collinearity was present (VIF=1.01-2.76).   
 
Class 1 
As mentioned previously, Class 1 infractions were the lowest severity among the 
three types.  However, when speaking in terms of frequency at which the maximum 
penalty was imposed, Class 1 infractions showed the highest occurrence.  Again, due to 
these data containing multiple levels of analysis, I tested for a correlation between 
observations.  Results suggested that approximately 10 percent of the variance in the 
decision to punish by imposing the maximum earned credit sanction was accounted for 
by between-inmate variability in their characteristics (p ≤ 0.05).  A higher percentage, 16 
percent, of the variation in the decision to punish in this way was accounted for by 
between-facility variability in their characteristics (p ≤ 0.05).  As with all other analyses, 
these intra-class correlation coefficients supported my employing a statistical model that 
accounted for the clustering of the data.   
I proceeded with the analysis to understand whether or not an inmate’s race or 
gender, or the combination thereof explained variability in how prison officials  
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Table 10. RQ.4 GLMM Estimates for Receiving the Maximum Credit Penalty 
            Class 1           Class 2           Class 3 
Measures b se b se b se 
Intercept -3.43 2.05  -3.60* 0.77 -2.49 1.45 
              
Level 1: Infractions             
Violent Infraction ----- ----- -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.11 
Prior Infractions -0.09 0.22 0.12 0.07 0.20 0.12 
Months to Infraction 0.02 0.01 0.01* 0.00 0.05* 0.01 
Multiple Violations -0.86 0.51 0.15 0.11 0.04 0.14 
Total Sanctions 0.57* 0.15 0.66* 0.05 0.71* 0.11 
              
Level 2: Inmate             
Male 1.67 1.46 -0.31 0.61 -2.14 1.20 
Race/ethnicity             
Black -2.39 3.06 -0.63 0.89 -4.23 2.33 
Hispanic 18.50 22.55 0.25 2.54 -8.25 10.46 
Native American 2.76 2.61 -1.85 1.08 -6.01 3.43 
Age 0.12 0.08 0.08* 0.03 0.11* 0.05 
Age (sq.) 0.00 0.00  -0.00* 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 
Male*Black 2.98 3.16 1.12 0.93 4.80 2.59 
Male*Hispanic -19.97 22.61 -0.50 2.61 8.42 10.49 
Male*Native American -2.07 2.91 2.28 1.49 6.29 3.50 
Male*Age -0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03 
Black*Age 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.07 
Hispanic*Age -0.58 0.76 -0.02 0.08 0.34 0.40 
Native American*Age -0.08 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.19 0.11 
Male*Black*Age -0.11 0.11 -0.04 0.03 -0.15 0.08 
Male*Hispanic*Age 0.64 0.76 0.03 0.09 -0.34 0.40 
Male*Native American*Age 0.06 0.09 -0.08 0.06 -0.19 0.11 
>=HS/GED -0.06 0.21 0.04 0.06 -0.05 0.10 
LSI-R Score -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Prior Incarceration 0.15 0.22 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.10 
Sentence (yrs.) 0.00 0.02 0.01* 0.01 0.05* 0.01 
Violent Crime 0.07 0.24 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.11 
85% Crime 0.12 0.67 -0.09 0.17 -0.26 0.25 
Pct. Served 0.01* 0.23 0.18* 0.08 0.17 0.10 
              
Level 3: Facility             
Security Level             
Max./Med. -0.44 0.40 -0.43 0.33  -1.97* 0.18 
Minimum 0.03 0.38 -0.36 0.36  -1.12* 0.18 
              
Random Effects             
Level 2 intercept 0.46* 0.18 0.31* 0.06 0.49 0.11 
Level 3 intercept 0.81* 0.30 1.09 0.24 0.06* 0.04 
              
Fit Statistics             
 -2 LL 5939.46** 30234.81** 13635.22** 
Note: *p < 0.05; **=likelihood ratio test significant; estimation method=RSPL 
Class 1: ICCL2=10%; ICCL3=16%; Class 2: ICCL2=8%; ICCL3=23%; Class 3: ICCL2=9%; ICCL3=13% 
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sanctioned inmates to the maximum earned credit penalty.  Once again, I treated the 
effects of these extra-legal factors as both fixed and random at the facility level.  Results 
indicated, however, that they did not vary across facilities, leading to the conclusion that 
there were no differences in slopes within facilities on the odds of receiving the maximum 
earned credit penalty (χ2=2.37, df=14, p > 0.05). Therefore, I continued the model 
building process, treating all factors as having fixed effects.  The full model provided a 
better fit to the data than the unconditional model (χ2=165.81, df=29, p ≤ 0.05).   
Overall, many factors failed to explain the variability in prison officials’ decision 
to impose the maximum earned credit penalty for Class 1 infractions, particularly one’s 
race, gender, and age, or the combination of these variables.  Those that helped to explain 
variance in the outcome were the number of sanctions an inmate received and an inmate’s 
proximity to his or her prison release date.  Specifically, as the total number of sanctions 
for the infraction increased, so did the log odds of receiving the maximum penalty.  
Sanctioning officials were also more likely to sentence an inmate to the maximum penalty 
the closer the inmate was to his or her prison release date.   
 
Class 2 
Even though Class 2 infractions were generally more severe than Class 1 
infractions, the use of the maximum earned credit penalty was less frequent.  In examining 
whether or not a multi-level model was warranted, the statistically significant intra-class 
correlation coefficients indicated that approximately eight percent of the variability in the 
maximum penalty rate was accounted for by between-inmate variability in their 
characteristics (p ≤ 0.05).  Twenty-three percent was accounted for by between-facility 
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variability in their characteristics (p ≤ 0.05).  This again supported the use of a multi-level 
model, as there were correlations between observations within the same inmate or within 
the same facility.   
 Although the impact of race and gender were central to this study, again race or 
gender or the combination of the two were not statistically significant predictors of prison 
officials’ decision to punish an inmate by imposing the maximum earned credit penalty.  
I tested both the fixed and random effects at the facility level, but findings indicated that 
they did not vary across facilities (χ2=6.92, df=14, p > 0.05).  Thus, I continued the model 
building process, treating all factors as having fixed effects.  As with prior results, the full 
model was the best fitting model (χ2=548.22, df=30, p ≤ 0.05).   
 Some variables did predict the log odds of receiving the maximum earned credit 
penalty, and they were:  time to the infraction, the total sanctions an inmate received for 
the infraction, the inmate’s age, his or her total sentence length, and the proximity to his 
or her prison release date.  All variables mentioned were positively related to the odds of 
having the maximum earned credits removed, with the exception of age.  Age exhibited 
a curvilinear relationship, where the odds of receiving the maximum earned credit 
sanction increased up to age 39 and then began to decline after that point. Again, I tested 
the joint effect of age with race and gender, but results suggested there were no 
differences by specific groups.  Similar to Class 1, the data suggested that the full model 
was an improvement over the null model (results of the deviance test are provided above); 
however, few variables explained the variation in prison official’s decision-making 




Although Class 3 infractions were the greatest severity among the three types of 
infractions, this class of infractions still did not receive the maximum earned credit 
penalty as often as Class 1 infractions.  An analysis of the intra-class correlation 
coefficients suggested that approximately nine percent of the variance in officials’ 
decision to punish by imposing the maximum earned credit sanction was accounted for 
by between-inmate variability in their characteristics (p ≤ 0.05); 13 percent of the 
variation in the decision was accounted for by between-facility variability in their 
characteristics (p ≤ 0.05).  These statistically significant intra-class correlation 
coefficients provided evidence to proceed with the multi-level analysis. Through the 
model building process, I again estimated both the fixed and random effects of race, 
gender, and their combinations to understand if their intercepts and slopes varied across 
facilities.  Results were not statistically significant (χ2=9.75, df=14, p > 0.05) and, 
therefore, I proceeded to the full model these factors as having fixed effects.   
As with the model for Class 2 infractions, some incident-level variables predicted 
the log odds of receiving the maximum earned credit penalty, and they were:  time to the 
infraction as well as the total sanctions an inmate received for the infraction.  Both had 
positive effects on the outcome, where an increase in the time between infractions as well 
as receiving more sanctions for the infraction predicted an increase in the log odds of 
having the maximum earned credits removed.  With regard to inmate-level factors, an 
inmate’s age mattered, yielding an increase in the odds of the outcome occurring up to 
the age of 45.  After this point, the odds of receiving the maximum earned credit penalty 
decreased.  The effect of age did not vary when testing for its interaction with various 
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race and gender combinations.  Lengthier prison sentences also predicted greater odds of 
receiving the maximum earned credit sanction.  However, as revealed in earlier analysis 
and continuing to appear in these later analyses was the finding that an inmate’s race, 
gender, or combination of these variables did not predict prison officials’ decision to 
sanction an inmate to the maximum earned credit penalty.  Furthermore, being in a 
maximum/medium or minimum-security prison compared to a community facility 
predicted a decrease in the log odds of the infraction receiving the maximum earned credit 
penalty.    
 
Summary of Sanction Findings 
A second focal point of this study was the replication of race and gender 
disparities in post-sentencing sanction outcomes.  In particular, I evaluated the impact of 
these extralegal factors on the likelihood of a prison official to sanction an inmate to lose 
earned credits as well as the on the likelihood of having more earned credits removed.  
Due to the multiple levels of target data for this part of the study (i.e., infraction, inmate, 
and facility), I evaluated whether or not there were correlations between the multiple 
observations that belonged to an inmate or to a facility.  Results indicated that the data 
were clustered and that a proportion of the variation in the outcome was, in fact, due to 
this clustering.  Regarding the inmate-level clustering, intra-class correlation coefficients 
ranged between 0.09 and 0.19; they ranged between 0.13 and 0.34 for the facility-level 
clustering. 
With this evidence, I proceeded to analyze the data using generalized linear mixed 
models.  For all three research questions, the data did not support my hypotheses.  
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Findings indicated that, whether an inmate was male, female, black, Hispanic, Native 
American, white, or some specific combination of the former, race and gender were not 
predictive of post-sentencing sanction outcomes.  When combining the effect of age with 
these variables, I still did not find statistically significant joint effects; although age did 
have a statistically significant main effect in some models.  Other variables for which I 
controlled, however, suggested that they did explain some of the variation in the type and 
in the severity of the sanction an inmate received.  Although the results varied by model, 
characteristics of the incident, characteristics of the inmate’s prison term, and the type of 
facility to which the inmate was assigned were predictive of the outcome.   
As indicated by the analysis for RQ.2, models for Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 
infractions suggested that an inmate had increased odds of receiving an earned credit 
sanction if he or she received multiple violations during or multiple sanctions for the same 
incident.  The data also supported this finding for inmates who served a longer prison 
sentences.  The strength of these effects, however, was weaker as the infraction class 
became more severe.  If the inmate was in prison for an 85% crime or if the inmate was 
assigned to a facility with a higher level of security, then these attributes predicted a 
decrease in the odds of receiving an earned credit sanction.  This was true for all infraction 
classes.  The strength of these effects, however, did not show a consistent trend by 
infraction class.  From this point, the results of infraction-specific models began to 
deviate.  Although no other factors were statistically significant for Class 1 infractions 
with the exception of percent of time served, a few other variables continued to explain 
variation in the odds of receiving an earned credit sanction for Class 2 and Class 3 
infractions.  Specifically, age exhibited a curvilinear relationship.  The remainder of the 
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statistically significant variables described the incident:  if it was violent, if there were 
prior violations, and if multiple months had passed up to the incident.  For both models, 
if the inmate had prior violations, then this predicted lower odds of receiving an earned 
credit sanction.  If more time passed with no incident, then this predicted greater odds of 
receiving an earned credit sanction.  Infraction class-specific models were not consistent, 
however, in the directionality of the effects for violent infractions.   
The models for RQ.3 provided a poorer fit with regard to explaining variation in 
the quantity of earned credits removed.  For Class 1 infractions (males only), if prior 
violations preceded the incident or if the inmate was assigned to a maximum/medium 
security facility compared to a community-level facility, then this predicted greater odds 
of having more earned credits removed.  If the inmate received multiple sanctions for the 
incident, then this predicted a few number of earned credits being removed.  Examining 
the results for Class 2 and Class 3 (males only) infractions suggested a better model fit as 
well as more consistency between the models.  The more time that passed incident-free, 
the more sanctions imposed for the incident, and the longer the inmate’s prison sentence 
all predicted a decrease in the odds of having more earned credits removed.  These effects 
were stronger for Class 3 infractions. For both models, age exhibited a curvilinear effect, 
and those at higher levels of security were more likely to have more earned credits 
removed.   
RQ.4 examined if there were race or gender disparities in being sanctioned to the 
maximum earned credit penalty.  This research question served in part to supplement the 
findings of RQ.3 due to females being excluded from the analysis of Class 1 and Class 3 
infractions.  The results from the two research questions, however, indicated directionally 
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similar outcomes.  Again, race, gender, and the race-gender (as well as the race-gender-
age) combinations were not statistically significant.  The results also indicated that the 
model for Class 1 infractions had the poorest fit.  Only the inmate having more sanctions 
imposed for the incident and the inmate having served a greater proportion of his or her 
prison sentence predicted an increase in the odds of having the maximum earned credit 
penalty imposed.  Regarding Class 2 and Class 3 infractions, the inmate having more 
sanctions imposed for the incident also predicted an increase in the odds of receiving the 
maximum earned credit penalty.  And the effects of this variable in these models were 
stronger as well.  Lastly, if more time passed up to each infraction, if the inmate was 
younger, and if the inmate had a longer prison sentence to serve, then this predicted an 
increase in his or her odds of receiving the maximum earned credit penalty.  Only for 
Class 3 infractions, however, did the facility’s security level matter, where being at higher 
levels of security predicted lower odds of receiving the maximum earned credit penalty.   
It should be noted that the statistical models employed for RQ.2, RQ.3, and RQ.4 
(as well as RQ.1) included many interaction terms, a decision driven by the theoretical 
approach and findings among extant literature regarding the joint effect of race and 
gender as well as race, gender, and age on criminal justice outcomes.  Including these 
series of interaction terms in the models may have resulted in no effects due to my 
overanalyzing the data. To ensure the validity of the findings, I specified more 
parsimonious models, but arrived at similar conclusions.  Thus, I presented the larger 




Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion 
A wealth of research has provided evidence that disparate group outcomes exist 
at all stages of criminal justice processing, beginning at points of first contact and 
extending to criminal sentencing.  These disparate group outcomes are due, in part, to 
biased decision-making, resulting in racial minorities and males being overrepresented in 
rates of arrest, prosecution, conviction, and sentencing.  The purpose of the current study 
is to extend our knowledge of the breadth of biased decision-making in the criminal 
justice system by examining outcomes at an additional stage of the criminal justice 
process:  post-sentencing.  Using a large sample of offenders who exited a Southern state 
correctional system between 2012 and 2013, I employed a series of models to understand 
whether or not there was a replication of disparate race and gender outcomes in the 
handling of prison rule violations and their subsequent sanctions.  Specifically, I sought 
answers to two broad research questions:  Does race or gender influence prison officials’ 
decision to issue an infraction?  Do these same characteristics influence the type of 
sanction a prison official issues for the infraction?  I hypothesized that racial minorities 
were more likely to incur a prison infraction than whites and that the severity of their 
sanctions was greater.  I also hypothesized that males were cited for an infraction more 
often than females and that their punishments were also more severe, but only for less 
egregious rule violations.  For more egregious infractions, the gender gap in punishments 
was reduced if not fully eliminated.   
The findings of the analyses provided partial support for my hypotheses.  Inmates 
of a specific race or gender did experience different prison infraction outcomes, net of 
other variables.  In particular, black inmates were more likely to have received a formal 
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prison infraction when compared to whites.  However, the analyses indicated no 
differences for Hispanics or Native Americans when compared to whites.  The finding 
for Hispanics is not consistent with prior research on racial sentencing disparities 
(Steffensmeier and Demuth 2001; Franklin 2013) and may be explained, in part, by this 
study’s measure of being Hispanic.  Scholars have noted that the inability to separate 
one’s ethnicity from one’s race tends to dampen (Frase 2009) or even alter findings, an 
issue that may occur when research relies on official state data that makes no distinction 
between the two constructs (Steffensmeier and Demuth 2001).  A discrepancy between 
the prison intake personnel’s categorization of the inmate’s race and the sanctioning 
official’s perception of one’s race could also be a source of discrepancy in the data.  The 
non-finding for Native Americans is neither consistent nor inconsistent with prior studies.  
Extant research on sentencing outcomes for this racial group when compared to whites 
reveals that punishments vary depending on crime and sentence type, where at times 
Native Americans are treated more harshly and other times they are treated more leniently 
(Alvarez and Bachman 1996; Franklin 2013).  Thus, continued research on this subgroup 
is warranted to more definitely speak to the trend.  With regard to gender, the data 
suggested that males were more likely than females to receive a formal infraction.  This 
result is consistent with prior research that finds females are generally treated more 
leniently by all actors of the criminal justice system.  When considering the joint effects 
of race and gender on the likelihood of having a formal infraction filed, there were no 
differences for these distinct race-gender combinations.  The null effects regarding race-
gender combinations are contrary to studies that find moderated effects among groups of 
offenders in formal sentencing outcomes, where (young) black males are sentenced more 
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harshly than other groups (Steffensemeier et al. 1998).   They also are contrary to research 
suggesting that, while females commonly receive leniency in punishment, leniency in 
punishment is not always afforded equally to black and white females. The discussions 
below may help to reconcile these unexpected outcomes.  
Although this study showed partial support for the replication of race and gender 
disparities in who received a formal prison infraction, results revealed no differences by 
race or gender in terms of how prison officials sanctioned the inmates for their cited 
infraction.  Being black, Hispanic, Native American, white, male, female, or any 
combination of these characteristics did not predict whether or not an inmate was 
sanctioned to lose earned credits for the misbehavior nor did it predict the quantity of 
earned credits one lost.  Instead, prison officials’ decision-making with regard to how to 
punish the misbehavior was generally predicted by characteristics of the infraction, 
characteristics of the inmate’s prison sentence, and a characteristic of the facility which 
housed the inmate.  These results are congruent with prior research that has found 
minimal to no race and or gender effects in this particular form of post-sentencing 
(Crouch 1985; Steiner and Cain 2017).  Additionally, this study originally intended to 
review infraction-level incident reports to understand how the context of the incident 
leading to the infraction helped to explain disparate sanction outcomes by race or gender.  
Due to the results indicating that there were no race or gender differences in the 
application of an earned credit sanction, this subsequent inquiry was not necessary.   
Overall, these data show a replication of race and gender disparities in how prison 
infractions are issued, but they do not show race and gender disparities in the application 
of earned credit sanctions.  As over half of all infractions were sanctioned to lose earned 
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credits, the findings in this study are encouraging.  Although race and gender disparities 
exist from arrest to sentencing, the disparities stop, at least in some ways, at post-
sentencing.  An even larger implication is that the financial and institutionalization 
impacts of removing earned credits in disparate ways for specific groups of inmates are 
not exacerbated by actions at this stage of the justice system.  This said, I must restate 
that this particular state prison system did sanction over half of all rule-violating inmates 
to lose earned credits.  Although we can be encouraged that the specific groups of 
individuals of focus in this study were not treated in disparate manners, the overwhelming 
reliance of this particular correctional system on removing earned credits as a sanction 
tactic does warrant attention.  As stated previously, the average financial impact to house 
an inmate per day in the United States is approximately $91.00 (Mai and Subramanian 
2017).  Additionally, greater amounts of time behind bars raises concerns of increased 
institutionalization of the inmate, or an effect in which inmates may adopt a (greater) 
criminal orientation.  Thus, additional work is needed to assess more broadly the 
infraction and sanction behaviors in other state prison systems, especially those in other 
regions of the United States, to more definitively conclude that race and gender disparities 
in post-sentencing are less apparent.   
Although this research did not find support for the hypotheses regarding disparate 
sanction outcomes, several additional explanations that contextualize this conclusion are 
important for discussion.  First and foremost, a potential selection bias is at play.  One 
objective of this study was to fully estimate the impact of removing earned credits on an 
inmate’s total time behind bars, an objective that required the use of inmates who exited 
prison.  Inmates who exited prison, however, may be characteristically very different than 
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inmates who remain in prison.  It may be more fruitful for future studies to utilize non-
released inmates when examining potential disparities at post-sentencing.  With that said, 
Steiner and Cain (2017) employed their analysis on a sample of non-released inmates and 
found minimal gender and no race differences in who received a good time sanction.  
With regard to the severity of the good time sanction (i.e., quantity of good time removed) 
they found no gender or race differences in the outcomes.  It is noteworthy, however, that 
it was rare in their Midwestern state prison system for prison officials to sanction inmates 
to lose good time credits (only 6 percent of all infractions) due to concerns over prison 
overcrowding.  An additional selection bias is worth mentioning.  I attempted to 
emphasize that this study evaluated formal prison infractions.  There may be qualitative 
differences between inmates who proceeded through the formal infraction and sanction 
process and inmates who were handled informally.  Prison officials may exhibit fewer 
inconsistencies in how they treat inmates who were exposed to the formal infraction and 
sanction process.  Inmates subject to preferential treatment may have never made it to the 
point of having a formal infraction filed or to the point of receiving a formal sanction. 
The particular sanction evaluated in this study, loss of earned credits, also requires 
a separate discussion.  Although these analyses failed to show that earned credit sanctions 
were inconsistently imposed across groups of inmates, more research is needed to 
understand whether or not other sanctions types such as segregation or removal of 
privileges exhibit similar findings.  It is also unknown whether or not imposing an earned 
credit sanction is considered punitive on behalf of the sanctioning personnel.  If this type 
of sanction is considered to be a lesser punishment, then disparate outcomes in post-
sentencing could be visible for other, harsher sanction types.  Before concluding that there 
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are no racial disparities in post-sentencing sanctions, additional analyses are warranted to 
more rigorously evaluate the distinct forms of punishment.   
A final line of explanation for these non-findings pertain to the theoretical 
framework on which this study is based.  I used the Focal Concerns Perspective 
supplemented by the Selective Chivalry Thesis to guide my thinking on how and why 
race and gender differences would be replicated at post-sentencing.  A central tenet of the 
Focal Concerns Perspective is that decision-makers in the criminal justice system 
oftentimes have incomplete information on a case or on an offender.  As a result, they 
tend to develop a perceptual shorthand to assist them in their decision-making, which 
may include racial and gender stereotypes that influence their thinking on an offender’s 
propensity to commit criminal acts in the future.  These stereotypes tend to indicate an 
offender’s blameworthiness and the need of facility personnel to protect others from the 
dangerousness of the inmate.  However, with regard to punishment in prison, this study 
may have placed an overemphasis on the role of race- and gender-based stereotypes and 
a de-emphasis on the role of general inmate-based stereotypes.  Particularly, “inmate” 
may be a master status that is a greater stigma for an individual rather than the individual’s 
race or gender (Goffman 1963).  The greater an individual is woven in the depths of the 
criminal justice system, the more others may label him as criminal and as an outcast.  
Under this frame of thinking, then, inmates are viewed by prison officials as a 
homogenous group rather than heterogeneous classes within the larger grouping of 
“inmate.”   
Similarly related, this study hypothesized that sanction outcomes would be similar 
to preceding stages of the criminal justice system due to prison official’s decision-making 
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being based on some perceptual shorthand regarding the offender’s culpability and 
dangerousness.  The prison environment is oftentimes very different than a typical 
courtroom or traffic stop encounter, however, where greater race and gender disparities 
in decision-making outcomes are realized.  Inmates serve time behind bars for long 
periods of time, much longer than the short amount of time a police official is engaged 
with a citizen at a traffic stop or that a judge is faced with hearing the facts of a criminal 
case.  The inmate may serve years in a prison and spend years surrounded by the same 
prison personnel, and a level of rapport may develop between inmate and officers that 
does not typically exist at other stages of the criminal justice process.  This extended 
contact could help to dispel stereotypes that could otherwise be the basis for one’s 
decision given the absence of other legal information.  If this is true, then the contact 
hypothesis may be a more fruitful avenue to pursue in this line of research.  The contact 
hypothesis suggests that exposure to and interaction with individuals different than 
oneself can lead to a positive impression of the other, thereby dispelling stereotypes 
(Allport 1954).  But, oftentimes, this greater acceptance of differences is attained when 
those in contact are of equal status.  This said, research on this hypothesis yields that 
interracial contact reduces an individual’s stereotypes of others, especially with regard to 
whites’ perceptions of black criminality (Mancini et al. 2015).  Although this present 
study did find race and gender differences in who received a prison infraction, the null 
effects for sanction outcomes may be in some ways explained, in part, by a different 
theoretical framework.  These frameworks may point to either the role of “inmate” being 
a master status or the role of exposure in dispelling out-group stereotypes that influence 
individuals’ perceptions of others.   
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I have spent time recapitulating the outcomes of this study and offering possible 
explanations for why my hypotheses were only partially supported.  With these 
explanations in mind, I would be remiss to not dedicate attention to limitations of this 
study, limitations from which future research on post-sentencing could benefit if able to 
be considered.  Most importantly, this study was not able to control for behavioral 
characteristics of the supervising personnel that may have impacted their decision.  This 
particular prison system’s policy provided an exhaustive list of available sanctions, but 
prison officials enjoyed considerable flexibility in determining which sanction to impose.  
Given this flexibility, this study was not able to consider why an official decided to issue 
a specific sanction type.  For instance, does a sanctioning official’s decision depend on 
his own perception of what is punitive or what he thinks the inmate perceives to be 
punitive?  This behavioral component is very difficult to capture when it is not explicitly 
controlled in the study’s design, but future work may consider the impact of this 
perspective at an earlier stage in the process in an attempt to account for its influence.  
Future work may also benefit from evaluating the impact of sanctioning personnel’s 
demographic features relative to the inmate.  For instance, do male officers who sanction 
male inmates result in distinct outcomes compared to female officers who sanction female 
inmates?  Do white officials sanctioning Native American inmates yield distinct 
outcomes compared to black officials sanctioning white inmates?  The combinations are 
many, but this is a perspective that would provide a robust alternative to the continued 
examination of group differences in post-sentencing.  I also give attention to the impact 
of an inmate and his participation in prison programming during his time in prison.  In 
this prison system, participation in a treatment or educational program required the inmate 
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to be infraction-free and incurring of an infraction may have resulted in the inmate’s 
removal from the program.  Thus, to prevent an interruption in services, personnel may 
have been less likely to file a certain type of infraction because it might impact an 
inmate’s prison standing.  Future studies should control for the potential influence of this 
variable on the outcome.   
I also mention a final limitation of this study that would impact future analyses of 
this particular state prison as well as other studies which evaluate post-sentencing in other 
regions of the United States.  Under strict budgetary constraints shortly after these data 
were collected, this particular prison system began to restore lost earned credits in an 
attempt to manage the overwhelming overpopulation issue experienced in recent years.  
Although this policy originated in the 1970s, the large-scale implementation in more 
recent years was unique.  I view this department-wide restoration of lost earned credits 
as an action outside of normal processes; therefore, to be able to generalize these findings 
to other prison release cohorts, I must make mention of this occurrence.   
Although indicated above, it is worthy of being restated.  We can be encouraged 
by the finding that race and gender disparities throughout the criminal justice system 
appear to lessen at the point of post-sentencing earned credit sanctioning, a sanction type 
that has a direct impact on an inmate’s time behind bars.  However, this encouraging 
outcome should not overshadow the finding that there are race and gender differences by 
whom is cited with a formal prison infraction.  As Crutchfield et al. (2010:931) ask, 
“Can…any statistically significant differences in criminal justice outcomes based on 
anything but legal factors be acceptable?” I assert that even this finding is unacceptable 
and work is needed to correct the injustice so that race and gender ceases to matter in 
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these situations. This Southern state’s prison system should be encouraged to develop 
more explicit guidelines to safeguard against any type of disparate outcome.  Although 
studies suggest that guidelines alone will not be enough to eliminate biased sentencing 
(Everett and Wojtkiewicz 2002), research does indicate that there are fewer (gender) 
disparities in sentencing when sentence guidelines are available (Mitchell 2005).  Thus, 
this prison system may benefit from a centralized body to handle how prison infractions 
are issued. At the time of this study, sanction outcomes were decided at each facility. This 
centralized body is important, as injustices in who is punished and who is not is hidden 
from the public eye.  Any potential safeguard to reduce the possibility of disparate 
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Appendix A: Infractions* 
Class 1 Violent
 Making sexual threats to another person.  Y 
 Correspondence/conduct with visitor in violation of posted regulations, 
excluding sexual activity.  N 
 Aiding or abetting in the commission of any rule violation.  N 
 Monetary misconduct-Entering into contractual agreements requiring 
time payments; receiving salary/ wage advances; entering into other 
contractual agreements; failure to turn in all pay checks or money 
received. House arrest/pre-parole conditional supervision/electronic 
monitoring/specialized supervision program offenders will receive prior 
written authorization to enter into contractual agreements that require 
time payments. Also, they will turn in monies in a timely manner for 
program support fees, restitution, court costs, or other required financial 
obligations.  N 
 Employment misconduct-Quitting job without prior approval; getting 
fired for misconduct on job, tardiness, or shirking of duties; failure to 
notify staff/employer when too ill to work.  N 
 Unauthorized use of mail or telephone, to include passing unauthorized 
messages or conducting unauthorized activities.  N 
 Unauthorized contacts with public.  N 
 Interfering with taking of count.  N 
 Bucking an offender line.  N 
 Not having proper ID or displaying ID improperly.  N 
 Possession/use/introduction of tobacco for an amount of less than 20 
cigarettes and/or less than one ounce of tobacco-like products; lighter 
and/or one book/box of matches.  N 
 Charging another offender for services rendered.  N 
 Use of tobacco or tobacco like products in an unauthorized outside area.  N 
 Failure to follow sign-in/sign-out procedures.  N 
 Unexcused absence from work/school assignment or other program 
activity.  N 
 Unauthorized presence in another’s cell/living quarters.  N 
 Unauthorized use of state/private/public property/supplies.  N 
 Forgery of any type to obtain goods/materials (Attach document where 
possible).  N 
 Taking of property.  N 
 Possession of money or currency, unless specifically authorized.  N 
 Possession of property belonging to another person or offender; 
unauthorized state/private/public property, or official 
documents/materials, or legal material of another offender.  N 
 Possession of clothing or property not authorized by the facility, to 
include possession of excess personal property.  N 
 Possession of gambling paraphernalia that is not specifically authorized 
property as specified by OP-030120.  N 
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 Insolence to staff member or citizens.  N 
 Failure to comply with rules and conditions of supervision, contents of 
any community based supervision program, accountability plan, 
itinerary, or other contracted agreement.  N 
 Lying to staff member.  N 
 Malingering; feigning an illness.  N 
 Participating in games of chance for gain/profit.  N 
 The receiving, trading, selling, giving, or loaning of property.  N 
 Attempting to give, giving, or receiving money or anything of value as a 
bribe or inducement.  N 
  
Class 2 Violent
 Bestiality.  Y 
 Battery of another person.  Y 
 Assault; any willful attempt or threat to inflict injury upon the person of 
another.  Y 
 Making sexual proposals, innuendos, inferences, or threats to another 
offender.  Y 
 Using abusive/obscene language.  Y 
 Making profane/obscene gestures to a staff member or citizen.  Y 
 Interfering with the canine or handler in the performance of their duties.  N 
 Any attempt to receive or receipt of money or property in any form, 
from another offender or another offender’s family member, as well as 
sending money or property to another offender or offender’s family 
member; this includes attempting to conceal the transfer of money or 
property through another person who is not a family member.  N 
 Under the influence of and/or any use of illegal drugs, alcohol, 
intoxicating chemicals or any medication in an unauthorized manner, 
including “cheeking” or “palming” the medication. “Cheeking or 
palming” medication is defined as any attempt to fail to promptly take 
medication as ordered by staff by hiding the medication while 
representing to the staff in any manner that the medication was taken as 
ordered.  N 
 Use of mail, telephone or computer to conduct illegal business.  N 
 Tattooing or possession of tattoo paraphernalia/self-mutilation, 
including body piercing except earrings authorized for females/any 
attempts to inflict self-injury or ingestion of any harmful or poisonous 
substance.  N 
 Carrying out any action designed to coerce administration, and/or 
fraternizing with any staff member, with the exception of sexual 
activity.  N 
 Tampering with or blocking any lock, locking device, or other security 
equipment.  N 
 Refusal to submit to substance abuse testing for determination of 
violation of rule 02-2. Testing is not mandatory when it is evident that 
the offender has used a chemical substance. If the offender alleges N 
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inability to produce a specimen, a two hour delay period under 
observation will be allowed.  
 Attempt to contaminate, pollute, alter, substitute, or destroy any urine 
sample or report.  N 
 Failure to cooperate in any investigation. Does not include disciplinary 
procedures investigations.  N 
 To alter or mutilate any official document, offender ID, or evidence or 
to destroy or attempt to destroy any evidence, including but not limited 
to, eating it or flushing it down a toilet.  N 
 Violation of operating procedure entitled “Correspondence, Publication, 
and Audio/Video Media Guidelines.”  N 
 Program Misconduct-Refusing to participate in an agency sanctioned 
program, quitting prior to successful completion, or being removed 
from the program for any reason. Education misconduct to include 
cheating on tests, or possession/passing of stolen tests or answer keys.  N 
 Refusal of medical care/appointment after transportation to an outside 
medical facility.  N 
 Possession/use/introduction of tobacco for an amount of twenty or more 
cigarettes and/or one ounce or more of tobacco-like products; more than 
one lighter and/or more than one book/box of matches.  N 
 Possession/utilization of a cell phone or cell phone paraphernalia in 
community corrections.  N 
 Use of tobacco or tobacco like products in a state owned building.  N 
 Outside defined boundaries within facility as defined by facility or 
present in a restricted area.  N 
 Demanding/receiving money or favors or anything of value in return for 
protection against others, to avoid bodily harm, or under threat of 
informing.  N 
 Breaking into another person’s room/locker.  N 
 Destruction/mutilation/malicious alteration of state/private/public 
property to include the intentional blocking of any drain in any manner 
which causes flooding.  N 
 Destruction of property of another person.  N 
 Manufacture of intoxicants.  N 
 Counterfeiting, forging, or unauthorized reproductions of any document, 
article of identification, money, security, or official paper.  N 
 Possession of unauthorized identification.  N 
 Possession/introduction of unauthorized tool.  N 
 Possession of any other item not authorized by the facility.  N 
 Engaging in sexual activity with another consenting person excluding 
time on passes.  N 
 Indecent exposure, to include urinating or defecating in any location 
other than a toilet, or masturbating in view of staff, visitor, or vendor.  N 
 Failure to obey verbal and/or written order of staff member in a prompt 
manner.  N 
 Failure to obey a group order (e.g., “move”, “lockdown”).  N 
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 Making a false allegation against any person, with the exception of 
other offenders.  N 
 Preparing or conducting a gambling operation.  N 
 Failure to comply with the limits placed on extended limits of 
confinement.  N 
 Failure to return from any approved activity or pass at the designated 
time.  N 
 Failure to successfully complete telephone contact while participating in 
an off-center activity or pass.  N 
 Outside defined boundaries of facility without permission (Community 
Correctional Centers, Community Work Centers, and Halfway Houses 
only).  N 
  
Class 3 Violent
 Seizing another person as a hostage.  Y 
 Riot. May be used only when the director declares an emergency status 
in writing.  Y 
 Communicating a threat to staff either in person or in writing.  Y 
 Killing another person(s) to include any attempt to cause grave injury to 
another person rendering that person brain dead or left with the loss of a 
limb or organ.  Y 
 Participating in activity that directly results in the intentional death of 
another person.  Y 
 Participating in an activity that directly results in the intentional injury 
of another person(s).  Y 
 Rape or forced sexual act.  Y 
 Kidnapping another person.  Y 
 Battery of staff member with physical contact which results in bodily 
harm.  Y 
 Battery of a staff member with physical contact which does not result in 
bodily harm.  Y 
 Making sexual threats, innuendo, or inferences to, or stalking a staff 
member or citizen.  Y 
 Threats of bodily harm or death to a staff member or citizen.  Y 
 Possession/introduction of any gun, firearm, weapon, ammunition, 
knife, sharpened instrument, or Class 2 tool, to include keys and 
security equipment.  Y 
 Adulteration of any foods or drinks.  N 
 Possession/introduction of any explosive, combustible substance, 
fireworks, and/or unauthorized matches/lighters being used in 
conjunction with any item listed in this rule violation as an incendiary 
device.  N 
 Banding together for purposes of demonstration, work stoppage, hunger 
strike, etc.  N 
 Taking over a part of the physical plant.  N 
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 Participation with others or an attempt to incite others in a course of 
disorderly conduct: (a) with purpose to commit or facilitate commission 
of a felony or misdemeanor; or (b) with purpose to prevent or coerce 
official action; or (c) when the actor or any other participant to the 
knowledge of the actor uses or plans to use a firearm or other deadly 
weapon.  N 
 Involvement in writing, circulating, or signing a petition that poses a 
threat to the security of the facility.  N 
 Running from or resisting apprehension or refusal to submit to restraints 
within facility, to include hiding within the facility to avoid detection or 
with the intent to escape.  N 
 Selling, trading, bartering, or giving prescribed medication/drugs to 
another person.  N 
 Possessing, preparing or writing in any manner, a document in any 
form, which poses a threat to the security of the facility to include: 
possessing or preparing maps or any documentation indicating an 
attempt to introduce contraband into the facility.  N 
 Possession/utilization of a cell phone or cell phone paraphernalia or 
posting to a computer site in minimum, medium and maximum security 
facilities and county jails.  N 
 Setting a fire.  N 
 Possession/introduction of any drug, synthetic drug, narcotic, intoxicant, 
chemical, to include paperwork or documentation containing 
information for the manufacture of intoxicants/drugs/illegal substances, 
drug paraphernalia, not prescribed by medical staff, or failure to take 
medication as prescribed.  N 
 Possession of staff uniforms.  N 
 Escape for any period of time from the custody of the Department of 
Corrections.  N 
 Participating in any activity that aids or abets an escape.  N 
 Any attempt to escape from the custody of the Department of 
Corrections.  N 
 Violation of City, State or Federal law. (Does not require conviction in a 





                                                 
Regarding the disciplinary process, staff member refers to any employee, student intern, volunteer, 




Appendix B: Infraction Sanctions 
Class 1  
 Discretionary Revocation of earned credits/achievement credits 0-60 days26 
 Restitution27 
 Fine of $5.00  
 Extra duty not to exceed 40 hours  
 Visitation Restriction not to exceed 90 days28 
 Telephone Restriction not to exceed 90 days 
 Canteen restrictions for up to 90 days 
 
Class 2  
 Discretionary disciplinary segregation for 1-20 days  
 Discretionary revocation of earned credits/achievement credits 1-120 days26 
 Reserved  
 Restitution27 
 Fine of $10.00  
 Extra duty not to exceed 60 hours  
 Visitation Restriction not to exceed 180 days28 
 Telephone Restriction not to exceed 180 days 
 Canteen restrictions for up to 180 days 
 
Class 3  
 Disciplinary segregation for 20-30 days  
 Revocation of earned credits/achievement credits 120-365 days26 
 Reserved  
 Restitution27 
 Visitation Restriction28 
 For Riot (when declared by the director) and Escape, 
minimum/medium/maximum security offenders will lose all earned credits; 
minimum security with community placement, will lose 365 to all earned credits  
 Canteen restrictions for up to180 days 
 
 
                                                 
26 Not to exceed amount already accrued by the offender. 
27 Restitution may be imposed when monetary loss was incurred as a result of the infraction, but will not 
exceed the actual amount of the replacement value of the item/s destroyed, damaged, or missing. 
Restitution may also be imposed for the cost of providing a service such as ambulance or doctor’s fees.  
28 For Class 3 infractions, visitation may be restricted for one hour or less, non-contact for up to 180 days. 
For Class 2 and 1 infractions, condition and duration of visitation may be restricted for up to 180 days 
and 90 days respectively. For 02-6 offense only, loss of telephone privileges (other than client/attorney) 
may be for 180 days to remainder of sentence. For Class 3, 2, 1 only allowed hygiene items to be 
purchased during canteen restriction. 
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Appendix C: Crime Designations 
Violent 
 Assault and battery with a deadly weapon 
 Assault and battery on corrections employee 
 Assault and battery on office of juvenile affairs employee 
 Accessory 
 Act of terrorism 
 Act violence/bodily harm-threats 
 Aggravated assault and battery on police officer 
 Aggravated assault and battery 
 Arson - first degree 
 Arson - fourth degree 
 Arson - second degree 
 Assault and/or battery on emergency medical technician 
 Assault and/or battery with dangerous weapon 
 Assault and/or battery with deadly weapon 
 Assault and battery 
 Assault and battery on a police officer 
 Assault with intent to kill 
 Assault with intent to commit a felony 
 Assault while masked or disguised 
 Assault with intent to kill 
 Attempt to commit crime 
 Bail jumping 
 Beating or injury of children 
 Burglary - first degree 
 Burglary - first degree 
 Burglary - second degree 
 Caretaker abuse 
 Caretaker abuse/financial exploitation 
 Carrying weapon/drugs/alcohol into jail 
 Carrying weapons 
 Child abuse 
 Child pornography 
 Child prostitution 
 Child stealing 
 Conjoint robbery 
 Convicted felon prohibited carry firearms 
 Conjoint robbery 
 Conspire/attempt/endeavor to commit drug crime 
 Conspiracy 
 Cruelty to animals 
 Discharging firearm into dwelling 
 Distribution of CDS/possession with intent 
 Distribution of CDS within 2000 feet of park/school 
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 Domestic abuse 
 DUI - liquor or drugs APCV 
 Eluding police officer 
 Endanger human life during arson 
 Escape after lawful arrest 
 Escape from confinement 
 Escape from county jail 
 Extortion 
 Failure to register as sex offender 
 False declaration of ownership in pawn shop 
 False personation 
 False pretenses or bogus check over $50 
 False pretenses or bogus check under $50 
 False pretenses; trick or deception 
 Forcible sodomy 
 Forgery - second degree 
 Grand and petit larceny 
 Grand larceny 
 Grand larceny from person at night 
 Harboring fugitive 
 Incitement to riot 
 Indecent exposure 
 Inducing minor to engage in prostitution 
 Injuring or burning public building 
 Kidnapping 
 Killing police dog or horse 
 Larceny 
 Larceny - auto aircraft or other motor vehicle 
 Larceny from the house 
 Larceny of merchandise from retailer 
 Larceny/burglary of CDS 
 Leaving scene of accident involving death 
 Leaving scene of accident involving injury 
 Lewd or indecent proposals/acts to child 
 Maiming 
 Manslaughter first degree 
 Manslaughter first degree - intoxicated driver 
 Manslaughter second degree 
 Manufacture of CDS 
 Mistreating police dog 
 Misuse of forged/counterfeit/suspended driver's license 
 Murder first degree 
 Murder second degree 
 Omitting to provide for a child 
 Perjury by subornation 
 Personal injury accident while DUI 
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 Pointing firearm 
 Pointing weapon at another 
 Possession of CDS (marijuana) AFCF 
 Possession of controlled substance 
 Possession of credit card belonging to another 
 Possession precursor with intent to manufacture 
 Possession CDS within 1000 feet school/park/child 
 Preventing witness from attending court 
 Prisoner placing body fluid on government employee 
 Procure/produce/distribute/possess juvenile pornography 
 Protective order violation 
 Rape 
 Rape - first degree 
 Rape - second degree 
 Rape by instrumentation 
 Receiving/possessing/concealing stolen property 
 Receiving/possessing/concealing stolen vehicle 
 Riot 
 Robbery first degree 
 Robbery or attempted robbery with dang weapon 
 Robbery second degree 
 Sexual battery of person over 16 
 Shooting with intent to kill 
 Stalking 
 Throw or drop object on motor vehicle 
 Trafficking in illegal drugs 
 Unauthorized use of a vehicle 
 Use of vehicle in discharge of weapon 
 Use of vehicle in discharge of weapon 
 Using offensive weapon in felony 
 Uttering forged instruments 
 Violation of SOR residency restriction 
  
85% 
 First degree murder 
 Second degree murder 
 Manslaughter in the first degree 
 Poisoning with intent to kill 
 Shooting with intent to kill, use of a vehicle to facilitate use of a firearm, crossbow 
or other weapon, assault, battery, or assault and battery with a deadly weapon or by 
other means likely to produce death or great bodily harm 
 Assault with intent to kill 
 Conjoint robbery 
 Robbery with a dangerous weapon 
 First degree robbery 
 First degree rape 
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 First degree arson 
 First degree burglary 
 Bombing 
 Any crime against a child provided for 
 Forcible sodomy 
 Child pornography or aggravated child pornography 
 Child prostitution 
 Lewd molestation of a child 
 Abuse of a vulnerable adult who is a resident of a nursing facility 
 Aggravated trafficking 
 Aggravated assault and battery upon any person defending another person from 
assault and battery 
 Human trafficking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
